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Wellington's Logistical Arrangements in the Peninsular War 1809-14 
Toby Michael Ormsby Redgrave 
After observing the paucity of published information regarding 
the organisation and duties of the Peninsular commissariat and the 
inaccuracy of some of those statements that are to be found this thesis, 
explaining first the impediments arising out of the internal organisation 
of the department itself, examines in turn the provenance of the army's 
food and forage supplies, the means adopted to pay for expenses incurred 
in the Peninsula, the limitations of the transport system and the 
functioning of all aspects of the service in support of offensive 
operations. In these studies it is argued that local resources played 
a large part in the provisioning of the army, and were particularly 
important during offensive operations: that the commissariat employed 
credit to raise money and obtain goods and services: that transport was 
also mostly locally recruited and that shortage of money was one of the 
main hindrances to the efficiency of the transport system. In 
conclusion, besides a demonstration of how the British and French systems 
of commissariat differed and how their differences affected the grand 
strategy of the war, it is shown that the British mode of supply was too 
expensive to sustain large scale operations for long, with the result 
that the campaign of 1812 could barely be supported and the campaigns of 
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CHAPTER I: Introduction. Logistics and the Demands of Strategy 
in the Peninsula. 
If any justification be needed for presenting a thesis about the 
provisioning of Wellington's army in the Peninsula, it is surely 
criticism on the grounds of the subject's familiarity rather than its 
unimportance that may be expected. "The whole future of the army in 
1809", Oman wrote, "depended on whether the Commissariat Department 
would be able to rise to the height of its duties"1 , and he later 
felt 
entitled to conclude that the successful maintenance of the Peninsular 
War "in 1810-11-12 was surely*, at bottom, the work of the much maligned 
commissaries"2. This statement of the vital nature of the commissaries' 
duties has passed unchallenged to the present day3. It may however be 
felt that a topic so important must be equally well-known and either 
comprehended in one of the three major English histories of the war or 
already the subject of a specialised stud. y. Surprisingly the histories 
are all reticent about commissariat affairs, none more so than Oman's own4, 
where the volumes concerning the events of. 1809-14 contain no index entries 
whatever under the heads of Commissariat, Commissary-General, Kennedy or 
Bisset. Fortescue's four volumes on the same period5 have five references 
to Commissariat but only one of these conveys information about the 
Peninsular system and. some of its statements are misleading. Thus the 
Commissariat Car Train is said to have "put the finishing touch to the 
organisation of the transport"6, while 1812 is "the year which may be taken 
as that in which ... 
(the transport and supply system) was finally perfected"7. 
Napier devotes little more space to commissariat matters than Fortescue, 
although making the important point that Spain was far from destitute of 
food, its transport from one place to another being the main problem for 
1. C. Oman, Wellington's Army, 1913, p 161. 
2. Ibid, p 319. 
3 Indeed a modern writer has gone further and asserted that "it is 
essential to grasp the elements of this system (of commissariat) before 
considering Wellington's tactical system". F. Myatt, The Soldier's Trade, 
1974, p 180- 
4- C. 0mal., A History of the Peninsular. War, 7 voll, Oxford, 1903-30. 
5. J. W. Fortescue, History of the British Army, 1899-1930, vols VII-X- 
6. Ibid, vol. VIII, p 344- 
7- Ibid. 
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an army8. Questions of finance receive more detailed attention than 
matters of commissariat sistem or the procuring and transporting of 
supplies in all three works but they are always treated out of their 
economic context and the problems associated with them are only partly 
explained. Altoget1er little will be found in these great histories 
about what the commissaries' duties were, in what way and how successfully 
they accomplished them and what effect their activities had upon the 
nature of the war. Subsequent general histories have been hardly more 
revealing. 
Turning to specialised studies of commissariat matters in the Peninsula 
the student will be confronted with five, one of which is a short article 
and none of which forms the major part of the work in which it is found. 
Two of these five essays are older than the rest. The chapters on the 
Peninsula in Fortescue's history of the R. A. S. C. are skimpy9, containing 
little more information than the 'History of the British Army' and strung 
together with a short synopsis of the military operations. Much superior 
is the chapter on the commissariat in Oman's 'Wellington's Army'10. Here, 
although the reader will discover that a part of the supplies consumed by 
the British army was requisitioned or otherwise obtained locally, the role 
of convoys bringing provisions from the coast to the troops is emphasised 
and British naval supremacy cited as the vital factor that enabled the 
Peninsular army to be supported. Consequent upon this view, Oman suggests 
that the American war of 1812-14 endangered the army to the extent that 
grave consequences would have followed its outbreak earlier than in 1812. 
This theory overestimates the military danger posed by the American 
privateers by ignoring the fact that few of the food imports for army use 
into Spain and Portugal were carried in British shipping11. A similar 
theme has however been approached again in more recent times by GE Watson, 
who suggests that the United States had it in their power to cripple the 
British war effort in the Peninsula, either by cutting off all supplies of 
8. W Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France 
from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814,6 vols, 1832-40. 
9. JW Fortescue, R. A. S. O. A History of Transport and Supply in the British 
Army, 2 vols, 1930. 
10. See also the references to commissariat duties on pp 161/2 and 261-7- 
11. The military dangers of the American war were probably greater in 1813 
than they would have been in 1810 since for part of the former year Wellington 
was depending so greatly upon the sea communication between Lisbon and 
Santander. 
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flour in late 1812 rather than mid-1813 or by continuing to sell flour 
and relying on the consequent specie drain to bankrupt the British 
commissariat12. Considering the large purchases of wheat made by 
British agents in South America and the Middle East during 1813, to say 
nothing of the large stocks (over five months' consumption at the end of 
1812) of flour held at Lisbon in the first place, it seems unlikely that 
the British army could have been starved out of the Peninsula by the 
withdrawal of the American flour supply from the outbreak of the 1L1, _--14 
war, although privations might have been inflicted upon the civilian 
population of Portugal by this measure. The specie drain, although 
causing worry to the British even in 1811, the year of the Non-Importation 
Act and of a huge increase in American flour exports to Portugal, patently 
had not brought about the bankruptcy of the commissariat before mid 1813, 
the time when these exports began sharply to decline, and the general 
amelioration of the British financial position in the early part of 1813 
tends to counteract the suggestion that bankruptcy might have been the 
result of the exports being further encouraged. In any case, by the summer 
of 1813 the American flour supply was no longer of great importance to the 
British peninsular army13. 
The attention of more recent writers on commissariat affairs has been 
more comparative, more concentrated upon modifying the old simplification 
that the British, relying on depots, fought the French who relied on eating 
what they found along the way. Richard Glover, in a general essay on 
commissariat affairs14, observes that to some extent 18th century armies 
had 'lived off the country', particularly in the matter of forage, and that 
the contribution of the French revolutionary armies to the commissary's art 
was not the invention of the requisition but a new ruthlessness in its 
application. His statement that "in general all armies had to live on the 
produce of the land where they were campaigning in the days before railways 
or modern methods of food preservation enabled them to live on supplies 
from afarl5", applies in part to the Peninsula if "the land where they 
12. GE Watson, 'The United States and the PeninsularWar', Historical 
Journal, December 1976. The two arguments, clearly incompatible, that are 
set out above are wielded rather like Dr Johnson's pistol. 
13. See chapter III for details and references regarding the supply of 
flour and wheat. 
14. Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation, CUP, 1963, Appendix A, p 255-66. 
15. Ibid, p 258. Glover excepts the supply through the North Spanish 
ports in 1813 from this generalisation. 
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were campaigning" is interpreted more widely 
than simply as the land 
which the troops occupied, but ignores the not inconsiderable imports 
which helped supply the British army in all the war years. These imports 
should not surprise, nor on account of them should credit be allowed to 
commissariat enterprise, since Portugal and Spain were net importers of 
wheat on a large scale even in peacetime. Although Glover mentions the 
importance of transport in utilising the resources of the general locality 
and prompt payment for supplies obtained locally, these subjects are 
treated in greater detail and with direct reference to the peninsular 
situation by S. G. P. Ward in the most informative and accurate of these 
specialised studies as far as the Peninsula is concerned. 
16 
Ward, 
pointing out that the British requisitioned some and purchased in the 
Peninsula many of the supplies consumed by their army, cites the factors 
of money and transport, along with staff shortage, as the most important 
constraints upon the commissariat system. Transport enabled supplies to 
be drawn from a wider area than that which the army physically occupied, 
and money was necessary to pay both for the transport and for the supplies 
it was to carry. This basic analysis is itself only a reiteration of 
what was observed over a century ago by a commissary who had served in a 
senior capacity in Spain and 13ortugal. "Money and Transport, " he wrote, 
"may be called the Field Commissary's right and left arm; but though 
credit or even force may imperfectly remedy the want of the one, nothing 
can replace the other". 
17 
It is not intended to quarrel with this proposition, urged by the old 
authority and the new. More remains to be said however about how it 
worked in practice. To what extent did the British make credit or force do 
the work of money, and how were their operations limited by financial 
stringencies? How far could the transport system cope with the demands 
made upon it? What alterations in the mode of supply were necessary to 
support active operations? Misleading or inaccurate answers to questions 
like these are to be found in modern works. Thus in an article by Weller1s 
16. SGP Ward, Wellington's Hea&,, uarters, 0UP, 1957. Chapter entitled 
'The Maintenance of the Army in the Peninsula', pp 66-101. 
17. RI Routh, Observations on Commissariat Field Service and Home 
Defences, London, 1852, p 21. 
18. J Weller 'Wellington's Peninsular War Logistics', Journal of the 
Society for Army Historical Research, XLII, P 197. 
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it is stated that local purchases were fair, honest and proper but not 
how soon and in what medium they were paid. In any case it is presumed, 
as it is by Oman, that most of the provisions used were brought from 
overseas. Weller also vaguely asserts that a transport breakthrough was 
brought about in 1812 by the opening of the Tagus and Douro rivers as far 
as Spain, making "transportation. .. easy in the central area. 
" Ward 
too, although accurate regarding the system by which the transport was 
conducted between 1810-12 is evidently not familiar with its approximate 
capacity, for he, like Weller, makes it perform the feat of drawing supply 
depots forward into Spain to support the campaign of 1812.19 Thus one 
aim of this thesis will be to correct such misconceptions of detail. 
It is also intended to resolve the contradiction between the Oman and 
Weller opinion, that most supplies came from the coast, and the Ward and 
Glover opinion, that purchases in the general locality were predominant. 
The point is not merely academic since the ways in which the supply of 
money and the efficiency of the transport could affect the strategical 
possibilities depend upon the answer. If Wellington's army relied mainly 
on supplies brought by sea then the capacity of the transport service 
dictated the distance from the coast at which it could operate and the 
speed at which supplies could be moved controlled the rate at which the 
troops could be marched away from their coastal depots. Alternatively 
if the army relied mainly on drawing provisions from the general area of 
operations it could manoeuvre with less transport but would need more 
money, and its operations would be limited by different considerations, 
the season for example, or the need to protect its supply areas. 
Accordingly chapter III (and in part chapter VI) is devoted to examining 
the provenance of the British army's supplies, each major ration commodity 
receiving separate treatment in the attempt to show that local resources 
played a large, though by no means exclusive, part in the provisioning of 
the army, and were especially important during offensive operations. 
Chapter IV will demonstrate that the Peninsular commissariat lived on 
credit, by means of which they both raised money and bought goods and 
services, and, aided by chapters VI and VII, that the increasing expense 
19. "When at Burgos in1812 the Army had scarcely been able to be supported 
by the tenuous line from Portugal. " Ward, op. cit, p 97. See also his 
extensibility of depots theory on p 83. 
% -9- 
of the war grew nearly too great for that credit in 1812 and called 
thereafter for retrenchment which affected operations. Chapter V will 
explain the transport system and the changes that took place in it and 
will show how shortage of money was one of the main factors limiting its 
efficiency. Chapter VI will relate all these aspects of the service to 
the conduct of Wellington's offensive operations, concentrating on those 
of 1812-14. The whole argument is prefaced by chapter II which deals 
with the internal organisation of the Peninsular commissariat department, 
partly as a help in understanding the references to ranks and duties which 
will be made in succeeding chapters and partly to illustrate the basic 
difficulties, like shortage of officers, their lack of training and the 
cumbersome accounting system, which hampered commissariat business and 
which should be seen as the continuing background to the picture presented 
in the chapters that follow. In these chapters an attempt has been made 
not to depend simply on qualitative evidence. Rather than say, for 
example, that Wellington's army at a certain period was supplied partly by 
requisition, with instances, partly by contract, with instances, partly by 
imports, with more instances, it has been attempted to enliven the use of 
instances with rough calculations of the relative importance of the various 
categories distinguished. Thus if supply by regisition were proffered as 
a revolutionary new aspect of Wellington's affairs, it would be a more 
important novelty if such supply could be shown to account for, say, 25% 
of the army's provisions than if it only occurred 1% of the time. An 
effort will be made to provide such percentages where at all possible, not 
in any meticulous interest - for the best of the results will only be 
approximations embodying several assumptions into data initially less 
complete than might be wished - but for the purpose of enabling the reader 
to assess the importance of the statement made or qualification offered. 
Though this is not intended to be a comparative study a certain measure 
of comparison with the French methods of supply is inevitable and it may 
be helpful here to indicate the way the French administered the gathering 
of provisions. General Clausel's orders regarding the support of the 
Army of the North in the year 181314 may be seen in the British Museum20. 
20. B. M. Eg Mss 388. This order of course never took effect, being 
overtaken by events. 
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They took the form of a contribution of ten million dollars paid in 
monthly instalments and divided among the provinces in the army's charge 
according to an estimate of their relative wealth. It was preferred that 
the contribution be paid in cash but up to half could be offered in kind, 
a list of acceptable commodities and fixed prices being included in the 
order. A rough calculation suggests thatthis sum would be nearly enough 
to feed Clausel's force for a year but would not meet any transport costs 
nor provide anything towards the army's pay. The difference, if any, 
between supplies realised by contribution and supplies consumed would need 
to be met by unplanned requisitions but the gap was closed a little further 
by the existence of a dormant contribution requiring towns when called 
upon to give support to flying columns. The allocation of liability and 
the collection of the money was left to the native administration but 
enforcement of the order was in the army's hands and would take place in 
the event of the levy not being met within five days of the end of any 
month. If fairly administered and efficiently executed it cannot be 
supposed that this decree laid any excessive burden upon the locality, 
since it was in lieu of the royal taxes that would have been levied before 
the French arrived and since it only represented the bare subsistence of 
Clausel's troops, whose numbers only increased the population of the 
occupied provinces by about 2. 
The burdensome side of the French occupation was the fact that not all 
their requisitions could be planned in advance and distributed fairly. 
Any region through which troops were marching or which would only be 
temporarily occupied, or any area in which a large field force had been 
concentrated, might be drained utterly of resources whose collection would 
probably not be systematised in the least. Thus when MassLna's army 
occupied the Rio Maior position the collection of provisions appears to 
have been entirely the units' duty, supervised in a general sense at army 
corps level, with the Intendant-General a mere spectator, lacking alike 
transport and military authority21. A great deal of the French military 
effort in the first three years of the war went into subduing new areas 
21. JB Koch, Mgmoires de Massena Paris 1848-50, vol VII pp 239 and 
276. JJ Pelet, The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-11, ed. and transl. 
Horward, Minneapolis, 1973, p 255. 
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and campaigning against the allied field armies in territory which was 
not in a state of organisation to admit of requisitions in the orderly 
manner of the example cited, and so where the French (like their Spanish 
opponents) had no recourse but to more or less outright pillaging22. 
While Napoleon's armies thus depended greatly upon the resources of the 
area they occupied, whether realised in an orderly or an irregular manner, 
it should not be forgotten that, imports of food being an inescapable 
economic necessity in Peninsula life at war or in peace, overseas resources 
went to feed the French armies as well as other occupants of Spain. "The 
connexion (sic) of the Jew Baccri with the French, " wrote the British pro- 
consul at Algiers, "is publicly known at Alicant; and also that vessels 
under Moorish colours continually carry provisions to the enemy. " 
23 
This 
passage was written respecting an incident where H. M. Brig 'Philomel' had 
captured an Algerine vessel upon suspicion, later confirmed, that she was 
carrying corn to Barcelona, but Baccri himself had been involved in a 
suspicious affair the previous spring when another of his cargoes, bound 
for Lisbon, had been captured by a French privateer and carried into Malaga. 
The British were convinced the capture had been arranged but were never able 
to prove the point; the historian is in a position to observe what seems 
to have escaped notice at the time, that shortly after the incident Baccri 
was in a position to offer a large lump sum to the British commissariat in 
Portugal, to be paid for in Bills on the Treasury. The French forces in 
Catalonia and Aragon at least must have benefited from such traffic in 
supplies. 
The necessity for a comparison between the British and French commissariat 
methods arises when the influence of commissariat matters upon strategy and 
the course of events is considered. If the neat distinction between an 
army which lived off resources brought from afar and another which used 
those found locally, be rejected, is it still true to say that the British 
system conveyed more advantages than the French and if so, in what did the 
advantage consist? This question is considered in chapter VII. The more 
22. "En Espagne... les habitants .. 
etaient 
.. tous en insurrection, 
fuyant 
ä notre approche, il etait Bien difficile de vivre autrement que de maraude", 
"Aucune requisition reguliere nett ete praticable". Jomini, Guerre d'Espagne, 
ed. F Lecomte, p 31. 
23. B. M. Add Mss 41512 McDonnel to Athy 24th February 1813. 
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general question however of how far British operations were affected by the 
nature of the supply system receives consideration at various points in the 
course of the study. The influences will be found at the higher levels 
of strategy, since under immediate necessity Wellington invariably reacted 
first on military grounds and expected the commissariat to make do as best 
it could-. Sometimes the required support could not be provided, as for 
example in the pursuit of Massena from the Rio Maior when military consider- 
ations obviously counselled a prompt advance which ten days later was 
forced to halt for lack of supplies. On the other hand Beresford's attempt 
to relieve Bad. ajoz, also undertaken on purely military logic, although 
thwarted by the early fall of the place, proved by dint of much exertion 
and improvisation on the commissariat side possible to support. Many 
smaller movements too were made during the war when it must have been 
obvious that their supply would be uncertain, simply on grounds of 
strategical desirability. The posting of Craufurd's brigade forward in 
spring 1810 and the movement of Le Marchant's cavalry to cover the siege 
of Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 are clear examples. To a certain extent even 
premeditated operations were undertaken with an optimistic rather than 
precise calculation of commissariat factors, as will be seen in chapter VI 
24. 
At the local strategical or grand tactical levels the major contribution 
of supply matters to events arose from the fact that French soldiers were 
encouraged to keep on their persons as much food as they could carry while 
Wellington would never permit more than three days' rations (not alcohol) 
to be issued at a time, since the men would eat or sell their surplus 
supplies25. The fact that supplies at the front in excess of the three 
day limit had to be held on mules, or even in a store if the mules' services 
were needed elsewhere, detracted from the mobility of the British army. 
Manoeuvres like Massena's outflanking of the Bussaco position, Marmont's 
marches near the Douro before Salamanca and Soult's turning of Wellington's 
troops at San Christobal were far less of a risk under the French system 
than they would have been if executed by the allied army. 
24. The general proposition of M Van Creveld, Supplying War, CUP, 1977, 
that, in the days when food was the major constituent of the supply needed 
by an army, the gaps in planning could usually be filled somehow on the spot, 
operated to a far greater extent in the Peninsula than has sometimes been 
supposed. 
25. This circumstance was a matter of army organisation and discipline 
rather than any commissariat dogma or principle. 
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When the operations of the enemy were not causing alarms or counter 
measures on the allied side and when no offensive attempt necessitated 
close attention to the positioning of the troops, circumstances which 
prevailed at least in parts of the army quite often between 1809 and 
spring 1813, the cantonments of the units were usually selected with a 
view to making their supply as easy and inexpensive as possible. Thus 
the cavalry and artillery not needed at the outposts habitually lived to 
the rear of the infantry, near Tomar in 1809 and down the Mondego valley 
when the army was in the north, for greater ease of foraging the horses. 
The divisions too generally found quarters offering good access to the river 
depots on the Mondego or the Douro, as can plainly be seen from the dis- 
positions of the army in, say, May 1812 or the winter of 181213. Such 
dispositions however hardly come under the head of strategy, and in the 
consideration given later to the influences of supply in strategical outcomes 
and decisions most attention will be given to commissariat planning in 
relation to grand strategical issues. Even here it will be seen that the 
commissariat arrangements proved themselves partly flexible and were not 
absolute dictators of events. 
Although this thesis is concerned exclusively with the role in the supply 
of provisions played by the Peninsular commissariat, inasmuch as the 
Peninsular Commissary-General was the direct subordinate of the Commissary 
in Chief in London the authority of this latter and his place in the home 
administrative machine must be demonstrated to explain some of the events 
to which reference will later be made. Whereas in the American war of 
thirty years previously the force in the colonies had been supplied for 
the greater part of the hostilities by contractors to the Treasury Board26, 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars saw the progress of the commissariat 
as a Treasury sub-department towards complete control over the supply of 
stores and items of forage or provisions to the army. The appointment of 
Commissary-General27 in 1793 carried with it little authority and few 
duties. All contracts for provisions were still made by the Treasury and 
the mechanics of supply to the troops overseas were shared between the 
Commissioners of Victualling and the Commissioners of Transports. All 
26. N Baker, Government and Contractors, 1971. 
27. The head of the commissariat department was styled Commissary-General 
until autumn 1809, Commissary in Chief thereafter. 
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supplies to troops at home in barracks were the resy>onsibility of the 
Barraclunaster-General, In 1797 the country was divided for defence pur, joses 
into forty three districts and the experiment was made of J. ocalising the 
supply of provisions in order to reduce the waste and expense of 
maintaining large stocks in magazii-es. Each district was given a 
'Central Commissary' empowered to make local contracts for all supplies 
except bread and by the following year the authority of the Commissary- 
General was extended over all the districts. The head of the commissariat 
had no authority abroad until the appointment of Colonel Gordon as the 
first Commissary in Chief in 1809 when his responsibility was widened to 
include all overseas stations excepting Ireland and the East Indies, but 
a great many other extensions of his power had taken place in the interim, 
He now made all contracts for bread, oats and forage28, straw, fuel and 
candles both on a regular basis to troops in barracks and casually to 
detachments on the march or in camp. He was also the supplier of barrack 
equipment, subject to its meeting the standards of the inspector of Barrack 
Stores, while to the troops-broad he was the provider of all the various 
articles nowadays collectively referred to as Quartermaster General's 
stores, although these items were designed, inspected and housed by the 
activities of the Sto. r_ekeeper-General. The only important area of army 
supply in which the Commissary in Cbief had no part whatever was the 
production and provision of Ordnance stores, which came under the exclusive 
control of the Ordnance department whose Master General was responsible 
directly to Parliament29. 
The Commissary in Chief was the head of the commissariat at home and 
abroad with the qualifications already mentioned, but he was himself a 
Treasury subordinate and his activities were always kept under serious 
scrutiny. All correspondence from the heads of the department abroad 
went from the Commissariat office to the Treasury who generally passed 
back comments or instructions regarding the situation which the 
Commissary in Chief then used as the basis of his reply. All despatch 
of provisions or money, all administrative details, all disciplinary 
measures, promotions or increases in establishment required the Treasury's 
28. Meat contracts remained generally on a local basis. 
29. See the 18th Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry (1812) for 
the progress of the commissariat 1793-1809. 
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sanction. While J. C. Herries was Commissary in Chief3° the close super- 
vision over commissariat affairs exercised by the Treasury might be more 
reasonably termed co-operation, since Herries, himself a protegee of Spencer 
Perceval, had been a Treasury clerk earlier in his career and was on good 
terms with Vansittart and Charles Arbuthnot. Certainly his opinion was 
often consulted, both over financial questions like the certificates and 
'half and half' schemes (see chapter IV) and over a matter like Maberly's 
proposal for water-proofing greatcoats where it might have been expected 
that the Storekeeper-General rather than the Commissary in Chief would have 
been involved. 
31 
Nonetheless, at least as regards the service abroad, the 
Commissary in Chief was more an executive agent of the Treasury than an 
official who took major decisions on his own authority. His executive 
functions required that he act in close co-operation with other departments, 
notably that of the Storekeeper-General who laid down patterns, inspected 
and stored (in England) the stores that the commissariat bought, despatched 
and stored abroad32. This thesis is concerned however only with provisions 
which fell entirely outside the Storekeeper-General's responsibility, and 
regarding which the Commissary in Chief had to co-ordinate arrangements with 
two sub-departments of the Navy Board, the Commissioners of Victualling 
(chiefly for supplies of rum and salt meat) and the Transport Board who 
organised the shipping to carry the supplies overseas. Other provisions 
the Commissary in Chief normally obtained directly from private contractors. 
Thus while the Peninsular Commissary-General was responsible directly to 
the Commissary in Chief, reported to him and looked to him for orders, the 
real power of decision lay with the Lords of the Treasury, a fact it is easy 
to forget when looking from the Peninsula viewpoint, since the Commissary- 
General neither wrote to nor received letters from the Treasury directly. 
It is with the activities of the Peninsular commissariat that we shall 
henceforward be concerned. 
30. Herries took over from Colonel Gordon on the 1st October 1811. 
31. 'Waterproofing Soldiers' Great Coats', Journal of the Society for Army 
Historical Research, XII, p 8, P. R. O. W. O. 57/4 Harrison to Herries, 
13th December 1811 and 2nd January 1812. 
32. In 1812 an office under the Storekeeper-General's control was set up 
at Cadiz and later another at Corunna. P. R. O. W. O. 58/132, Herries to 
O'Meara, 8th Play 1812 and Herries to Bisset, 9th July 1812. 
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CHAPTER II : The Internal Organisation of the Peninsular Commissariat 
Department. 
The four grades of commissariat officer serving in the Peninsula in 
1809 were, in descending order of seniority, Commissary-General, Deputy 
Commissary-General, Assistant Commissary-General and Commissariat Clerk1. 
In 1810 there was instituted the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissary- 
General (D. A. C. G. ) senior to the clerks but below the Assistants, which 
addition to the hierarchy was necessitated largely by the increasing 
number of posts carrying individual responsibility that the enlarged size 
and greater dispersion of the army after 1809 created. Subordinate to 
these officers were various non-commissioned employees endowed with more 
or less responsibility according to the nature of their duties but with 
no single chain of command linking them all together. Thus a conductor 
of stores was superior to his bullock drivers, muleteers or herdsmen and 
a storekeeper was in command of the issuers and labourers who worked in 
his store but neither derived from his station any authority over the 
other. Further, since the size of convoys and depots alike varied widely, 
the mere grade of conductor or storekeeper is an inaccurate indicator of 
a man's importance. Any attempt to produce a correspondence between 
military and commissariat ranks breaks down below the commissioned level2 
where the categories into which the commissariat divided its employees were 
principally descriptive of the duty they performed rather than tokens of 
the authority they wielded. Perhaps the most sensible order in which to 
present these subordinate categories is in groups by diminishing rate of 
pay3. The best paid, earning between four and five shillings a day 
(650 to 800 reis Portuguese) were the conductors, storekeepers, interpreters 
and the holders of certain semi-clerical jobs. In the middle pay bracket 
(about 400 reis per day) were the coopers, receivers and issuers, master 
bakers and other skilled artisans together with the 'capatazes' or headmen 
1. These styles were frequently abbreviated to C. G. D. C. G. A. C. G. and 
C. C. respectively. A clerk might also be rendered as C. D. (Commissariat 
Department). 
2. As we shall see, there is hardly a practical correspondence of 
commissioned ranks either. 
3. A variety of paylists can be found in P. R. O. W. O. 61/108. 
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of the various categories found in the lowest pay group 
(about 150 to 250 
reis per day) which comprised the muleteers, bullock drivers, carmen, 
herdsmen, unskilled labourers and assistants to the bakers, carpenters 
and so on in the middle group. 
While the duties executed by these junior categories of employee are 
mostly self explanatory this is not true in the case of the officers who 
between them carried out a great variety of tasks, which can be reduced 
to five main types, field posts, depot posts, administrative or coordinating 
posts, special temporary assignments and supervision of accounts. Field 
commissaries were attached directly to military formations. Each brigade 
of infantry and each regiment of cavalry had its own commissariat officer 
(known generally as a brigade commissary) and as the infantry divisions and 
cavalry brigades became regular formations during 1809/10 a senior officer 
was appointed to supervise the supply of the larger unit. The case of 
the artillery was more complicated as the ordnance had its own supply 
organisation, the Field Train, but seemingly not enough officers to go 
round, as commissaries are frequently found attached to artillery brigades4 
and sometimes too the artillery units were supplied by the commissaries of 
the nearest division. The brigade commissaries' duties were preparing and 
issuing the rations for the men and horses of their units, maintaining in 
a local depot whatever reserve stocks they were ordered to hold, organising 
the journeys of the unit's transport to collect provisions from whichever 
depot was allotted to them and ensuring by local purchase, contract or 
requisition that the supply did not fall short. When in addition to these 
duties it is considered that they were also required to keep meticulous 
accounts in duplicate or triplicate, it may be seen that a great deal of 
work was involved even when the unit was stationary. When it began to 
move, especially if the march took it further from its depots, the task 
became nightmarish. D. A. Q. G. Head, commissary to the 3rd division during 
the advance to the Pyrenees in 1813, recalled his day commencing at three 
o'clock in the morning when he called on General Picton to learn the march 
4. For example, Mr Head to Robe's brigade in spring 1810, or Mr Allsup to the Horse Artillery from 1811 to the end of the war. 
5. This seemingly simple, if time consuming, task frequently included making 
arrant, emen s for the grinding of flcur, the baking of bread and the 
butchering of cattle. 
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orders, the morning being devoted to paying or registering claims by local 
inhabitants and scouring the countryside on either side of the line of 
march for provisions, the afternoon to milling and baking bread and the 
evening to issues to the division, sometimes extended over as much as 
five miles. He claimed often not to have retired before midnight: 
Originally, by the General Order of the 4th May 1809, it had been intended 
to use Assistants as brigade commissaries but shortage of officers of that 
rank soon made this practice impossible to maintain6 and for most of the 
war the field commissaries were officers from any of the three lowest 
commissioned grades, with Deputy Assistants predominant. Only the 2nd 
division, unusually large and frequently operating independently of the 
main army, was considered a Deputy's appointment as appears by the fact 
that three successive Assistants holding the post between 1810 and 1812 
were styled Acting Deputy and were promoted during or soon after doing 
the duty7. Before the institution of the rank of Deputy Assistant the 
senior commissariat officer attached to a division had been styled Acting 
Assistant but this practice lapsed thereafter and it became commonplace to 
find Deputy Assistants in charge of divisions8, while clerks frequently 
did the duty of the cavalry and the infantry brigades. 
By contrast depot commissaries held static posts. They were responsible 
not only for storing the provisions (and sometimes the field equipment and 
other stores) entrusted to them and for keeping accounts of all issues and 
receipts but also for levying, administering and paying the transport 
needed to fetch the provisions and to pass them from depot to depot when 
required. Besides these duties they had to supply detachments passing 
through and also any garrison or hospital in the town. It was also not 
uncommon for depot officers to enter into contracts at least sufficiently 
to meet the normal daily consumption. Head describes his duties as a 
subordinate clerk at Coimbra towards the end of 1809 as "drawing checks for 
returns of provisions and forage on the storekeeper in charge of the stores, 
6. Even in the Oporto campaign not all units were served by Assistants. 
7. The three Acting Deputies were Aylmer, Ogilvie and Routh. Ogilvie 
when a Deputy was senior commissariat officer to the 6th division for a 
short time in 1812 but this was only an interim appointment until he could 
be found a task more appropriate to his rank. All the information respecting 
promotions in this chapter is taken from the relevant Army List 1812-15. 
A. For example, of Ogilvie's four divisional 1 ads in 1314 three, Cuming, 
Dobree and Head, were Deputy Assistants and only one, Tupper Ca? Iey, was an 
Assistant. 
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upon documents, whereon it was my duty to see that the specified number 
of officers, rank and file, were correctly vouched by the commanding 
officer of the regiment or detachment; that the quantities of provisions 
drawn were correctly estimated and that the receipt was signed by the 
person duly authorised. These vouchers, in those days furnished. in 
triplicate, were then entered in an abstract... "9 Keeping accounts 
evidently loomed large for the depot commissary, probably to an even 
greater extent than for his colleague in the field although his working 
conditions, being static, were more suitable for the paperwork invccred. 
He was not entirely spared the pressure of active operations however, 
although he avoided the field commissary's greatest difficulty on campaign, 
buying or requisitioning food, since the movement of the army increased 
the demand for requisitioned transport. Despite the difference in the 
qualities required for field and depot work, the one demanding a man 
physically energetic and prompt in practical matters, the other best 
served by patience, tactful handling of the local authorities and 
administrative ability, there is no evidence that any specialisation 
among commissariat officers took place, their careers appearing to present 
a more or less Haphazard sequence of field and depot postings10. Thus 
the same men and the same ranks found. serving with the army are also found 
at the depots, with the slight difference that the largest depots were 
sometimes a Deputy's command 
11. 
The assortment of junior racks found 
among the depots is well illustrated by looking at the men commanding the 
important depots of north Portugal during the summer and autumn of 1812. 
Two were Assistants, Mackenzie at Oporto and St. Remy at Lamego, two, Head 
at Celorico and Kensington at Ciudad Rodrigo, were Deputy Assistants, 
9. G Head, Memoirs of an Assistant Commissary-General, 1968, p 222. 
10. Consider for example the careers of Messrs Carey and Head as typical of 
many who served from 1809 to 1814. Both served in the Coimbra depot in 1809. 
Thereafter Carey spent most of his time until July 1811 in various depots 
though attached for short periods to Erskine's hrigade and Vaux's accounts 
office, and then served out the war in the field, first with Le Ma rchant's 
brigade and then the 4th division. Head spent 1810 attached to Robe's 
artillery brigade, moved in 1811 to the depot at Alter do Chao and then 
Celorico, where he remained until Nay 1813 when he received his fin:. l wartime 
posting, to the 3rd division. Ibid. and. N. LS. Acc 4370 No 17916 f-57- 
11. The important advanced depot at Salamanca in 1812 was commanded by D. C. G. 
Ogilvie and some more permanent depots were of equal status. For example 
Coimbra in the same p=riod was run by D. C. G. Drake and Cadiz by D. C. G. O'Meara. 
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Lavers at Pesqueira was a temporary officer with the acting rank of 
Assistant12, while Messrs Flanner and Buckham at Almeida were both clerks. 
The overall co-ordination of measures as well as the administration of 
particular branches of the service was generally the province of the 
Deputies. The most senior of them, Dalrymple13, spent most of the war at 
headquarters as an active second in command, sending out orders on a. 
variety of subjects and often making emergency arrangements, such as those 
for the evacuation of the sick back into Portugal during both the re-alignment 
of late 1809 and the retreat of 1812. During Bisset's illness in September 
1812 and Kennedy's absence from the army in early 1814 Dalrymple acted as 
head of the department with perfect success, and in general his duties were 
those of an assistant to the Commissary-General rather than related to any 
single branch of service. His direct subordinates in the field were the 
Deputies appointed to supervise independent bodies of men larger than 
divisions14. These appointments were as temporary as the formations to 
which they were attached such as the force sent into Estremadura with 
Beresford in 1811, the troops left at Madrid in 1812 or the three 'columns' 
in the Pyrenees and south of France, and it cannot be said that any 
permanent chain of command existed in the field whereby the Commissary- 
Ceneral's orders descended through Deputies to the divisional commissaries. 
Such only appeared under exceptional circumstances like those mentioned 
above when distance or difficulties of terrain made it impossible for a 
personal direction over the divisions to be exercised from headquarters. 
Moving from the field to the depots there is again no evidence of any 
permanent posts intermediate between the Commissary-General and the 
individual depot commissaries although some control over the stations in 
their vicinity was exercised by the most senior of the depot officers, the 
Deputies who commanded at the great base depots of Lisbon, Ftgaeira, Coimbra 
and Oporto15. Direct authority over the inland depots was retained by the 
12. Temporary acting Assistants were not necessarily senior to Deputy 
Assistants. The seniority seems to have depended on their posting. Thus 
McNTau fiten as commissary to the 3rd division in 1812 was deemed by Bisset 
senior to Streephan, posted as commissary to one of the brigades, although he 
was only a Deputy Assistant while Streephan was an acting Assistant. P. R. O. 
W. O. 57/41- Various letters of early 1812. 
13. He was promoted Commissary-General on the 29th January 1812. 
14. The 2nd division was exceptional in being, as we have seen, a Deputy's 
command and a permanent formation. 
15" John Mackenzie at Oporto was an Assistant acting as a Deputy. The reason 
he was not promoted was that he lacked the requisite length of service. When 
the army moved its base to the north coast of Spain, naturally the relative 
importance of the depots altered and Deputies were employed at Santander and 
St. Jean de Luz. P. R. O. W. C. 57/42 Kennedy to Herries, 18th August 1813. 
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Commissary-General except in the south where he exercised control at least 
over the forward depots through the Deputy attached to the force in 
Estremadura. 
Thus the Deputies only partly acted as a layer of the hierarchy 
separating the Commissary-General from direct contact with the lower ranks. 
Some of their time was also spent carrying out particular assignments 
apart from the day to day running of commissariat affairs. Ogilvie's 
peninsular career although, like Mackenzie, he could not be promoted 
Deputy until 1812, he served in that capacity from 1809 onwards) well 
illustrates this as, interspersed with more regular jobs he also bought 
barley in south Spain at the end of 1809, set up and inspected depots on 
the Mondego at the end of 1812, was in charge of cattle buying rear Braganza 
in early 1813 and paid the army's debts in the rear of its advance to the 
Pyrenees later in the year, these various activities occupying nine of his 
fifty two months' active service in the period covered by this study. 
D. C. G. Boyes too, before going on leave in the summer of 1812, had himself 
been responsible for obtaining a cattle supply from the region north of his 
station at Lamego, and when he did return home did so under orders to 
procure "machines for weighing live cattle"16. Transport was another 
branch of the service that occasionally threw up senior administrative 
tasks, and thus we find D. C. G. Thomson responsible for organising the 
forwarding of supplies to Beresford in the Albuera campaign, or D. C. G. 
Aylmer in charge of a quantity of apparently spare carts in the advance of 
1813. Naturally not all special assignments were handled by Deputies - 
one need cite only A. C. G. Purcell's mission to the Azores or Mr Lefevre's 
provision buying duties in late 181017 - but it does seem that, with the 
exception of the permanent posts already mentioned, the exact nature of a 
Deputy's responsibility depended on the immediate needs of the service, 
that they were given the most immediately important duties and that as 
changing circumstances altered the priorities so they could expect re- 
appointment to the posts of new importance. Thus the hierarchy of ranks 
at the disposal of the Commissary-General was not arranged as a pyramid but 
as a succession of cooperative duties. 
16. P. R. O. W. O. 5R/134. Herries to Kennedy, 19th August 1812. 
17. See chapter III for these occasions. 
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Before ccnsidering further some features of the internal organisation 
of the department which contributed to bringing about this state of affairs, 
there remains to be noticed one more aspect of commissariat service which, 
although in its detail no longer of more than an antiquarian interest, is 
nonetheless, because of its universal application and time consuming 
character, of central importance in any assessment of the department's 
performance in the war. Every commissary having public stores or money 
entrusted to him was required to submit accounts showing precisely to what 
use they had been put and in addition to accompany his accounts with the 
necessary vouchers to prove the truth of the information. Thus when 
supplies were bought locally not only had the receipts to be presented 
showing the precise nature of the transaction but the prise paid for the 
articles had to be certified as fair by two magistrates of the locality, 
in a separate document18. The execution of the Treasury's instnvctions 
respecting accounting was guaranteed by the practice of holding the 
commissary personally responsible for whatever he failed to account for 
unless he could show sufficient reason for his exoneration. Thus the 
important features of the accounting system as far as the functioning of 
the department in the field was concerned were firstly that the commissary 
was personally interested in the completeness of his accounts and secondly 
that, in days before carbon paper or the calculator, the accounts took a 
great deal of time to compile. The accompanying figure lists all the 
separate returns and accounts field and depot commissaries had to make up 
and present: when it is remembered that most of them represented an 
agglomeration of small events, each with its own set of vouching documents 
and often requiring also the conversion of foreign currency, weights and 
measures into English equivalents, it will be seen how many hours work this 
purely administrative task represented for the officers of the department 
19. 
In practice the bulk of the accounts were always greatly in arrear as it 
was often as much as the officers could do to keep abreast of the daily 
statements required of them and which were sent to the Commissary-General 
purely for his information. 
18. This stringent requirement had often to be relaxed in practice. The 
word 'magistrate' could be construed to refer to any respectable inhabitant, 
and in view of the language difficulty it is probable that many of the 
signatories had no good idea what they were signing. Many accounts had 
finally to be accepted though lacking complete vouchers, and no doubt many 
also whose vouchers were no true proof of the transactions they accompanied. 
P. R. O. 58/132. Herries to Dickens, 20th January 1812. 
19. The loss of man-hours was even greater when it is considered that the 
accounts had to be delivered, at Lisbon or headquarters, by a commissariat 
employee, and were not to be entrusted to the post. N. A. M. A=6807-22. 
Department Orders para 12. 
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RETURNS & ACCOUNTS TO BE SUBMITTED BY COMMISSARIAT ACCOUNTANTS (Early 1813) 
Dam 
Daily state of provisions 
& forage 
(Field Commissaries) 




Complete cash and store accounts 
with vouchers. 
Entry and Issue books (kept by 
store-keepers) 
(Depot Commissaries) 
Abstract of issues to Portuguese 
personnel with vouchers. 
Abstract of issues to Spanish 
personnel. 
Abstract of extra rations issued 
to General Officers. 
Weekly 
Weekly return of provisions & forage. 
(Field Commissaries) 
Detailed return of issues. 
(Depot Commissaries) 
Return of field and camp equipment. 
(Depot Commissaries) 
Return of men and animals drawn for 
by staff officers. 
List of drafts made upon the Deputy 
Paymaster-General. 
Report of work performed by hired mules. 
Occasional 
Return of meat supplied from each 
'lot' as consumed. 
Rations issued to mules to be entered 
in the capataz's register whenever 
such issue takes place. 
Abstract of short issues to men 
and horses. 
(Field Commissaries) 
Detailed receipts, issues and 
remains of field & camp equipment 
with vouchers. 
Return of all clothing issues for 
which the regiments are chargeable. 
Send department pay estimates 
to Lisbon. 
Report to Lisbon any accounts 
still overdue, with explanation. 
Return all arrivals of boats. 
Short delivery of rations by mule 
brigades to be marked upon their 
certificate of last payment. 
Copies of abstracts of bat & forage 
money and staff pay to be transmitted 
'regularly'. 
Twice weekly return of money held by 
Deputy Paymaster-General. 
(Senior officers at depots) 
Schedule of bills drawn for the 
payment of transport, whenever 
directed. 
Account of cars hired on regiments' 
behalf whenever such hiring takes 
place. 
Twice monthly return of hired boats. 
_24_ 
The accounts of the individual commissaries were submitted first to the 
Commissary-General's office, for most of the war under the charge of D. C. G. 
Vaux, where they were compiled into a grand account between the Commissary- 
General and the Treasury, and passed thence to the officers of the accounts 
branch of the commissariat for examination. The processes of compilation 
and examination, with every error or omission having to be referred back 
to an already overburdened commissary on active service for explanation, 
were lengthy. For example, Kennedy's cash and store accounts for 1810 
were only submitted to D. C. G. Dickens, in charge of the accounts department, 
in the early part of 1813, and even despite this delay it is probable that 
Dickens' men were not able to grant them immediate attention since in the 
previous September they had been engaged in scrutinising the accounts of 
Purveyors and Paymasters-General and had only got as far as the year 181020. 
The delay was partly the result of understaffing, Mr Vaux's office in 
particular having been almost denuded of clerks by Bisset during 1812 to 
meet the demands of the field army, but arose mainly from the complexity 
of the regulations and the laborious nature of the accounting methods 
employed. Even double entry book-keeping seems to have been an art 
unpractised in the Peninsula21. The inefficiency of the system is evident 
in that it required four separate stages to encompass only two processes, 
namely the compiling and checking of the accounts. Kennedy proffered a 
helpful suggestion in March 1813. After noticing that his Egyptian accounts 
of 1802 were still not passed by the Comptrollers, he proposed that each 
sub-accountant should be responsible to the Treasury directly for money and 
stores held by him, rather than, as previously, coming under the overall 
responsibility of the Commissary-General. This attempt to transfer the 
burden from the field to London met with no response and Kennedy's frustration 
at the impeding of the service as well as concern at the magnitude of his 
personal responsibility showed themselves plainly in his later representation 
on the subject. "I trust" he wrote, "that my suggestions will .. receive 
a cool and impartial consideration before they are finally rejected22". 
We shall later be considering the divided loyalty that his circumstances 
20. The ultimate settlement of these accounts was of course in the hands of 
the Treasury, via its subordinate boards, the Comptrollers of Army Accounts 
(for stores accounts) and the Auditors of Public Accounts (for cash accounts), 
and took a very long time indeed. Commissary-General Murray who handed over 
the Peninsular command in June 1810 did not receive his final clearance 
until 6th March 1826: P. R. O. A. 01 569/459. 
21. "No books by double-entry were kept in the Peninsula, but to the want of 
this check may be ascribed much of the confusion of Account which was manifest 
on that service". Routh, op. cit. p 62. 
22. P. R. O. W. O. 57/42. Kennedy to Herries, 5th December 1813. 
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imposed upon a commissary. Certainly the question of accounting tended 
to widen the gap always apparent between the men in the field and their 
superiors at home, the former necessarily assigning the highest priority 
to their executive duties, the latter to retaining a real control over 
expenditure. 
The accounts branch of the commissariat, like the stores branch, was 
subordinate to the Commissary in Chief and both sections were organised in 
the same way as regarded ranks, discipline and promotion. In the attempt 
to reduce the evils of patronage and guarantee the competence of officers 
holding more senior ranks, Colonel Gordon had instituted a system of 
promotion whereby a certain minimum time must be spent in possession of 
each rank before the holder became eligible for the next one. Thus a 
clerk must have served for at least a year before becoming a Deputy Assistant 
and thereafter four years (or one year if he had been four years a clerk) 
before promotion to Assistant. Similarly the Assistants had to wait five 
years (or two years on top of a total of eight years from entry) before it 
was possible for them to rise to Deputy, in which rank a minimum of three 
years had to be passed. While this procedure may have had some effect in 
enabling the Commissary in Chief to resist pressure from patrons23, it did 
not guarantee the superior talents of high ranking officers for the reason 
that a year's experience in the field was more valuable than five years in 
England when it came to carrying out the Peninsula service. Yet the 
promotion system made no allowance for experience, only for length of 
service. Wellington criticised these regulations in November 181024 as 
tending to restrict the power to promote on merit and more seriously as 
placing a premium on those sedentary skills acquired before 1809 by the 
only officers of sufficiently long service to be eligible for promotion. 
The system however survived the remonstrances of the Commander of the Forces 
and Ogilvie, the man he wished to promote to Deputy25, did not receive the 
step until the 22nd March 1812, five years to the day after his appointment 
as an Assistant. Later Kennedy was prevented from making an early promotion 
23. Although it may be observed that the existence of the system did not 
prevent Thomas Forth Winter, made a Deputy Assistant on the 16th November 
1811, being promoted Assistant on the 29th April 1812. 
24. B. M. Add Mss 49481 f. 137, Wellington to Gordon, 6th November 1810. 
25. Wellington even suggested Ogilvie as the man most fit to succeed 
Kennedy if the need arose. 
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in the case of John Mackenzie. Thus in this case we can again see a 
certain lack of awareness among the authorities in England of the peculiar 
difficulties of the Peninsular service and their unwillingness to adapt 
previously established practice to the requirements of field duty. 
The rigidity of the promotion system helps to account for the mixture 
of ranks which, as we have already noticed, were found performing similar 
duties in the commissariat. A meritorious officer who could not be 
promoted could at least be appointed according to his abilities and deserts, 
thereby circumventing the possibly stultifying effects of the promotion 
regulations. In any case these stultifying effects have been much 
exaggerated. It is evident from the dates of promotions that, contrary 
to the implication of Wellington's letter, there was no queue of deserving 
officers anxiously awaiting the tardy date appointed for their promotion. 
Indeed I have Only found for certain two Peninsular officers (Messrs 
Ogilvie and Gauntlett) who were advanced immediately upon their becoming 
eligible, all other promotions above the rank of Deputy Assistant going to 
men who had been available for advancement for some months at least26. 
Where cases do come to light of officers apparently deserving reward yet 
being passed over, the cause is usually not to be found in the regulations. 
Mr Kirton, for example, a clerk, was recommended for promotion by General 
Hill in September 1809 but was deemed too young by Commissary-General Murray. 
In 1811 Ogilvie recommended him to Kennedy who would not forward the request 
because of the arrears in the clerk's accounts and Kirton served the entire 
war as a clerk despite filling a succession of responsible though subordinate 
posts with energy and efficiency. By the regulations he could have been 
promoted after a year's service27. Augustus Schaumann too, well known as 
the writer of a lively memoir, was employed as a clerk in the Peninsula from 
1808 onwards and, particularly during 1809, on important and difficult 
duties which he appears to have executed successfully, and yet he was not 
promoted Deputy Assistant until December 1812. If Wellington's expressed 
ideal of promotion by merit was imperfectly realised in the Peninsular 
commissariat the fault lay not only with restrictive regulations but also 
26. In the case of Adams, promoted Deputy on the 4th May 1813, the gap is 
a mere seven weeks but normally it is very much longer. 
27. To be fair, at the time Kirton's claims were again rejected, not only 
were his accounts in arrear but the accusation that he had unduly falsified 
his receipts for meat had not been rebutted. The time it took him to live 
down this suggestion probably explains his being passed over subsequently. 
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with internal jealousies and frictions that prevented promotion going 
always to the most deserving. 
While it appears that promotion was not always the reward of good 
service, it is also true that, as far as can be judged, such promotions as 
were made were bestowed worthily, certainly above the rank of Deputy 
Assistant28. The early appointments to the new rank of Deputy Assistant 
in 1810 were a rather more mixed bag. Twenty four Peninsular officers 
were affected, of whom eleven were promoted Assistants fairly soon after 
becoming eligible the following year. All these eleven seem to have given 
satisfaction in various posts. Notable among them were Purcell who 
reportedly satisfied General Craufurd's exacting taste as commissary to 
the light division in 1810 and later went on a confidential mission to the 
Azores, St. Remy in command of the important depot at Iamego during the 1812 
campaign and Wilkinson the second in command to the Deputy supervising the 
2nd division in 1811/12. The remainder, although including Francis 
McDonnell who was the recipient in July 1810 of an excellent testimonial 
from no less critical a judge than General Picton, contained two undoubtedly 
bad choices in Peter Berard, described by General Pane as "one of the most 
useless persons I ever met with"29 and dismissed in 1812 for embezzling 
stores, and Ignatius Wechinger, an offensive boorish man who repeatedly 
proved himself too stupid to be entrusted with any inddpendent responsibility 
whatever30. The appointment of these men was entirely in the hands of the 
Treasury but it is obvious that the recommendation of the Commissary-General 
was seriously attended to. Of the fourteen Peninsula clerks who had held 
28. Of the fourteen promotions to Deputy of officers serving in the 
Peninsula that took place between Spring 1809 and the end of 1813, five 
appear to have been well justified by the subsequent performance of the 
officers, about eight I lack the information to judge and only one may have 
been a liability in so high a rank. 
29. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17908, Fane to Ogilvie, 19th August 1810. 
30. He wrote in 1813 "I supose this station will be brack up, no more 
suppleis are passing this way & very seldom a Detachment on their way to 
the army... " This quotation demonstrates not merely his imperfect grasp 
of English spelling and grammar but more significantly his incompetence 
since it was written before his depot had begun to handle the great 
proportion of the traffic for which it had been established. It only 
appeared denuded to him as he had been sending supplies in the wrong 
direction. Ibid No 17969, Wechinger to Ogilvie, 25th July 1813. 
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local Acting Assistant status in the autumn of 180931 no fewer than twelve 
were included in the appointment of Deputy Assistants, six subsequently 
achieving the rapid jump to Assistant in August the next year. The remaining 
dozen of the twenty four new Deputy Assistants who served in the Peninsula 
during 1810 were all save three sent to Portugal after October 1809 so there 
would not have been time for their promotion to have been earned by service 
in the field. Murray must therefore be acquitted of blame for the 
appointments of Wechinger and Berard. Notably the three ordinary clerks 
in the Peninsular department who also obtained promotion (Carey, St. Remy 
and Filder) themselves became Assistants in August 1811. Thus a total of 
nine of the eleven officers finding rapid promotion had enjoyed early 
experience of the Peninsular service which suggests both, not surprisingly, 
the value of practical experience and more importantly the realistic spirit 
which governed the choice of who to promote in the lower ranks as well as 
in the higher. 
Besides promoting good officers it was naturally necessary to reinforce 
the department from time to time. As the size of the army increased, and 
as the British commissariat took on a greater share of responsibility for 
the Portuguese system, the number of commissaries needed grew too. The 
increase in the department's establishment however more than allowed for 
the growth of the army. In October 1809 thirty three officers and acting 
officers were supplying an army of about 30,000 men. A year later the 
army had expanded by at least a third but the commissariat by two thirds to 
fifty seven officers, while in 1812 a force of rather more than 45,000 men 
was served by as many as eighty seven commissariat officers32. Thus had 
the officer establishment been adequate at the start it might have remained 
adequate as the war proceeded, but unfortunately the department began the 
war so very understaffed that all the increases in the officer establishment 
could do no more than enable it to keep pace with its duties. The 1809 
figure of thirty three officers contains no fewer than eighteen who are 
styled acting Assistants, men substantially clerks holding officers' posts, 
31. There were sixteen listed but one, Petken, was under arrest and another, 
Downie, left to join the Spanish army, so neither were eligible for 
appointment as a Deputy Assistant. 
32. Since the proportion of cavalry with the army increased somewhat 
between 1809 and 1812, this meant more work for the commissariat than appears 
from the bare total. Nonetheless the real increase in officers is apparent 
enough. 
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and besides these there must have been many clerks without that appointment 
doing officers" duty as thirty three men is not enough to go round the 
number of jobs available33. This practice of employing clerks to supply 
deficiencies in the officer establishment lasted throughout the war and 
resulted in subdivisions within the grade of clerk whereby the already 
existing distinction which paid clerks 5/- or 7/6d a day according to their 
seniority was widened by the introduction of a 10/- per day rate for a 
clerk acting as an officer, while the 5/- (or sometimes 4/6d) remuneration 
was kept only for men, many of them locals or literate soldiers borrowed 
from the army, who bore no responsibility and executed only office duties. 
The total number of clerks employed in the Peninsula rose from twenty in 
spring 1809, to forty five in the autumn, to two hundred and fifty five in 
1812, but a large proportion of this increase must have been in the junior 
category and not all of the 1812 clerks can be regarded as potential 
officer or acting officer material. 
Despite the good performance of many of the acting officers, shortage 
of manpower in the upper ranks became a serious problem in 1812 when such 
exceptional demands were made upon the department's activity. Even as 
early as the 11th June 1811 Gordon had been obliged to resort to the expedient 
of selecting twelve temporary acting Assistants from the army in an effort 
to get round the illegality of receiving anyone directly into the commissariat 
at a rank higher than that of clerk34. Evidently this measure did not 
prove very satisfactory as nine months later Bisset complained and had to 
be assured he could send them home again if he wanted. By the end of 1811 
not far short of a half of all officers commissioned in the commissariat 
were serving in the Peninsula, but even so the 1812 campaign brought forth 
constant complaints from Spain about lack of officers and repeated demands 
for more assistance. "I have subjected the Home Service to some inconvenience, " 
wrote Herries on the 12th October 1812 regarding his decision to let a few 
more officers from the British establishment sail for Lisbon, "as many of 
the districts will be left without a Commissary.. "35 Fortunately the 
33. Of the thirty three men four were sick, one only employed in making up 
his old accounts, four more held office jobs to do with current accounting 
and one was under arrest. This left twenty three officers to fill about 
thirty posts with infantry brigades, cavalry regiments and depots apart from 
supervising other aspects of the service. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17902 Return 
of Commissariat Officers in Spain and Portugal, Badajoz September 1809. 
34. P. R. O. W. O. 58/130 Gordon to Kennedy, 11th June 1811. 
35. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134 Herries to Kennedy, 12th October 1812. 
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demands of 1812 upon manpower were never so seriously repeated. 
The 
shortage of officers in the field during the summer of 1812 
by comparison 
with earlier and later years does appear in the 
few figures which are 
preserved. Thus in 1810 eight officers and senior clerks controlled 
twenty three assorted subordinates with the 2nd division, while in late 
1813 five men of officer status commanded sixty two other employees with 
the 6th division. In August 1812 the same 6th division was reduced to 
two officers and one senior clerk among its commissariat staff of fifty 
eight. The depot at Salamanca too, where the commissariat employed fifty 
seven people, was run by a Deputy with only a single clerk to help him in 
October 1812. 
With respect to the non-commissioned grades the situation was easier 
because the commissariat had not only the rank and file of the army but 
also the indigenous population to call upon for recruits. Some such 
employees were also provided from England 
36. The Victualling Board sent 
a number of coopers in response to a request from Kennedy and these men seem 
to have remained in service until the end of the war in spite of their return 
being requested in April 1613 
37. 
Help from home was also sought over the 
conductor establishment, Wellington and Bisset asking for fifty in 
the 
summer of 1812. The Treasury agreed to their employment on the 18th 
June 
but Herries had some difficulty in finding suitably qualified men prepared 
to undertake the work for 5/- per day and all were not assembled until 
the 
end of July38. Nor was their assemblage the end of the matter as five 
subsequently declined the appointment upon their duties being more fully 
explained to them, presumably having only been interested in the five guinea 
advance of wages which none was able to repay, and another, Edward Bell, 
got as far as Portsmouth where he "exhibited evident signs of insanity and 
was sent back to London"39. His equipment and travel expenses had cost 
36. The establishment of British non-commissioned employees in spring 1809 
was 30 bakers, 6 coopers, 6 bricklayers, 4 blacksmiths and farriers and 
4 carpenters and wheelwrights. P. R. O. W. O. 57/2, Harrison to Murray, 8th 
April 1809. 
37. P. R. O. W. 0.58/57 Herries to Commissioners of Victualling 24th April 1813- 
38- "It is scarcely necessary for me to point out to you the difficulties 
which present themselves in prevailing upon persons of the description which 
would be suitable to this employment to undertake it". P. R. 0. W. 0.58/132 
Herries to Bisset, 2nd July 1812. 
39. P. R. O. W. O. 57/5, Harrison to Herries, 3rd November 1812. 
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the Treasury £21 8/8d. One of the remaining forty four recruits kept a 
journa. l40 which shows that he arrived at Lisbon on the 11th September 1812, 
thence proceeding via Ciudad Rodrigo to the front. On the 25th November 
he drafted a letter of resignation but appears to have got over his 
grievance and settled down comparatively happily in winter quarters. By 
December he was able to be entrusted with the sole superintendence of small 
mule convoys. Useful though these men must have proved it is evident that 
they arrived too late to be more than bewildered spectators of the final 
stages of the campaign of 1812. The further hundred conductors requested 
by Kennedy at the end of the year and probably sent in January 1813 must 
also have needed time to acclimatise. In any case it is apparent that 
England never provided more than the smaller part of the manpower for these 
junior grades. 
The regiments of the army supplied a large number of men for the non- 
commissioned grades in the commissariat, in particular to do jobs like 
conducting stores, keeping stores, 'writing' and making issues. Most 
returns do not include these men and any guess as to their total number 
would be hazardous, but it is obvious they were in evidence from very early 
in the war and often served for long periods in their new capacity. Thus 
the head butcher to Hinde's brigade, 6th division, in August 1812 had been 
appointed originally from the 53rd foot in April 1809 and the storekeeper 
(7th fusileers) in 1810. Altogether the brigade was served by eight soldiers, 
drawn from six different regiments, among the twenty six junior employees 
of its commissariat staff. The companion brigade, Hulse's, employed only 
three soldiers out of twenty nine, one of which trio, a conductor from the 
2nd foot, had been first appointed in 1809. This use of soldiers for 
commissariat duty was not a. phenomenon confined to the 6th division although 
better documented there than elsewhere. O'Meara at Cadiz used two sergeants, 
Moore and Cameron, as 'military clerks' to pay the working parties helping 
with the fortifications4l. In Portugal two conductors dismissed in 1811 
for neglect and intoxication are specified as military men, a corporal and 
a private in the 11th Veteran battalion42. The Englishmen seem mostly to 
40. N. A. M. Acc 7508-24. Notebook belonging to commissariat conductor 
Morris. 
41. These two were employed in 1810. They had to be dismissed later for 
faking the returns of employment and stealing the money. O'Meara pointedly 
replaced them with Spaniards rather to the indie ation of the Treasury who 
insisted they be laid off as soon as their particular service was terminated. 
42. P. R. O. W. O. 57/39, Dunmore to Gordon, 20th July 1811. 
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have been employed in the jobs of rather higher status, although their pay 
as butchers for example was as low as 1/6d a. day, and they were not expected 
to serve as labourers or drivers. Naturally for these duties where 
knowledge of English was not a necessary qualification it was sonsible to 
employ locals and this increasingly became commissariat practice. 
The small size of the 'tail' in commissariat employ that the British 
army dragged behind it in the Peninsula is sometimes the subject of surprised 
comment. Portescue's 719 employees in the summer of 1812 is often quoted 
in this context43, though it misleads by taking little account of the large 
amount of local labour that the department seems always to have employed. 
Precise numbers are of course haid to obtain but one list exists, dated 
10th September 1811, being a return of the Portuguese inhabitants employed 
by the British commissariat in Portugal44. The number of men listed is 
1,254 and to this figure should be added the officers, clerks, borrowed 
soldiers and British non-commissioned employees as well as the unnumbered 
Spaniards employed to give,, an accurate tale of the strength of the Peninsular 
commissariat45. Most of the local labour_ was quite unskilled and need not 
detain us long: the categories of muleteer, driver, carman, labourer, 
domestic servant and herdsman account for 973 of the above total, and are 
divided in small groups among all the eight infantry divisions, nine cavalry 
regiments, guns, headquarters and most of the principal depots of Portu,. lA6 
Some of the remainder however occupied quite senior positions, 41 as clerks, 
124 as conductors and 26 as storekeepers. These were the people described 
by Larpent as "roguish Portuguese under-commissaries"47 and this rather 
prejudiced view was echoed in England where Herries felt that "it is 
undoubtedly a matter of the first consideration that preference should be 
given to British subjects in all Employments connected with the Commissariat"48. 
Foreigners (Spanish or Portuguese foreigners that is) seem to have stood 
43. JW Fortescue, R. A. S. C. vol Ip 92. 
44. Arquivo Historico Militar, Lisbon. Divisao 1, Seccao 14, Caixa 48, 
Num 1 f. 46. The list was originally enclosed with Wellington to Stuart 
12th September 1811. See the Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of 
Wellington ed J Gurwood 12 vols 1034-8, vol VIII p 2-74- 
45 - Most of the muleteers were Spanish ax. d even only counting those serving 
with the 'public' mi; lcs they must have numbered several hundred. 
46. No-one is shown serving at depots as prominent as Abrantes, Celorico or 
La mega which is surprising and suggests that the list may be i.; ccmplt; e. 
47. The Private Jourral of F. S. Larpent ed G Iarpent, 2 vols. 1057. Vol 1 
letter of 6th October 1812. 
48. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134, Berries to Kennedy, 15th December 1812. 
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little chance of promotion though Kennedy did point out in August 1813 that 
any positive veto on their advancement could only have had a bad effect on 
morale and recruiting alike49. Since, as we have seen, there were diffi- 
culties in supplying men from England, and since it was undesirable to 
denude the fighting units further than was necessary, the opposition to 
the employment of locals in the most responsible non-commissioned jobs did 
not prevent the growing prevalence of the phenomenon. A return of the 
storekeepers at Tarragona in March 1814 includes sixteen unmistakeably 
Iberian names out of a total of seventeen50, while the normal commissariat 
staff attached to a division shows, parallel to the long term reduction in 
the numbers and rank of the commissioned officers at the top, a steady 
growth in the numbers of ,; aides, interpreters, 
herdsmen and so forth on 
the payroll, between 1810 and 1814" 
To Spanish and Portuguese labour both skilled and unskilled was the 
commissariat, and with it the army, indebted for enabling it to cope with 
its ever-increasing duties. The service must have benefited greatly from 
this practice since the foreigners a, -pointed-to responsible posts would have 
been selected on the basis of their a-parent talent for them, whereas in 
the case of borrowed soldiers the commissariat would have received only 
those men their commanding. officers were prepared +n see Se Onded, while 
recruits from England were selected by men who had no experience of what 
their duties -would entail and took time to accustom themselves to the country 
and the language. Many Portuguese must have been recruited in the way 
Wilkinson describes in the case of a man originally in the employ of a local 
magistracy and dealing with the supply of bread to British forces near 
Sobreira Formosa in September 1810. "He was too active and useful to be 
overlooked, " Wilkinson wrote inter, "and either Belson or Girton got him 
as a foraging conductor"51, Despite the fact that such capable foreigners 
as these were not promoted above the rank of clerk, some of them do appear 
to have been entrusted with posts of sole responsibility from late 1810 
onwards. Thus the clerk G. da Silva commanded the depot at Castello Branco 
49. In all the new Deputy Assistants appointed between 1810 and 1813 only 
one name, Fra Leon Chiaranda, appears of an Iberian style. All I know 
about him is that he was serving at Lisbon in July 1813- 
50. P. R. O. W. 0.57/44. Daniell to Herries, 29th March 1814. 
51. I. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17981. Wilkinson to 02i3-yie, ? 1027. 
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in the autumn of 1811 and a Portuguese called Riheiro was 
in charge of the 
Villa Franca magazine in June 1512. Most of the responsible jobs though 
were executed by British ccmptis:? aries as a ma. ttcr of policy rather 
than by 
virtue of any superior capacity. Indeed the quality of 
British clerks 
recruited into the commissariat during the war years was a matter of 
recurrent concern to the Commissaries-General and evidently left much 
to 
be desired. 
Once again it was the demands of the campaign of 1812 that really 
illuminated the shortcomü, gs oc the clerical. intake, shortcomings of course 
caused as much by the lack of any training in Britain which wculd be relevant 
to the Peninsular service as by the unsuitability of the candidates them- 
selves, though this too was a subject of eoiiplaint52. It is not intended 
to suggest that nothing had been the matter with the intake before 1812. 
In September. 1810 O'Meara had. occasion to complain of five clerks recently 
arrived at Cadiz. Two of these men he admitted, "write a fair enough hand" 
but one of the oI, hers was decrepit from age and wrote badly, another could 
"scarcely write legibly" and wras subject to epileptic fits, whilst the 
third 
"almost immediately after his arrival betrayed.... strong symptoms of "n 
infirmity of mind"53. Such a worthless reinforcement as this must 
have 
been unusual hut it is evident that the main army too had found cause 
for 
complaint in the first part of the war, for Henries wrote to Bisset at 
the 
start of 1812, "I shall, in future deal very strictly in the examination of 
the persons they (the Treasury appoint (a:, clers54o In spite of this 
promise the situation seems to have worsened thereafter. Bisset had 
occasion in the summer to dismiss no fewer than six clerks for various 
breaches of disciplýLne55, Dalrymple, acting for Bisset in September, wrote 
home citing cases where the service had suffered for wart of efficient 
clerical assistance, and one of Kennedy's first letters upon his return to 
52. In his later book Bisset singled out lack of training as one of the 
chief causes of inefficiency in the field. 
53. P. R. O. W. O. 57/13, O'Meara to Gordon, 7th September 1810. 
54. Herries to Bisset, 30th January 1812. Quoted in Edward Herrie: ' 
'Memoir of the Public Life of the Right Hon. J. C. Herries', London 1880. 
55. Two for disobedience, two for "repeated acts of inebriety", one for 
abandoning his cattle in mid-journey and the sixth for an unspoci. fied offence. 
N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17959 f. 42. 
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the Peninsula in the same month was a complaint of the youth, inexperience 
and ignorance of the most recently arrived clerks. The point had also 
been made in a curious way earlier in the year when Wilkinson earned a. 
reprimand for writing to a friend with a private request for 'assista, -.:! e', 
viz a. man who could_ write, do accounts, sober, civil and of a strong; 
constitution. One can only assume that some or all of these admirable 
qualities were too frequently missing in the 'assistance' provided from 
En gland 
56. 
Why did. the problem appear to worsen rather than improve after Herri_es' 
institution of an examination for new clerks? He was rather proud of this 
innovation57 though few details are known about the rigour of the questions 
asked or of the standard of answers required. It appears however that the 
great demand for meng in 1812 rapidly overweighed too strict a consideration 
of the suitability of an applicant. Zn reply to an inquiry whether a 
vacancy could be found, Bisset explained in March that he had no vacancies, 
he took arybody he could get58. Between April 1812 and the end of the 
year eighty two clerks were sent to Portugal, and at least twenty eight 
had already arrived since the date of Kennedy's departure. How great a 
cooperative effort on the Treasury's part this was may be seen by a, reference 
to their attitude in 1808 when "the Treasury had some doubts as to the 
necessity for sending out so great a number as twelve add _tional. clerks, 
for whom Sir Robert Kennedy had applied"59. Evidently such numbers as 
these could not be provided without a. drop in the quality of the recruits 
even in the hard economic conditions which prevailed in 19,12 in England and 
during which the security of a government salary must have appeared 
particularly attractive. Certainly by the end of the war it would seem 
that a clerkship in tho commissariat had risen in social status and was 
becoming a serious alternative to the more usual army career for gently 
56. P. R. O. W. O. 58/132. Herries to Kennedy, 28th March 1812. 
57. When Case at Estremoz was made a clerk in the Peninsula Hurries sent 
Bisset a copy of the usual entrance questions with a reference to "the 
e -amination T have thought it nenessar}" to have upon ever;; ý, andidate on his 
admission into the Dep't". Ibid, Herries to Bisset, 24th April 1812. 
58. B. M. Add Mss 57377. Bisset to Herries, 15th March 1812. 
59. Sir John Bisset 'On Commissariat Service'. Quoted in 'Army Adýministratior, ' 
by Major-General Sir Gerald Ellison, Army Quarterly, October 1921. 
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born but indigent younger sons60. There was no shortage of applicants - 
Herries was pestered throughout 1813/14 with letters requesting admission 
into the commissariat for some relative or friend of the writer to whom he 
returned the invariable reply that appointments were entirely in the hands 
of the Treasury - but this process may have led directly to the prevalence 
of the 'youth, inexperience a: id ignorance' that provoked Kennedy to complainG1. 
The qualities most frequently found and most generally prized among junior 
regimental officers were not those best suited to commissariat service 
which needed above all a tireless and accurate attention to detail. The 
absence of any training preliminary to field service, for which no exs, mine. tion 
could be a substitute, naturally encouraged an unprofessional approach to 
the commissariat and gave its recruiting a character more like that of the 
army than that of the Ordnance department for example. The result was 
that much time was needed before a new clerk's suitability for responsibility 
in the Peninsula could be ascertained and it is to this fact as much as to 
the numerical shortage of officers that the great pressure of work that fell 
upon the senior or experienced commissaries is to be attributed. 
Tack of numbers, absence of any useful preliminary training and the 
obligation to render detailed accounts of their varied activities all 
hampered the efficient execution of the commissaries' duties in the Peninsula.. 
Besides these factors there was a more basic flaw in the whole concept of 
the commissariat as an institution independent of the rest of the army 
62. 
The effect of this was that every commissary serving with troops had a dual 
responsibility, to obey the orders of his superiors in the department and 
to ensure that the dispositions and manoeuvres of the military commander to 
whom he was attached were as well supported logistically as possible. The 
problem this division of loyalties could be is clearly expressed in the 
following extract from a letter sent by D. A. C. G. Dobree to Ogilvie, his 
60. The inclusion of the commissariat in the Army List for the first time, 
in 1812, must have contributed to this tendency. 
61. Commissariat clerks may have been generallyr younger on their first 
appointment at the end of the war than at the beginning. The average ages 
at entry of six clerks who joined 1809/11 and six who joined 1812/14 were 
24 and 21 respectively which gives some support to Kennedy's cri. ticl sm, 
though rot jr itself a very strong piece of evidence. See Records o-' 
Service, N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17916 f. 57 seq. 17918 f. 24 seq. 17934 f. 1n3, 
17935 f. 72 seq. and 17978 f. 57 seq. 
62. This situ2tion was not of course unique to the comTnissariat, that of 
the Ordnance department being most similar, but the huge scale of commissariat 
operations exposed it more. obviously I believe höre than elsewhere. 
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direct superior in the commissariat. "I am sorry you should have converted 
into an ignorance of duty my not obeying directly an order which would have 
been the cause of the division starving, without first acquainting the 
General officer who looks to me for supplying it, As stating to him what a 
helpless situation we should be left in if the whole of our small transport 
was to be sent to Passages... " 
63. 
This kind of appeal to the outside 
authority of a general cropped up regularly at higher command levels too 
where it caused mhfriction. Thus Bisset in the manpower crisis of 1812 
ordered O'Meara & Cadiz to send three officers to join the main army and 
when his instruction was not obeyed, repeated it in a most peremptory way64. 
O'Meara complained to Herries about this treatment and was told that he 
should have informed the Commissary-General in the first place that General 
Cooke had sanctioned his refusal to detach the officers, and this, Herries 
felt, would have closed the issue. later under rather similar circumstances, 
Kennedy sent home Wellington's support for his own refusal to detach any 
officers to strengthen the commissariat of the southern army, with the 
result that compliance with the order was not insisted upon. 
It was thus recognised that in matters directly affecting the field 
service the control exercised by the department's chiefs over their juniors 
was necessarily limited by the dictates of efficiency. However in matters 
of administration and accountancy, in fact in any aspect of the service in 
which economy could be practised, the directions from above were rigid. 
This distinction is plainly reflected in the department's standing orders v 
a booklet comprising sixty articles of which twenty nine are concerned with 
modes of accounting and reporting, thirteen with details of the manner in 
which various payments are to be made and a further five deal with minor 
administrative concerns such as the death or sickness of commissaries and 
the branding of public mules. Only thirteen out of sixty are even loosely 
concerned with the contingencies of field service, the general principles of 
63. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17952, Dobree to Ogilvie, 22nd December 1813" 
64. Not only did he insist on obedience to his commands at Cadiz, he also 
virtually accused O'Meara of nepotism in the appointment of his cousin to the command of the commissariat at Tarifa. P. R. O. W. O. 57/41, Bisset to 
O'Meara, 11th May 1812. 
65. N. A. M. Ace 6807/22. These instructions appear from internal evidence 
to date from 1813, almost certainly before the advance of the army. 
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which it was evidently assumed everybody would need to pick up for himself. 
Obviously a perfect division of commissariat duties between those concerning 
checks or limitations of spending and those concerned with ensuring the 
arrival of sufficient rations at the right time and place cannot be made 
since money was a ubiquitous element. What may be said is that, subject 
to the 'rules' of accounting, the Treasury and the Commissary in Chief 
left to the Commissary-General and the army commander all details of 
administration and field operations66. Even in the realm of finance, as 
will be seen in chapter IV, the Treasury used their authority with caution. 
Matters such as the siting of depots, theorganising of transport, the 
provenance of the supplies67, appointments within the Peninsula, the 
apportionment of cash among the different services and the maintaining of 
whatever reserves of provisions were deemed necessary were all decided by 
the Commissary-General in consultation with Wellington. At a lower level 
the field commissaries partook somewhat of this freedom, being often (though 
not always) at liberty to make any reasonable arrangements that would ensure 
the supply of their unit68 and to allocate their transport and subordinate 
staff as seemed best to them. 
It is evident that the relationship between the Commander of the Forces 
and the Commissary-General was of central importance to the effective 
running of the department while that between the Commissary-General and 
the Commissary in Chief was rather less so. During Wellington's command 
of the armies from 1809 to 1814, four men served him as Commissary-General 
at headquarters, Messrs John Murray (until June 1810), Robert Hugh Kennedy 
(until December 1811 and again from October 1812 onwards), John Bisset 
(December 1811 to August 1812) and Charles Dalrymple as deputy for Bisset 
in September 1812 and for Kennedy in January and February 1814" Despite 
these changes in the command, continuity rather than change is evident in 
the basic system from spring 1810 onwards, this reflecting partly Wellington's 
66. As will be seen in chapter VII the basic system employed by Wellington 
was called into question at home during the war but never by anything more 
imperative than an alternative suggestion. 
67. Supplies were rarely sent from England unasked and never without the 
Commissary-General being consulted as to his wished. Only the decision to 
supply the troops principally from the United Kingdom during the last nine 
months of the war was taken in England. 
68. Field commissaries were told which depots they must draw from. They 
were also instructed as to the amount of reserve they were required to keep 
in hand and were sometimes prohibited from procuring items locally if the 
depot supply was more cheaply available. They were also often restricted 
in the prices they could offer for goods. 
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consistent attention to the details of commissariat 
business and partly the 
fact that Bisset for his tenure of the command was conscious that he was 
deputising for Kennedy and did not wish to make more changes than he felt 
essential. Thus it was the relations between Wellington and 
Kennedy that 
were the most important to the operations of the department, and 
it is clear 
that these were cordial. Wellington had wanted Kennedy as Commissary- 
General on his return to Portugal in 1809, though in the event the appointment 
was delayed for over a year, and his irritation at Kennedy's return to 
England at the end of 1811 makes it plain that the two men had indeed co- 
operated successfully69. Perhaps the reason why Wellington and Kennedy 
agreed together so well was their common love of system. This phenomenon 
is well documented in the case of Wellington; it also appears in Kennedy's 
fury at the relatively minor changes introduced by Bisset, where he had 
obviously assumed, from Bisset's expressing a liking for his, Kennedy's, 
system, that not one iota of it would be lost when he returned. The same 
trait in Kennedy's character is revealed by Routh's unwillingness to have 
the Commissary-General aware that he had "b: en suggesting any improvements 
in what he of course deems perfect because it is old"70. However that may 
be, the allies owed much for their success in the Peninsula to the good 
working relationship between Wellington and Kennedy, a circumstance only 
worthy of remark because of the poor relations that existed between Kennedy 
and almost everyone else in his own department. 
That Kennedy was disliked by many of his senior subordinates was no 
doubt unfortunate but while all did their duty little harm can be seen to 
have come to the service. However his feuds with Herries and Bisset both 
produced some harmful results71. It is not surprising that the energetic 
and alert Herries succeeding Colonel Gordon, who had taken his overseas 
responsibilities in a nonchalant spirit, should have infuriated Kennedy, 
69. Wellington also worked well with Bisset during Kennedy's absence and 
gave 'favourable public testimonials' as to the Commissary-General's services. 
That these were more than empty compliments can be seen from his treatment 
of Pipon. See Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field Marshal the 
Duke of Wellington ed. the 2nd Duke of Wellington, 1858-72, vol VI p. 188. 
70. B. M. Add Mss 57415, William Herries to Herries, 17th October 1813- 
71. I cannot trace the origin of Kennedy's dislike of Herries. A letter 
to Herries of 1807 refers to 'your friend Mr Kennedy' implying that the 
hostility began at a later date, but the sense could easily be ironical. 
B. M. Add Mss 57375, Drummond to Herries, ? 1807. 
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a suspicious man in any case and jealous of his own authority. One of the 
early acts of the new Commissary in Chief was to observe in February 1812 
the absence of any returns of camp equipage for later than July 1811. He 
pointed out (correctly) that Kennedy had misunderstood his instructions72 
and on being shown a return of later date which Kennedy happened to have 
in his pocket when he returned on leave criticised its accuracy, the local 
purchase of shoes and blankets which it disclosed and an assortment of other 
inefficiencies: "I perceive that there were on 14th March at Lisbon 81 
tents & 140 poles; at Abrantes 88 tents & 232 poles & at Bucellas 329 tents 
and no poles. - Under the head of canteens I perceive that there were at 
Lisbon 14,474 canteens & 1,546 straps; at Coimbra 797 canteens and 6,429 
straps & that in no depot the number of canteens & straps are the same"73. 
These were fair criticisms perhaps but it is easy to see why thgroffended 
Kennedy coming from a civilian with no knowledge of conditions in the field 
and only three months in his job74. Subsequently when Harries took Bisset's 
part in the dispute between the two Commissaries-General, bad relations 
between the two men were confirmed. 
Herries' eagerness to keep abreast of events in the field and his desire 
to make the authority of the Commissary in Chief practically felt overseas 
manifested themselves in his bad habit of communicating with subordinate 
officers behind Kennedy's back. The first occasion might be dismissed as 
merely a misunderstanding. The Board of Trade requiring some information 
abaut the state of the magazines at Lisbon and the volume of trade passing 
through the port, Herries wrote for information to D. C. G. Pipon rather than 
to headquarters in order to save time. Kennedy, angry, neatly revenged 
himself by stigmatising Pipon's report as "completely at variance with the 
real facts75 yet declining, in spite of further invitation, to enlarge 
upon this comment, with the result that Herries had to produce before the 
Board figures which he knew to be erroneous without being able to point 
out in what respect they wandered from the truth. The next affair was 
72. "It is not enough to send 3 returns in a period of nine months they 
should be sent three monthly"; P. R. 0. W. 0.58/132 Herries to Kennedy, 20th 
June 1812. 
73. Ibid, flerries to Bisset, 20th April 1812. 
74. Kennedy had to be soothed after reacting ill to the criticisms by 
being told he was "a meritorious officer of tried character and abilities". 
Ibid, Herries to Kennedy, 11th June 1812. 
75. Herries' phraseology; P. R. O. W. 0.58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 19th 
January, 1813. 
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rather more serious. Henries, lacking up to date information of the 
progress and requirements of the army in the Vitoria campaign, wrote to 
Santander for speedy information about the state of supplies. Ogilvie 
returned him an extensive report earning himself thereby a furious rebuke 
from Kennedy. The Commissary-General's public reason for his anger was 
that Ogilvie's report would misstate the real circumstances and mislead the 
home authorities: "it appear from the letter itself that such correspondence 
can only lead to error" he wrote, purporting to paraphrase Wellington's 
opinion76. Herries was not convinced. "The information you transmitted 
to me", he informed Ogilvie, "has not only not been the occasion of any 
improper step on this side, but on the contrary has been materially useful 
to us in some respects in which we have not received such explicit accounts 
from any other quarters"77. Much though one must sympathise with the 
Commissary in Chief in his desire for prompt information where to send 
supplies and in what quantity at such an important strategical juncture, 
he cannot on these grounds be exonerated from the charge of impropriety 
since his correspondence with Ogilvie was of several months' standing 
before the Santander letter came to Kennedy's notice. "I shall be very 
glad to hear privately from you as often as you can spare a few minutes... 
how things are going on when you are placed at a distance from Head 
quarters, "78 Herries had written on the 13th February. The unmilitary 
and undesirable nature of such a correspondence needs no demonstration. 
Though Herries was at fault in these cases, most of the ill feeling 
derived from Kennedy's jealous reaction to any real or imagined encroachments 
upon his authority. This aspect of his character combined with his 
habitual selfishness of outlook to produce a violent dispute with John 
Bisset at the end of 1812. Kennedy's ultimate intention to return to the 
Peninsula when he departed in 1811 and his unwillingness to make over his 
authority to his successor had led to an arrangement whereby Bisset carried 
76. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17936, Ogilvie to Kennedy, 2nd October 1813, with reply of 8th October in margin. Ogilvie had to send copies of all his 
correspondence with the Commissary in Chief and when he asked whether in future he might obey Herries' orders regarding reports he was told "that 
you may be under no mistake as to my meaning I order you not to communicate 
with the Commissary in Chief under any circumstances except through me". Wellington also reprimanded both Ogilvie and Herries on this occasion. 
77. Ibid, Henries to Ogilvie, 27th October 1813- 
78- Ibid, No 17914 f. 13, Henries to Ogilvie, 13th February 1813. 
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on the service in Kennedy's name and not at his own responsibility. 
Thus the customary transfer of stores and provisions from the account of 
the departing Commissary-General to that of his successor did not take 
place on Bisset's assumption of control. Naturally it was found impossible 
that Kennedy could from England continue to exercise any useful authority 
over affairs in Spain and naturally again, 1812 being a most active and 
eventful year for the army, it was necessary for Bisset to make various 
alterations in the commissariat arrangements to meet changing circumstances79. 
On his return to Portugal, already annoyed by Bisset's independence of 
action in the meantime, Kennedy refused to hold himself accountable for 
expenditure during Bisset's term as Commissary-General and ordered him, 
instead of proceeding to Gibraltar as instructed by the Treasury, to wait 
in Spain and make up his accounts for the period in question. A most 
acrimonious exchange of letters ensued between the two men: Wellington's 
offer of mediation, welcomed by Bisset, was refused by Kennedy. The 
unanimous verdict of Herries, the Treasury and the Commissioners of Audit 
was that "Sir R. Kennedy must be considered the accountant to the Public 
in the let Inst'ce for all the Expend're incurred in the Comm'riat Departm't 
in the Peninsula during his absence upon leave"80. "I am fixed with Mr 
Bisset's accounts"81 wrote Kennedy, but it is impossible to imagine any 
other decision in view of the arrangements he himself had put in writing 
earlier in the year82. It is hard not to feel sympathy with anyone subjected 
to the risks involved in accounting to the public especially for a service 
over which he had not exercised personal control. Kennedy however was 
himself inconsiderate about such matters: only a week after ordering Bisset 
to prepare accounts forthe period of his alleged responsibility he issued 
an extraordinary order requiring every accountant between Ciudad Rodrigo 
and headquarters to send in his cash and store accounts up to the 24th 
79. The changes which seem particularly to have upset Kennedy were the 
borrowing of clerks for field service from his accounts office, certain 
promotions recommended by Bisset and a new regulation regarding the issue of 
rations to General Officers. 
80. P. R. O. W. O. 57/5. Harrison to Herries, 5th May 1813- 
81. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 16930. Kennedy to Ogilvie, 29th April 1813- 
82. For example "Mr Bissett entails no responsibility upon himself for the 
expenditure incurred by my sub-accountants". That admittedly is Herries 
purporting to quote Kennedy but the absence of any transfer of stores must be 
conclusive against the possibility, whether just or not, of making Bisset the 
accountant, since it could never have been established what he was to be 
accountable for. P. R. 0. W. O. 58/132, Kennedy to Herries, 11th March 1812, 
quoted in Herries to Kennedy, 8th June 1812. 
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December 1811. Plainly while these were being made up no progress could 
be made by Bisset trying to compile his own. 
83 Yet when the need to compile 
Commissary-General Murray's accounts in 1810 had been adduced as an excuse 
for the incompleteness of those for the month in progress, Kennedy had 
brushed it aside. "I cannot allow the current duties to stand still for 
old accounts"84. Evidently it made a difference whose accounts were in 
question. 
These dissensions were naturally harmful to the discipline of the 
department. Thus the clerk, Morrison, dismissed by Bisset in August 1812 
for "repeated acts of inebriety"85 took advantage of the dispute between 
Bisset and Kennedy to ask the returning Commissary-General for reinstatement 
and appears in fact to have enlisted Kennedy's support for his appeal 
although there seems no reason for doubting that the punishment had been 
merited. Kennedy too did his best to keep Bisset in Spain although aware 
that the Commissary in Chief had ordered him to Gibraltar, and only gave 
way in the face of a positive direction from Wellington that the instructions 
as to his posting be obeyed. Bisset having assumed his new command, 
nobody troubled to inform Herries who discovered by chance that the Gibraltar 
station was no longer leaderless just in time to prevent the sailing of 
Commissary-General Drummond, appointed after it had appeared that Bisset 
was remaining in Spain86. From the worst dangers of faction and personal 
antipathies however the commissariat was protected by the 'dual responsibility, 
already noticed, by its close association with the army where morale was by 
this time high and by the ever-present practical demands of its duty that 
left little time for politics. While Kennedy was not muck} liked by at 
least some of his colleagues, there is no evidence to suggest that any 
cliques formed themselves as a result. That the personal difficulties 
between Herries and Kennedy did not have a crippling effect upon the service 
83. Quite apart from the effect on Bisset, it is curious to find a Commissary- 
General demanding old accounts from his front line subordinates during a period 
as critical and busy as the siege of Burgos, and in the face of the possibility 
of a major retreat which did indeed commence only eight days after the order 
was issued. 
84. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17983, f. 74. Kennedy to Ogilvie, 9th July 1810. 
85. His habitual drunkenness achieved its zenith at the sacking of Badajoz 
where he was observed lurching about the streets with a drawn sabre, for which 
activity he was finally reported to the Commissary-General. 
86. Kennedy was obviously amused at this confusion: "Bisset has ... set off 
in a frigate for Gibraltar - Drummond is also gone to Gibraltar, ordered there 
by the Commissary in Chief instead of BissettlU" Surely he ought to have 
reported his change of heart regarding Bisset, which took nearly seven weeks 
to filter back to London. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17970 f. 158. Kennedy to 
Ogilvie, 15th January 1813. 
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is due to the very different spheres of operations of the two men in spite 
of the fact that one was nominally the superior of the other. With all 
Herries' energy it was quite impossible that much direction of affairs in 
the field could be maintained from London, even with a Commissary-General 
more informative and docile than Kennedy87. Force of circumstance turned 
much of both men's attention to their own side of the whole task, Kennedy 
under the immediate superirisibn. of Wellington, and Herries under the 
Treasury, whose Board took a real interest in the support of the war. 
Accordingly their dispute was not attended with the grave inconvenience 
that might be supposed. 
Since the department has often been ill-regarded for its standards of 
integrity and since dishonest practices appear on the face of it to present 
as great a threat to the efficient execution of its duty as disputes among 
its senior officers it may be appropriate here to enlarge upon the incidence 
and importance of peculation. A sequence of frauds and dishonesties can 
be traced throughout the war, ranging from simple robberies to well-calculated 
swindles. Straightforward thefts of money, animals or personal baggage 
might be the work of servants, as in the case of D. A. C. G. Dallas who lost 
baggage and public documents or Mr Jackson who lost money, or subordinates 
like the clerk Sabater who stole public money from D. A. C. G. Wilgrefo in 1813. 
Naturally such occurrences also took place in the army, but the quantities 
of public money with which commissaries might be entrusted made them 
particularly tempting targets. Embezzlement of stores was also generally 
the work of non-commissioned employees, though one Deputy Assistant, Berard, 
was dismissed for this offence. More subtle deceptions than these are also 
known to have been practised, such as the forging of paylists by Messrs 
Moore and Cameron at Cadiz or the method of Mr Richardson at Merida 
"fraudulently receiving 5 per cent out of the payments made by him"88 but 
again only subordinate employees seem to have been involved. Although 
naturally only those crimes which were detected, and probably not all of 
those, have survived for inspection it seems reasonable to assert that the 
87. Thus although Bisset was praised for his 'clear and explicit reports', 
no more comprehensive instructions were sent to him than to Kennedy. Indeed 
in April the Treasury returned Bisset's report about the pecuniary state of the army "on which it does not occur to my Lords as necessary to give any 
directions". P. R. O. W. O. 57/4, Harrison to Herries, 16th March 1812, and 
57/5, Harrison to Herries, 9th April 1812. 
88. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17972 f. 85. 
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sums of money and value of public property involved were so small as to 
have no practical effect upon the department's overall operation. 
89 All 
the sums mentioned in accounts of the cases as lost to the public, though 
substantial to the low paid individuals involved, are trifling to a larger 
consideration. D. A. C. G. Head lost 1,210 dollars (say ¬325) stolen at 
Celorico, Cameron's share in his swindle is said to have amounted to about 
£72, Storekeeper Daniel Buckley made ¬60 from the illicit sale of a pipe 
of wine and so on. Since all these frauds were carried out by men in 
subordinate positions it is not surprising to find them, though numerous, 
so insubstantial, as the opportunities open to such men would have been 
limited especially if they hoped, as many must, to avoid detection. For 
any fraud of public significance to occur the connivance of an independently 
acting commissariat accountant would have been necessary, because he would 
both have had responsibility for larger quantities of stores or money and 
have been in a position to attempt to cover up the matter afterwards90. 
It is evident from the various regulations not merely for scrupulous 
accounting but also for vouching as correct the entries in the accounts that 
the Treasury were sensitive about this possibility. In the event only one 
officer of suitable position seems to have fallen under serious suspicion 
of malpractice during the war, his case being rather more worthy of 
consideration than the petty affairs referred to abote. 
In March 1812 the Duke of'York received an anonymous letter narrating 
certain scandalous transactions alleged against the Cadiz commissariat. 
Herries decided to investigate the accusations in secret, under cover of 
the existing project to send a senior officer of the accounts branch to 
Cadiz to establish an office. Accordingly on the 30th March D. C. G. Dickens 
in Portugal was ordered to proceed to Cadiz and investigate the charges, 
while D. C. G. O'Meara, head of the Cadiz department, was informed only of 
the ostensible reason for Dickens' impending arrival. Closer examination 
of the charges appears not to have justified so much trouble in their study 
and Dickens' two reports of May and June exposed them as having no basis 
89. I omit from consideration here all question of the dishonesties of 
the muleteers which cannot be so lightly dismissed and receive consideration 
in chapter V. 
90. Frauds within the department are being referred to here. Naturally 
many deceptions could be practised, by merchants for example on customs 
officials, quite independently of any commissariat connivance. 
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in fact. Previously though to the arrival of the second report, two 
further disquieting communications were received at the Treasury, signed 
this time, and containing new charges, one from a Spanish official named 
Morgado, in which O'Meara was accused of conspiring to defraud the Spanish 
customs by issuing falsified certificates of ezemption91, the second from 
a certain Mr Thuillier by which the commissary was supposed to have 
behaved with profitable partiality in the allocation of army contracts. 
Morgado's letter was sent to Dickens as an extension of his investiga- 
tions while Thuillier's went to O'Meara himself for explanation, breaking 
the secrecy hitherto attached to the inquiry. In fact O'Meara knew 
already of Thuillier's accusations as their copyist had sought (unsuccessfully) 
to earn three hundred dollars by offering the commissary the damaging 
letters that were to be sent to England. O'Meara's defence was to send 
home all the papers he could relative to the army contracts, pointing out 
that at no time had he acted without the expressed approval of the garrison 
commander. Although Thuillier b, dmself went to England to plead the case 
for his contracts as preferable to those O'Meara had accepted, he wasted 
his journey as O'Meara's explanations were felt adequate. Morgado's 
charge was harder to disprove. Dickens' two avenues of exploration were 
both closed to him under suspicious circumstances, first when the customs 
refused to show him any details of duty-free certificates issued 
92 
. and 
then when a page in a ledger belonging to Morgado's old employer, Mr Leford, 
and stated by Morgado to contain incontrovertible proof of his charges, was 
found by Dickens to have been torn out when the investigator, after several 
calls, eventually found Leford at home. O'Meara., though apprised of 
Morgado's letter by the time he answered Thuillier's charges, made no 
mention of Morgado, but he anticipated the next development when he 
characterised a friend of the Spaniard's, McDermot, as a man with a 
personal grudge against himself93. In July McDermot sent to England a 
letter of accusations against the British commissariat which was returned 
91. Goods imported for the use of the British garrison were exempted from 
customs duties. 
92. This despite the fact that Morgado was a Spanish official. Dickens 
concluded from the customs' refusal that they were themselves guilty of 
frauds in respect of these certificates. 
93. RcDermot had been a baker in the employ of the commissariat, dismissed 
by O'Meara. He resented this and attempted to regain his place by threats 
against the commissary who ignored them. P. R. O. 57/41, O'Meara's letter 
and enclosures of 5th July 1812. 
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to Dickens for his consideration. Both Dickens and Herries by this time 
placed no credence in the charges but the process of exoneration worked 
slowly and it was not until the end of the year that O'Meara was "completely 
and honourably acquitted of all culpability in the alleged transactions" 
and his accusers stated "to have been activated by the basest motives of 
calumny and malevolence"94. 
It must be presumed that these conclusions were correct95 and that the 
persistence of these accusations, even after the official pronouncement of 
O'Meara's blamelessness is only evidence of a faction at Cadiz disgruntled 
with the presence or behaviour of the British commissariat. Various 
motives can be discerned, McDermot's revenge for dismissal, Thuillier's 
the irriiation of a thwarted businessman 
96, 
while Morgado was possibly 
spurred by patriotic feelings97. The indecisive result of Dickens' inquiry 
into his charges suggests that he may have had an inkling of real crimes, 
perhaps with Leford as the guilty party. His departure from Leford's 
employ and subsequent job in the customs service favour this view as had 
his dismissal been ignominious to himself it might have been expected that 
O'Meara or Dickens would have adduced this to the discredit of his assertions. 
One of the most striking features of the case is the way in which a single 
anonymous letter was sufficient to start a major investigation of an officer 
hitherto most highly regarded by his superiors and colleagues alike. This 
demonstrates clearly the attentiveness of the Treasury to the possibility 
of frauds. Granted this suspicious attitude it is tempting to suppose 
that any major swindles would not have passed without investigation and 
that the absence with the field army of any cases comparable to O'Meara's 
denotes the honesty of the commissariat officers. The amateurish nature 
of the investigation does not negate this argument which becomes less 
convincing however in the light of various significant circumstances. 
94" P. R. O. W. O. 58/134. Herries to Cooke, 29th January 1813. 
95. Cooke, the garrison's commanding officer, and Henry Wellesley, British 
ambassador to the Cortes, were also satisfied of O'Meara's innocence. 
96. And, if O'Meara's account is true, of a thwarted smuggler. He claimed 
Thuillier falsified a duty-free certificate and when this was detected tried 
to bribe O'Meara to ignore the fact. Dickens reported that Thuillier had 
been a smuggler in England. 
97. He would not be the only Spaniard to resent the British presence at 
Cadiz, nor the only Iberian to accuse the British officials of profiting at 
the expense of his nation's customs, with or without evidence. 
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One circumstance is the widespread contemporary conviction that 
commissaries benefited in illegitimate ways from their employment. 
Comments range from the generalised and guarded, like Iarpent's "The 
Commissaries all live here exceedingly well, the Lord knows how out of 
their pay; and that ought to be nearly their only advantage"98, to the 
specific, like Tomkinson's statement that the commissaries used public 
money to speculate in the orders to pay that had to be given the muleteers 
in lieu of money. Certainly a department order had been passed 
forbidding such speculation in the bills of army officers99. Even the 
memoirs of the commissaries themselves provide occasional support for 
such suspicions, Schaumann's remark "if a commissary is expected to 
starve in the midst of all his stores, then the devil take the whole 
business"100 is well known, but more interesting perhaps would be an 
account of where he got the ¬700 remitted to England on page 352. It 
would have taken every halfpenny of his pay for three years to amass the 
sum. Adding force to these considerations is the extreme ease with which 
officers of the department could profit by their duty. Leaving aside 
perquisites such as animals which could be 'requisitioned' unofficially 
(see again Schaumann page 151), the anarchical weights and measures system 
of Portugal left endless loopholes to anyone who received or issued 
provisions. The basic measures of grain (the Portuguese alquier or 
Spanish fanega) and alcohol (the pipe and its fraction the almude) were 
subject to immense regional variations101 with the result that a receipt 
quoted in local measure was a quite imprecise document in itself, leaving 
aside the unavoidable difficulties of accurate measurement under field 
conditions. Meat issues were even harder to check. How much issuable 
meat could be expected from a bullock? Noboä, r could tell precisely until 
the animal was slaughtered, and the issuing commissary had always the last 
98. Such a remark might under certain conditions mean nothing at all, but 
Larpent was the Judge Advocate General and had no visible animosity towards 
the commissariat. Larpent vol I, letter of 14th April 1813- 
99. P. R. O. W. O. 57/38, Order of the 5th September 1810. 
100. A. L. F. Schaumann On the Road with Wellington, ed Ludovici, 1924, p 38. 
101. The alquier was normally taken at its Lisbon value of about 14 lbs of 
barley but near Oporto mightbe 17 lbs or in the Azores 27 lbs. On the same 
list of receipts I have seen the fanega of barley uoted at 54,60,64 and 
90 lbs. The 'normal' pipe seems to have been 1141 gallons of wine though 
the pipe of Oporto was 95 and the Lisbon pipe was reckoned 
in the port of 
London to contain 140 gallons. 
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word102. It must have been very easy for an astute officer to accumulate 
a series of individually undetectable discrepancies, all in his own favour, 
which would have built up over a year or so to a substantial quantity. 
With the help of a local inhabitant too certifying the prevalence of prices 
slightly higher than were current, he could discreetly have made considerable 
sums. 
Suspicion is not proof and it is not intended to suggest that all made 
profits on the side simply because all had the opportunity. As the war 
proceeded however the gradual tightening up of the regulations for 
receipting must have been designed to reduce opportunities for frauds 
which were suspected to exist. Gradually rules were introduced whereby 
receipts had to state English equivalents for all weights and measures and 
whether the sums of money involved were expressed in currency or metal103. 
Little could be done however to im, rove the vouching system. There were 
circumstances of active service under which a perfectly honest transaction 
could not be adequately vouched and there were many ways of forging or 
falsifying so as to invest a swindle with seemingly impeccable supporting 
documents. The ease with which dishonest members of the medical department 
were able to circumvent similar regulations as to the vouching of expenditure 
should be remembered, though in that case the dishonesty began at the 
highest level which appears not to have been so in the commissariat104. 
Though not even the most approximate figures survive in justification, 
it must be supposed that a small percentage of expenditure was regularly 
seeping away from its proper channels in a variety of little extravagances 
to the advantage of individual members of the department. The circumstances 
of the O'Meara case do suggest however the absence of corruption at very 
senior levels which alone might have given the situation the scandalous 
quality of the medical department defalcations, and it would be fanciful 
to state the 'shrinkage' of funds from fraud at a very high figure, to 
102. The system of 'averaging' and pricing meat 
(see chapter III) made 
it impossible to check the issued weight against the supposed weight when 
alive, which would not in any case have been more than an approximate guide. 
103. See chapter IV. 
104. K. E. Crowe, 'Thomas Burn Catherwood and the Medical Department of 
Wellington's Army: 1809-14', Medical History, vol 20 No 1, January 1976. 
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assert that nest feathering often got 
in the way of duty or to set peculation 
in the balance against the vital work done by the commissariat in making the 
army's operations possible at all. 
The principal hindrance to the efficient handling of commissariat business 
was lack of manpower and lack of a training scheme which would have enabled 
this shortage to be quickly overcome. All other inconveniences, a certain 
amount of personal friction, some waste from dishonesty, the decentralisation 
of command that resulted from the dual responsibility of the commissaoiat, 
and even the expenditure of time and effort over the accounts, are slight 
in comparison with this. The maligned promotion system on the other hand 
seems not to have deserved its share of criticism. About the competence 
of the individual officers a certain amount has been said, more instances 
are to follow, and a collected assessment of their quality will be presented 
in the final chapter along with some account of the relations between the 
department as a whole and the local population. It is now intended to 
consider separately the three main areas of commissariat responsibility, 
starting with the provision of rations. 
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CHAPTER III : The Provenance of Food and Forage Supplies to the Army 
1809-14. 
It is intended in this chapter to consider only the four most important 
commodities supplied by the commissariat to the army namely bread and meat, 
the basic necessities of life for the men, forage, equally vital to the 
horses, and alcohol which although not an essential supply like the others 
(indeed the issue was looked upon as an indulgence rather than as part of 
the soldier's entitlement) was almost invariably provided and so contributed 
to the demands on the military chest, and often the transport capacity, in 
the same way as the other ration items. The commissariat did at times 
provide other supplies besides these four, indeed firewood was probably 
a regular issue and rice at the rate of one pound per day among eight men 
was at times prescribed for the troops in General Orders, but the pressure 
of these and other subsidiary supplies upon the credit apparatus and the 
transport arrangements is felt to have been comparatively slight and the 
damage to army morale and discipline in the event of their failure, trivial. 
The problem of supply naturally grew with the increasing size of the army. 
In 1809 after Wellington's return to Portugal and before the Talavera 
campaign the British army totalled some 26,000 men with 4,000 horses. By 
the battle of Bussaco in September the following year these numbers had 
increased to 40,000 men and 6,000 horses. The addition of the Marquis 
de la Romana's Spanish army and certain Portuguese militia units raised 
the number of rations to be provided by the Commissary-General to 70,000 
and 12,000 of forage while the army remained in the Torres Vedras lines, 
and the dispersal of this concentration of force in 1811 did not reduce the 
ration strength to the level of the previous year since on the 5th March 
Wellington adopted the principle that Portuguese units attached to British 
divisions should draw their supply from British stores. This left the 
commissariat with the task of feeding some 60,000 men in 1811. In late 
1812 Kennedy mckoned the ration strength of the united army retiring on 
Portugal, once again at 70,000 and 12,000 forage rations, while in the 
Pyrenees he spoke of providing 100,000 rations to men and 20,000 to horses 
per day. Thus between 1809 and 1814 the quantity of provisions which the 
commissariat were expected to supply more than tripled, and it is againHt 
this background that the ways and means to be described in this chapter 
should be considered. 
"ý 
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CHAPTER III, part A: Bread. 
Bread, being a perishable commodity and easily damaged in transit, was 
neither stored in commissariat depots nor eaten far from the place of its 
baking. Troops stationed at depots, detachments passing through, the 
sick at hospital stations and the non-combatants of the commissariat and 
medical departments entitled to rations would receive bread freshly baked 
each day, sometimes from a small contractor or else baked by the good 
offices of the local magistrate, and similarly units of the field army in 
cantonments or in any position where there was a reasonable expectation 
of their remaining undisturbed for a while, would generally employ local 
labour to bake bread for their needs as far as the oven capacity of the 
locality would permit. 
1 
However the normal supply of the troops on the 
move and the reserve stock held in the depots from which the divisions 
drew their rations was of biscuit or of flour waiting to be baked. It 
was normally in the latter state that the commissariat received the bread 
rations when obtained from abroad or by purchase in the rear. Biscuit 
possessed the great virtue of lasting a long time provided it was baked 
hard enough. D. C. G. Boyes wrote of some baked under his direction at 
Tomar that, although not as good as biscuit baked in England, "it is far 
preferable to bread not only for carriage but for keeping as it will ... 
keep a month or two & is in my opinion very good"2. The secret, as D. C. G. 
Routh pointed out to a subordinate, was to bake it hard right through 
without leaving a soft part in the middle which would be liable to moulder 
It was also lighter in transit than bread since the ration was less, only 
one pound rather than a pound and a half, and was altogether a much more 
satisfactory commodity from the commissary's point of view. Not surprisingly 
though the superior gastronomic qualities of bread made it the more popular 
1. As early as the 17th June 1809 a General Order issued at Abrantes instructed 
all brigade commissaries whenever halting anywhere for more than one night to 
examine the baking capacity of the locality and expand it if required for the 
number of troops in their charge. As the arrangements for supply from the 
depots became more efficient with the accumulation of provision reserves and 
the growth of an effective transport this order in all its stringency became 
superfluous but baking, or otherwise obtaining locally, at least a part of the 
unit's consumption when in fixed positions remained usual to the end of the war. 
2. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17983, Boyes to Ogilvie, 30th September 1810. 
3. N. A. M. Acc 7701-36 A No 21, Routh to Marsden, 10th January 1812. 
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issue on the part of the army, and for convenience hereafter I shall 
describe the obtaining by the commissariat of bread, biscuit, flour or 
wheat as the bread supply. 
The bread supply is best considered in three periods, not precisely 
defined in time but running roughly, the first from April 1809 (the start 
of this study) to the end of 1810, the second from then until the lifting 
of the British ban on grain exports, announced to Commissary-General Kennedy 
on the 18th June 1813, and the third from that date to the end of the war. 
The first period was marked by the absence of any large scale importing 
arrangements, whether from the United KinLdom or other foreign sources. 
During 1810 slightly over one million pounds of flour was sent from England 
to the Peninsula, mostly comprehended in a single shipment which arrived 
in August, and at the end of the year the Treasury ordered the despatch of 
ten thousand quarters of wheat4. It is very likely that some biscuit was 
received from England in the latter part of 1809 but the quantity cannot 
have been great as the total value of supplies sent from the United Kingdom 
to Spain and Portugal in that year was only 20% of the 1810 figure and some 
of this money is accounted for by the rum and. salt meat sent as wells. 
These amounts are small compared with the army's requirements over the 
twenty one month period (somewhere in excess of twenty million rations) 
and perhaps might amount to 25 or 30j, of consumption. Smaller seem to be 
the quantities acquired from other sources overseas as far as they may be 
ascertained. At the recommendation of the Treasury Commissary-General 
Murray bought a consignment of grain including one million pounds of wheat 
from a certain Mr. Phillips in January 18106, and this was probably the 
most substantial import transaction of the period. A small amount of 
wheat was sent from the Azores on the 9th June 1810 (about 100,000 lbs)7 
and flour was sent to the Tagus from Cadiz both directly by the commissariat 
4. A bushel of wheat is reckoned to weigh roughly 60 lbs, thus the ten 
thousand quarters would have weighed 4,800,000 lbs. 
5. The reason for inferring this shipment is that the stock of biscuit in 
the 1st January 1810 return of depot stores is described as "English biscuit". 
P. R. O. W. O. 57/38. Further Boyes, in the letter quoted above, compares his 
product with the one baked in England implying the presence in Portugal of 
the object of his comparison. 
6. Further details of the above transaction may be found in the section 
dealing with forage and forage corn. 
7. P. R. O. A. 0.1 569/460. 
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and by a contractor at the end of the same year. More uncertain is the 
quantity obtained from the Barbary coast. In November 4810 Commissary- 
General Drummond observed that there was wheat awaiting collection "under 
treaty" at Bona since August but that only now were steps being taken, by 
the ubiquitous Sr Sampaio and Mr Cochrane Johnstone in a joint venture, to 
bring it to Lisbon8. The treaty referred to was presumably the trade 
agreement of the 9th September 1809 with Algiers, but it remains pure 
speculation to guess how much ultimately arrived at Lisbon, if indeed any 
did at all. 
It is clear that no certain figure can be obtained representing the 
number of bread rations consumed between April 1809 and the end of 1810 for 
which the army was indebted to imports. It is also clear that the amount was 
far from overwhelming and might reasonably be hypothesised to fall somewhere 
between a third and a half of all consumption. This estimate is not denied 
by the recorded opinions of the two Commissaries-General. Murray 
acknowledged four modes of supply to the army during his appointment, namely 
contract, purchase, requisition and imports from home, and reckoned purchase 
to have been his main resource9, while Kennedy felt that at least until 
July 1810 a third of all consumption had been provided by the brigade 
commissaries themselves. In the light of these statements we may look to 
the experience of the army at brigade level for confirmation of the great 
. eficiency of imported provisions and for information about how the lack 
was made good. 
That, as Murray implies, requisitions and local purchases played a 
substantial part in the bread supply during 1809 is confirmed by two letters, 
one from Mr Myler regarding the arrangements made for supplying the four 
squadrons of cavalry stationed at Vila Vicosa, who were to draw one thousand 
and twenty rations of bread per day from several villages in the vicinity 
10 
and one from A. C. G. Gauntlett (supervising the supply of the 1st division) 
informing General Sherbrooke that some villages had not provided their quota 
of bread and going on to report the failure of the Junta of Badajoz to 
8. Now Annaba in Algeria. B. M. Add Mss 57375, Drummond to Herries, 24th 
November 1810. 
9'0 18th Report of the Commissioners v. s. Presumably Murray lumps together 
as purchases import transactions such as that with Mr Phillips and local 
operations such as Mr Downie's trip into the mountains for cattle. 
10. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17907 f. 60, Myler to Ogilvie, 2nd Spptember 1809. 
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provide eight thousand rations he had been expecting11. Nor was it only 
in the forward positions that the troops lived off the locality since in 
June, Mr Schaumann had excused his tardy transport return by pleading the 
extreme difficulty of obtaining bread and corn at Tomar, no great distance 
from the main supply route from Lisbon to Abrantes12. Certainly some 
wheat and very likely flour and biscuit too did arrive at the army from 
the rear in the course of the year, but it is evident that the practice 
was to conserve such stocks for use on the march and when stationary to 
subsist for quite long periods on local means13. Myler's arrangement 
alluded to above was to last a month at some of the villages in question 
and not less than three weeks anywhere. 
After the division of the army at the turn of the year this system 
remained in force with all outlying units, but not perhaps quite to the 
same extent as in 1809. The light division, between the Agueda and Coa 
rivers found the district unable (notwithstanding even the draconian measures 
of Mr Downie during May14) to supply all their needs. Until the 26th March 
the 43rd regiment was able to live on a combination of supplies from the 
depot at Pinhel and from the inhabitants of Malpartida but thereafter the 
latter supply failed, while the 52nd, save the three companies in Gallegos, 
were already largely depending on bread from the rear. However the depots 
on which these troops depended, Almeida and Pinhel for the most part, 
themselves were stocked with a mixture of supplies brought forward along 
the depot chain and local purchases, so the emancipation of Craufurd's 
command from the resources of the vicinity was less than at first sight 
appears 
1-5. In the southern theatre as well the troops received a combination 
of depot supplies and local acquisitions, the former being held as a reserve 
11. Supplementary Despatches VI, Gauntlett to Sherbrooke, 15th September 1809. 
12. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 22080 f. 39. Schaumann to Ogilvie, 22nd June 1809. 
Schaumann was commissary to the 14th light dragoons at the time. 
13. The 3rd division too was following this practice in October. See N. L. S. 
Ace 4370 No 17907. Finlay to Ogilvie, 20th October 1809. 
14" Despatches VI. Wellington to Craufurd, 14th May 1810. Wellington 
even gave Craufurd permission to draw on the Almeida reserve rather than oppress 
the locals although Mr Cooper had received a reprimand in March for issuing 
reserve biscuit. 
15. During the week 24th to 30th March 1810 Almeida received 40 sacks of 
biscuit and 52 barrels of flour or wheat from the commissariat, and 59 sacks of 
flour or wheat with 718 loaves from local magistrates or private individuals. 
In the same period 14 pipes of wine arrived from Pinhel and 10 from the locality. 
N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17953. 
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stock "ggreable to the order on the 24th of February" 
16 
as D. A. C. G. Wechinger 
observed, upon his reporting six days' biscuit in the possession of Stewart's 
brigade. All the same the troops in his charge were being supplied with 
bread by the corregidor at Portalegre in July, as the men of Wilson's 
brigade had been the previous month. Not surprisingly, further from the 
base depot at Abrantes local bread was also much in demand though sometimes 
short in supply. From Castello Branco Mr Belson had to send as far away 
as Fundao and Covilhao for bread, though a month later he had found the means 
to draw one thousand nine hundred rations per day from the immediate 
neighbourhood17. 
Just as in the north the forward depots themselves were the recipients 
of some local supplies which they passed on to the units, so the depot at 
Portalegre was indebted to various natives of the country, officials, like 
the corregidor and providor of Portalegre, and private individuals for an 
assortment of supplies including substantial quantities of wheat and bread 
18 
Two private contractors, Messrs Dillon and Fletcher also served the southern 
army, providing supplies of bread, meat and barley. Mr Fletcher was based 
at Elvas where he offered the wheat and flour he obtained both to the British 
commissariat and to the Portuguese 'assentista', but appears to have given 
the British the first refusal, presumably because their credit was better. 
The Portalegre depot certainly received supplies from Fletcher at Elvas 
during June and very likely on other occasions, but, more than this, by July 
the merchant was acting in an intermediary role, almost as if he had been 
himself a commissary, His letter of the 13th of July shows him loading 
and despatching mules and making advance preparations for the reception of 
troops, both jobs normally the duty of commissariat employees. D. C. G. 
Ogilvie had asked him to "send all the brigade mules to Portalegre with 
Wheat, Flour and Barley: your request shall be attended to. I arrived 
this morn'g at six o'clock from Campo Maior; where I had arranged everything 
for the reception of the troops, by employing the same agents as I had at 
16. Ibid No 17972, Wechinger to Ogilvie, 14th June 1810. 
17. His early difficulties may have been as a result of his reluctance to 
issue rye bread. All accounts agree that the only flour available near 
Castello Branco was rye and there were several grumbles about its indifferent 
quality though Messrs Belson, Wilkinson and Berard all had to issue it in 
August and September 1810 for lack of anything better. 
18. For example in April and May 25,000 lbs of wheat from Sr Francisco Xavier 
Borges Perreira Ferrais and 70,000 lbs of bread from Sr Joao Martin Sergio 
d'Almeida. Ibid No 22079 ff 88 and 105/6. 
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the time General Hope was here19, and think nothing would have been 
wanting, but I am afraid the bread will now be lost which was baked last 
night" 
20. This establishes the fact that Fletcher was a source of bread 
for the southern troops, not only as an occasional supplier to the Portalegre 
depot but also as an arranger of local supplies directly to detachments, 
reinforcing the conclusion that the British forces made considerable use 
of local resources in this period of the war. 
These various evidences support the statements of Kennedy and Murray 
about the sketchiness of the supply moving forward along the depot chain 
in 1810 and also bear out the estimate given earlier of the relative paucity 
of flour and wheat imports in this first period as it is clear that a great 
deal of the bread consumed was obtained locally, without any accumulation 
of stocks in the rear resulting from this independent consumption. In the 
provision state of the 1st January there are shown about three million 
pounds of biscuit, flour and wheat while on the 30th November the same 
figure is less than one million pounds21. Thus the chief reason why so 
much bread was locally consumed in 1809/10 must be that so little was fed 
into the depots in rear. 
In the second period, from the end of 1810 to June 1813, great exertions 
were extended, mainly under the auspices of Charles Stuart and Wellington, 
to increase the import supply. The two main areas for these efforts were 
the Mediterranean and the 'United States, for no supply of wheat appears to 
have arrived from Britain in this period, although it was not until the 21st 
November 1811 that Lord Liverpool communicated to Wellington the government's 
decision that in view of the bad harvest no more grain was to be exported 
from the British Isles. This policy remained in force for eighteen months 
in spite of a particular request from Bisset in March 1812 that a supply of 
19. In 1808, during Sir John Moore's advance into Spain. 
20. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17974, Fletcher to Ogilvie, 13th July 1810. 
21. The exact breakdown is: Biscuit Flour Wheat (all lbs) 
1st Jan 1810 : 1,692,160 1,099,160 87,070 
30th Nov 1810 :- 398,500 548,080 
P. R. O. W. 0.57/38" 
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flour be sent22, and despite the tempting offer of a Mr John Lawrence 
Drake to supply twenty thousand quarters of wheat 
(foreign) to the Peninsula. 
Both request and offer were turned down23. The Treasury and the Commissary 
in Chief were not however totally insensitive to the needs of the Peninsula, 
and Herries entered into an arrangement with Messrs Oswell & Co to bring 
grain from the Black Sea. This project was announced to Bisset on the 
30th May 1812 with the warning rider that "It is however by no means certain 
that the gentlemen will find themselves able to surmount all the political 
difficulties which lie in the way of the performance of this engagement"24. 
By October the political difficulties had indeed proved insurmountable and 
Herries was asking Burgman, the Commissary-General in Sicily, to assist 
Kennedy as much as possible in obtaining Mediterranean grain for Spain and 
Portugal. The Treasury was still refusing to export "even for the army 
except under circumstances of absolute necessity"25. 
The Mediterranean had been a source of supply for Portugal before the 
Commissary in Chief thus enlisted Burgman's assistance in the buying. It 
was normal for the country in peace time to make up for its insufficient 
domestic wheat production by importing from the North African coast, although 
political difficulties with the Barbary States threw frequent interruptions 
in the way of this trade. The same pattern persisted in the war years, 
wheat being exported from Morocco and Algiers (possibly under the trading 
agreement, see above) despite the fact that the Algerines were at war with 
Portugal until the agreement of an uneasy armistice in June 181226. Prior 
to this, the Portuguese agent, Mr Dalz&ll, with the support of the British 
consul, Blanckley, had been arranging grain exports from Algiers to Lisbon 
but after Blanckley was dismissed in the spring of 1812 the proconsul, 
22. Ibid 58132, Herries to Bisset, 2nd March 1812. Bisset had asked for 
2,500,000 lbs of flour a month. Herries did not refuse out of hand but 
submi ted the question to the Treasury who vetoed the scheme. 
23. The offer was made on the 15th July 1812 and rejected two months later. 
The price of ¬5 per quarter was cheap by current English standards but perhaps 
the Treasury felt it excessive in the Peninsula. July was a month of low 
grain prices in the Mediterranean and wheat could have been bought for ¬4 10/- 
a quarter. By September this was no longer so but presumably the information 
took a while to reach London. Ibid 57/5, Harrison 
to Herries 15th July 1812. 
24. P. R. O. W. O. 58/132. Harries to Bisset, 30th May 1812. 
25. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134. Harries to Kennedy, 15th October 1812. 
26. B: M. Add Mss 41512. McDonnell to Stuart, 2nd April and 10th April 1813. 
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John McDonnell, began to urge Dalzell's recall and declared that no part 
of the export from Algiers should pass Gibraltar, so presumably the 
Algerine sup2ly at Lisbon was then stopped. The following year an 
agreement was reached with the Bay of Oran for exporting duty free articles, 
among them one thousand loads of wheat. This was perhaps a timely 
circumstance as the Moroccans had at this time decided that corn was not to 
be exported any more. Evidently this trade was not very dependable, and 
it was certainly very small in scale compared to the American shipments27. 
Clearly the commissariat, although taking great trouble in this period to 
procure supplies of grain, appear to have made no effort to increase or 
regularise the supply from north Africa, thus relegating it to a relatively 
minor role. 
Other Mediterranean sources may be briefly dealt with. Charles Stuart 
employed Sampaio early in 1812 to buy flour and grain at Gibraltar and 
Cadiz and eleven shiploads were duly forthcoming at Lisbon28. The Cadiz 
garrison, plentifully stocked as usual, sent ten thousand barrels of flour 
to Lisbon in January the same year 
29. Favourable prognostications about 
the harvest of 1812 in the Mediterranean regions led to an increase in 
trading activity in the late summer and autumn of the year and wheat prices 
at Malta and Sicily rose sharply, "which must be the case if Spanish vessels 
resort to Malta for supplies30 as one of Herries' Mediterranean correspondents 
observed. As the Treasury were sensitive to the price of articles they 
soon grew alarmed and modified their implied instructions of October 1812, 
when Commissary-General Burguran had been asked to render assistance to his 
Peninsular colleague, ordering that trade should be allowed to take its 
natural course, and that Levantine wheat should not be bought for Portugal 
in the central Mediterranean3l. By the time this direction was issued 
27. G. E. Watson, in his article already cited, is of the opinion that the 
response from north Africa was 'disappointing' viewed as a source of supply 
alternative to that from America in 1812. In 1811 46 Turkish or Moorish 
vess6is had entered the port of Lisbon compared to 797 Americans. Admittedly 
some of the latter did not dome directly from the United States and some of 
the Barbary trade may have gone in Portuguese or Spanish bottoms, but the 
Mediterranean vessels were smaller than their ocean going counterparts so the 
predominant volume of American trade seems clearly established. 
28. P. R. O. A. 0.1 570/467. 
29. P. R. O. W. O. 57/41, O'Meara to Herries, Ist February 1812. 
30. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134. Enclosed in Herries to Kennedy, 3rd November 1812. 
31. Ibid, 57/5, Harrison to Herries, 4th March 1813. 
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however it was evident that the need for vigorous action had passed, both 
from the healthy state of supplies at Lisbon32 and from the successful 
conclusion, in February 1813, of Sampaio's negotiations for a large purchase 
(eighteen million pounds) of wheat in Egypt. The altered situation of the 
war both in Spain and northern Europe by the time this purchase began iits 
journey through the Mediterranean rendered the eventual disposal of the 
consignment something of an embarrassment but this could not possibly 
have been foreseen at the start of the year33. 
Official initiatives tocbtain grain from the Americas were prominent in 
1811 and 1812. Indeed before the close of 1810 Stuart gave Sampaio bills 
to the value of ¬400,000 to be used in America for the purchase of supplies. 
This money was laid out to acquire forty six cargoes of flour, rice, Indian 
corn and navy bread (biscuit) which made their way back to the Peninsula 
early in 181134. The following year Stuart was again the author of a 
large purchase in America through the agency of Sampaio, although this time 
payment was made by Augustus Foster, British minister at Washington, with 
bills sent him from Lisbon for the purpose. Seventy one ships sailed on 
this occasion with cargoes of flour and grain, their passage being delayed 
by the April trade embargo imposed by the American government, but all 
arrived safely later in the year. The quantities involved in these shipments 
are evidently substantial and when to them are added the proceeds of two 
separate purchases of flour and grain in South America negotiated by Lord 
Strangford, British ambassador to the exiled Portuguese court, again at 
Stuart's i, istigation, there is accounted for nearly a half of the British 
commissariat's issues in 1811 and 181235. Nor is it necessary to look 
very far to discover the source of as much more as was required as it was 
32. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 18th January 1813. "I have to 
express my satisfaction at finding your supplies of flour and forage corn are 
so ample and that you have no reason to fear a scarcity of those articles in the markets". 
33" Ibid 57/6, Harrison to Herries, 3rd August and 20th October 1813, 
Wharton to Herries, 30th August 1813- 
34. P. R. O. A. 0.1 570/465. These are probably the vessels for which the 
Marquis Wellesley granted a protected passage in February 1811. 
35" Also contributing to this figure is wheat from the Azores and-flour from 
Canada, the former a small quantity (about 80,000 lbs), the latter more 
substantial (3,820 barrels) bought at Bisset's request by Commissary-General 
Robinson at Quebec and shipped in October 1812. P. R. O. W. 0.57/40, Pipon 
to Herries, 13t1 October 1812 and Ibid 58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 6th November 
1812. 
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common knowledge in the Peninsula 
that a great proportion of the flour 
eaten by the armies was brought from America 
by American merchants36. By 
the end of 1811 Wellington and Stuart had begun to worry about the drain 
of specie in paying for these large flour imports and the following year 
it became necessary to restrict the issue of licences to export silver37. 
Even under the restriction the trade remained considerable, as between 
mid-July and the end of September 1812 licences were obtained for the export 
of 322,500 dollars to America although this was a drop by comparison with 
the figure'for the preceding two and a half month period which had been 
over 700,000 dollars. This flourishing trade continued under British 
licence regardless of the outbreak of war in April 1812 and only came to 
a stop in summer 1813 as a result of two measures, the British decision of 
November 14th 1812 to issue no new licences (though to honour all those 
ext4nt - nine months was a typical limit on their validity) and the American 
Act of the 29th July 1613 forbidding all trade under British licences. 
A glance at the statistics for the war years makes the huge increase 
in American flour imports into Portugal after the year 1810 very apparent38. 
Far more flour was sold in 1811,1812 and 1813 than the allied armies 
could possibly have eaten, so it is clear that the only limitation which 
might have prevented the British commissariat obtaining an ample supply 
of bread both for the troops that were their responsibility and to contribute 
in kind towards the Portuguese subsidy, was lack of money or credit to pay 
for the provisions. Money was in short supply, especially durinE 1812, 
but British credit remained adequate and it would seem that, despite the 
Non-Importation Act of February 1811, some of the American merchants were 
36. See for example "Mr Pipon's drafts are generally for supplies of 
provisions purchased from the Americans", Despatbhes IX p. 364, Wellington to 
Bathurst, 18th August 1812. "All the flour useu comes from America, the 
ships of which country crowd the port", Letters of Colonel Augustus Frazer 
ed. Sabine 1859 p. 20. And many other references. 
37" B. M. Add Mss 31236 Stuart to Castlereagh, 24th September 1812. 
38. W. F. Galpin 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula', American 
Historical Review October 1922, gives these figures: 
1808 41,761 barrels flour. 1812 557,218 barrels flour. 
1809 65,149 1813 542,399 " 
1810 88,696 " 1814 4,141 " 
1811 529,105 
The quantities in the pre-war years vary widely: for example 22,633 barrels 
back in 1805 and 122,410 in 1803. 
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still prepared to accept payment in bills on London39, though many must 
have received cash from individuals better endowed with that asset than were 
the commissariat the British subsequently buying the flour with bills at 
second hand and an accordingly higher price. The value of drafts upon 
London made at Lisbon in 1811 and 1812 can only be explained by supposing 
substantial purchases in the Lisbon rarket. It is thus apparent that in 
this period, in contrast to the previous one, the commissariat was enabled 
to procure bread stocks from abroad adequate to the supply of the field 
army and the maintenance of a reserve in the magazines. 
Turning from the story of these imports to the experience of the army in 
the field, the comparative plenty of flour at the coast leads one to expect 
an increase in this period in theconsumption of depot supplied bread and 
biscuit and a corresponding lesser use of the local article. The evidence 
for 1811 suggests that this was not in fact the case and that the import 
increase went mainly to swelling the reserve depots, exiguous as we have 
seen at the end of 1810, and very little to feeding the army40. Even while 
the divisions were in front of Santarem and the communication with Lisbon 
was short the forces on the left bank were considerably supplied from the 
country and since the depot at Vallada from which they drew a proportion 
of their biscuit also supplied the men forward on the Rio Maior its shortages 
will have been felt by the main army too. Particularly in December 1810 
Vallada often ran short of biscuit. Messrs Wilkinson and Belson supplying 
units on the left bank must have drawn about half their bread from local 
sources at this time. It is likely that the left bank men, having better 
access to undevastated areas, were last served at the depots4l, the main army 
thus receiving more depot biscuit than these brigades, but by no means all 
theprovisions obtained on the left bank remained with the men on that side. 
39. Watson op. cit. suggests that the Non-importation Act put an end to the 
acceptance of bills on London by American merchants. On the other hand Galpin 
cites the case of a shipper instructed to accept such payment in March 1811 as 
being the normal practice. From Wellington's and Stuart's complaints about 
the specie drain it is evident that bills cannot have been popular but equally 
obvious that they were used on occasions. 
40. Paying the Portuguese subsidy in kind was another use to which sea-borne 
supplies were commonly put. 
41. Wilkinson hints as muchwhen he writes "On every side I see numberless 
mules and cars passing downwards with Grain for the troops on the other side". 
Q. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17980 Wilkinson to Ogilvie, 8th December 1810. 
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Besides this transfer of essentially local provisions the units of the main 
army also undertook foraging expeditions (sweeping the country towards the 
enemy as Schaumann explained) so the magazine supply to the troops on the 
Rio Maior was far from complete42. 
When the army returned to the Spanish border for the rest of the year 1811 
the consumption of supplies imported or purchased at the coastal markets was 
calculated by Bisset as part of a general break-down of expenditure. His 
finding was that "that proportioi of the supplies which is purchased with 
the different divisions and regiments beyond which they are enabled to draw 
from the depots, also those purchased at stations in the interior, exclusive 
of Lisbon and Oporto43, was over two thirds of total expenditure on supplies. 
This proportion would not have been equal for all commodities as local 
expenditure would have included much of the meat supply and probably all 
the alcohol so perhaps the proportion in the case of bread might have been 
somewhere around 50%o. It is however clear that this high proportion of local 
purchases did not result from a shortage in rear. Kennedy went so far as to 
sell wteat to the Victualling Board's resident agent at Lisbon in the 
autumn44, which he would hardly have done had he been in difficulties over 
the supply, and Bisset's January 1812 return of provisions, though not 
itself extant, was found so reassuring by Herries as to lead him to congratulate 
the Commissary-General on his steps to ameliorate the effects of the poor 
British harvest45. 
By 1812 it would appear that the flour and biscuit accumulated on the 
coast was beginning to make its appearance with the field army in increasingly 
substantial quantities and that during this year and the first half of 1813 
the bread supply came mostly from the rear although never to the complete 
exclusion of supplies from other sources. It is suggested by the manner 
of Bisset's department orders that the change in emphasis from local to depot 
42. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17980 f. 53. Mr Lefevre was at Bemfica at the end of 
1810 buying 'Wheat, forage corn and cattle'. Wilkinson complained about him 
too; "I an informed that a person now stationed at Bemfica has authority from 
the Commissariat to employ a number of agents in this part of the country who 
are sweeping it (if I may use the expression) of wine and grain of every kind". 
43" B. M. Add. Mss 38247 f. 29 Bisset to Her-ries, 16th January 1812. The 
calculations are based on an average of the previous six months' figures and 
so pertain to the second half of 1811. 
44. P. R. O. 1"0.57/4, Arbuthnot to Herries, 15th January 1812. 
45" Ibid 58/132, Herries to Bisset, 2nd March 1812. 
- 64 - 
supplies was at least partly achieved by changing the habits of the field 
commissaries who had acquired expertise from experience of fending for 
themselves and were unaccustomed to drawing more than a partial supply from 
magazines. After urging his subordinates to use the depots as much as 
possible Bisset proceeded: "I know that many Commissaries purchase Bread 
because some General Officers do not wish biscuit at all times to be issued. 
I will not however suffer this to be a plea and will lay the matter before 
the Commander of the Forces if it is made one. Besides Flour can be 
brought up from our Depots and baked with but little trouble or expence"46. 
That the biscuit and flour really was available in the depots as Bisset 
claimed is confirmed by the experience of Ashworth's brigade stationed at 
Castello da Vide where they were instructed in February to build a ten day 
reserve of biscuit: "You may be always supplied with bread from this depot 
(Portalegre)... or you may draw flour from hence or from Niza, 
47. These 
orders were obeyed as appears by the fact that the brigade in the three 
months between the 25th January and the 24th April 1812 obtained only 8% 
of its bread from local sources, the rest from the depots48. 
For most of the remainder of the year the army was in Spain but remained 
considerably dependent on its supply lines for biscuit. The depots at 
Bgrca d'Alva, Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca all supplied direct to the divisions 
in the north at different times and it may well have been the Commissary- 
General's original intention to maintain the bread supply even at a great 
distance from the depots solely from the rear. This appears to be the 
object of the policy, adopted by Bisset in the summer, of feeding the horses 
in the country and re-allocating the cavalry mules to carriage of bread and 
spirita49 but, as one might expect, even with such an increased transport 
capacity the bread supply from the rear was still precarious in the heart 
of Spain. D. C. G. Dumaresq had a man at Carbonero, near Madrid, in August 
buying bread for the 4th division, and the papers relating to the 6th division 
in July and August make it plain that they must have had their own 
46. N. A. M. Ace 7701-36 A No 55 Order issued at Niza, 16th April 1812. 
47. Ibid No 37, Routh to Marsden, 7th February 1812. 
48. Ibid C No 72. 
49" This idea was explained by Bisset to the Commissary in Chief as already 
in execution on the 5th July 1812 (P. R. O. W. O. 57/411 According to JE Daniel, 
Journal of an Officer in the Commissariat Department of the Army, 1820, the 
cavalry regiments still had their mules at the beginning of June so presumably 
the change-over took place in that month. 
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arrangements for a part of their bread50. The measure 
did at least have 
the good effect of transferring some of the strain of making up shortfalls 
in the supply from the already overworked field commissaries to those 
in 
command of intermediate depots. Two extra sources augmented the 
flow of 
biscuit from the rear to the army in 1812, contracts with individuals and 
issues of provisions from the revenue (in kind) of the Spanish Crown's 
recaptured lands in the Salamanca region. This latter source, described 
by Wellington as the only way to obtain provisions from Spain "without 
payment, either immediately on delivery or in a short period"51, appears 
to have turned out less considerable than was hoped, but was nonetheless 
of benefit to the depot at Salamanca where, independently of the supplies 
that were held for issue to the mule brigades, the hospital, garrison and 
detachments combined in consuming eight thousand rations g day52. 
Contracts with individuals were the larger means of extra supply beyond 
what was brought forward from the rear. Bisset appears to have made a 
substantial bread con-bract at Valladolid from which he had hoped the mules 
of the army might be supplied directly but by the 8th August this had 
already failed and he had to alert the divisional commissaries that their 
transport would need to go further to the rear. At Salamanca several 
contracts were extant at the same time, the largest being with Sr Antonio 
da Pessoa who bought the articles of his supply on the Portuguese border. 
This agreement, made towards the end of August by Commissary-General 
Dalrymple, the terms including a supply of one hundred thousand pounds of 
biscuit at five thousand pounds a day, was sufficiently successful to be 
wortl-, renewing for a further hundred thousand pounds on the 25th September, 
although what he provided seems to have been bread and not biscuit at all53. 
50. See chapter VI. 
51. B. M. Add Mss 31236 Marginal notes to Vansittart's memorandum of 2nd 
September 1812. 
52. Dalrymple and Ogilvie made proposals to obtain 120 and 200 fanegas res- 
pectively of wheat per day from the Intendente of Salamanca who had the duty of 
administering the crown lands. According to the note in the Ogilvie papers 
however only 1,500 fanegas were received between 24th August and 15th October 
1812 which makes 28 a day. Perhaps the revenue was divided as Wellington 
had originally ordered it to be given to the (Spanish) garrison of Ciudad 
Rodrigo and only at Dalrymple's request agreed thatthe commissariat should have 
first claim bra it Or perhaps the change of Intendente was entirely to blame. 
N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17981 f. 104 and Despatches IX p 483, Wellington to Beresford, 
14th October 1812. 
53. Mr Cairns asserted that Pessoa used two ovens to bake 3,200 rations of 
bread daily (4,800 lbs). To bake only 3,200 rations of biscuit would have been 
to perform much less than his cc., itract. Further Cairns complained that 
yesterday's bread was "of a very bad quality & nearly half rye", probable enough 
if Pessoa did indeed purchase on the Portuguese border but not likely to have 
been biscuit. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17981 Cairns to Ogilvie 15th September 1812. 
ý-ý---- 
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Concurrently with this contract ran another with two bakers called Pedras 
who were made responsible for producing bread from the wheat supplied by 
the Intendente at Salamanca and Puente Sauco and for its delivery to the 
troops. Yet a third contract for supplying bread, to the hospital this 
time, was held by Don Marizo Gebara in October. There seems to have been 
no shortage of suppliers54 - indeed more than these were turned away for 
their excessive prices - and it would seem safe to suppose that such 
shortfalls as did occur in the supply from the rear were made up readily 
from contracts rather than by requisitions on individuals or magistrates55. 
The defeat of Napoleon in Russia and subsequent shaking of his control 
over the Baltic coast and its large fertile hinterland caused the 
abandonment of the Treasury's non-exporting policy. On the 8th June 1813, 
Herries announced to Kennedy the purchase of nineteen hundred quarters of 
wheat arrived "under peculiar circumstances" from the Baltic, and its 
impending despatch to Portuga156. Tgn days later he wrote more fully 
explaining the new policy of supplying the Peninsula with large monthly 
quantities from the United Kingdom, "it being deemed a measure of considerable 
public economy ... that these supplies should be conveyed to you as much as 
possible from this country and by British shipping only"57. Thereafter 
the commissariat was to become as dependent for its bread supply on England 
as it bad been in the previous two and a half years upon America. 
The quantity which IIerries reckoned sufficient to support the army for 
the month of July was, besides the wheat already mentioned, one million one 
hundred thousand pounds of flour58. Unless he heard to the contary he 
proposed to send a very similar quantity every subsequent month59. In 
54. For example Sr Luis de Sobral whose 30,000 lbs of flour at 140 reis per 
pound were felt by Dalrymple to be too expensive: "it bears no proportion to the price of wheat, bread or biscuit, the latter of which although exceeding dear at 3 reals is much cheaper than flour at 140 reas". N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 
17947, Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 4th September 1812. 
55" Requisition was of course resorted to in 1812 but as far as I know to a 
negligible extent. 
56. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134, Berries to Kennedy, 8th June 1813- 
57- Ibid, 18th June. 
58. This was not a firm estimate on his part. In the same letter he asks 
Kennedy to tell him what quantities were necessary to maintain the six month 
reserve Wellington had ordered in 1811, and support the troops. 
59. Precisely 2,000 quarters of wheat and 1,120,000 lbs of flour. 
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the first month indeed more was shipped than was promised because to the 
flour was added half a million pounds of biscuit60. This enlarged amount 
would have been nearly adequate to provisioning eighty thousand men for a 
month and, when added to the fact that flour and biscuit was also shipped 
round from the Lisbon reserve stocks to the north Spanish ports61, it 
appears that the army was sufficiently supplied with bread from the sea. 
That this was not so is because so much of the supply was in the form of 
flour and the bakeries of Santander produced a mere six thousand pounds 
of biscuit a day62. By the 14th August the advanced coastal depot of 
Passages held as much flour as could be stored there and Kennedy ordered 
that no more flour unbaked should be sent on from Santander. "In the 
present situation of the army no bread can be got from the country and 
we therefore depend upon our Victuallers" 
63 
wrote Kennedy, adding that 
only nine days'biscuit and flour were held in the ports of Bilbao and 
Passages. At Santander there was a further two and a half days' biscuit 
and six hundred and fifty thousand pounds of flour that could not be baked. 
The obvious solution was to have the biscuit sent ready baked from 
England. Ogilvie had already suggested this in a letter to the Commissary 
in Chief on the 17th July, but it was not until Kennedy insisted on the 
18th of the following month that wheat or flour, especially in large 
cumbersome casks, was of little use thanks to the poor baking facilities, 
that the suggestion appears to have been acted upon. Biscuit already 
baked was the usual supply in the autumn, as far as can be judged in 
sufficient quantities for the consumption of the army at least until the 
60. The first shipment took place on 3rd July 1813. During July there 
were shipped 1,192,576 lbs of flour and 505,760 The of biscuit, besides the 
1,900 quarters of wheat. 
61. Ogilvie optimistically asserted that the surplus stocks from the depots 
in Portugal "have already wholly or in part reached this port" (Santander) 
on 17th July, but in mid-August he and Kennedy were complaining of shortages 
and on the 23rd August we learn that a Lisbon convoy was still held up at 
Corunna, a month after putting out. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17936, Ogilvie to 
Herries, 17th July 1813- 
62. P. R. O. W. O. 57/42 Ogilvie to Herries, 23rd August 1813. One of the 
hindrances to baking at Santander was the arrest of several bakers by the 
Spanish authorities "on account of being natives of France". It was the 
first of many obstructive actions by the Spaniards of Santander who seem to 
have resented the English presence. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 11955, N01-riff to 
Kennedy, 19th August 1813. 
63. Ibid No 16930, Kennedy to Ogilvie, 19th August 1813. 
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end of October64. In late November Kennedy did write alarmingly to 
London that his depots were running low again but his fear was mainly 
about forage corn and he mentioned biscuit only to stress his complete 
dependence upon a regular supply 
65. 
Clearly this was still forthcoming 
in the new year; by early April Dalrymple was in a position to refuse 
offers of biscuit supply from France, stating, "We have already abundance 
on the coast" 
66. 
Turning to the experience of the men in the field during the closing 
stages of the war, this picture of large scale importing is mirrored in 
the fact that bread was usually supplied entirely from the rear, particularly 
once the army settled into regular cantonments in and around the Pyrenees. 
Before the supply ships started to arrive in July there were many local 
purchases, including "a large quantity of rice and flour" bought by Ogilvie 
at Santander 
7, but generally by commissaries in the field. "I must 
inform you that the Commissaries of division always procure a certain 
quantity of soft bread and wine in the country" wrote Ogilvie in July 
68 
Procuring this bread however was not always easy. A. C. G. Tupper Carey, 
of the 4th division, draw all his bread between Seitember and January from 
depots, while D. A. C. G. Head with the 3rd division issued half rations at 
the end of December and was "wholly dependant on what I can get from 
Ustaritz (the reserve depot of the centre) to keep up even half rations 
of biscuit"69. The 6th division, short of transport in December, found it 
most convenient to employ all its mules in the carriage of biscuit and 
obtain the other articles of consumption by purchase or contract. The 
embarrassed condition of the 3rd division was, it is true, spared by 
64. P. R. O. W. O. 62/18. It is impossible to say for certain about quantities 
given in barrels as barrels of two standard sizes were in common use by the 
Victualling Board and other weights occur occasionally. Assuming that the 
17,072 barrels despatched between 11th September and 27th October 1813 were 
equally of the two common sizes the resulting quantity was sufficient supply 
over 47 days for 104,248 men. 
65. On the 21st November there were 1,500,000 lbs of biscuit at Santander, 
Passages and at sea; a reasonable reserve but little enough to require constant 
replenishment. P. R. O. W. O. 57/43 Kennedy to Herries, 21st November 1813. 
66. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17959" Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 3rd April 1814- 
67- This 'large quantity' seems to have cost him about £1,500. Converting 
at the army par of 4/6d per dollar, this would have bought roughly 20,000 lbs 
of each article. 
68. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17936. Ogilvie t Herries, 17th July 1813. 
69. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 16929. Head to Ogilvie, 2nd January 1814. 
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obtaining a supply of two thousand pounds of bread 
daily from the locality 
but this was an exceptional event, occasioned by a special arrangement made 
with the Maire of Hasparren by Dalrymple who "paid a very considerable sum 
of money to enable him (the Maire) to procure supplies from the interior 
of the country"70. Most units could find, until the Pyrenees were left 
behind in February, only enough bread to supply the staff, if indeed any 
was to be'-had at all. 
This shortage attracted a host of merchants and would-be contractors 
who bought supplies far away in Spain and brought them to the front, waiting 
to take advantage of the temporary difficulty which might be felt from 
time to time by one of the divisions. Judge Advocate-General Larpent 
commented on the phenomenon that "Bread and corn are so cheap and abundant 
this year in the Castiles, that they are quite without demand, and it even 
answers to bring Spanish bread up here to sell, above fifty and I believe 
a hundred miles"71. These speculators must have been quite successful in 
selling their wares for it to have been worth while continuing their 
operations, and they certainly induced a fulmination from Wellington about 
"the unnecessary encouragement afforded to the crowds of contractors and 
furnishers by whom the army is surrounded"72. Rice, meat and spirits 
though would all appear to be more common in tenders than bread, and in 
any case shortage of money must frequently have prevented commissaries in 
want from taking advantage of these offers73. It was not until mid- 
February when the money shortage at the front was eased that instructions 
were issued designed to limit purchases from contractors, and one may 
suppose that had such excessive recourse to middle-men been taking place 
previously, the instructions would have been issued earlier. Altogether 
while noticing the presence of these men, we may conclude their importance 
in the supplying of bread to have been small, alike from the extensive use 
made not only of the base depots but also of the reserve magazine at 
70. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17947, Ogilvie to Dalrymple, 28th December 1813- 
71- Larpent vol II, p 106. 
72. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17940, Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 15th February 1814. 
73. D. A. C. G. Head's initial reaction to his bread shortage was to request 
money to enable him to buy, but as he was not given any, here is one evident 
case of a unit in want of a supply but not able to take advantage of the 
presence of contractors. 
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Ustaritz which was only to be drawn upon in an emergency for the supply 
of bread, and from the several complaints from divisional commissaries 
as regards obtaining bread, that it was as much as they could do to supply 
the staff and the hospital without recourse to the depots. 
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CHLPTER III9 Part B: Meat. 
The meat supply presents a case of the Peninsular commissariat receiving 
only occasional assistance from England. The cost and difficulty of 
transporting live cattle on long sea voyages effectively ruled out the 
possibility that the army in Portugal should be supported in this way and 
only at the end of the war, when the allied advance to the Pyrenees had 
shortened their sea-borne communications with the United. Kingdom, was such 
a supply undertaken. Kennedy, to whom the idea of shipping live cattle 
was suggested, wrote home on the 18th August giving his sujport to the 
scheme but it was not until October that Herries concluded an agreement 
with Messrs Daniel Callaghan & Sons of Cork whereby one hundred Irish cattle 
per week should be shipped for Passages and St Sebastian, nor was it until 
the end of the month that the Treasury sanctioned the arrangement1. No 
record remains showing precisely how many of the animals arrived alive, 
though larpent mentions the advent of one hundred and fifty about the 
middle of November, but in his memoirs Kernes records that delays occurred 
in the shipments because of difficulties of convoy so it may be conjectured 
that the arrivals did not amount to the quantity envisaged. In 1814 the 
Irish supply appears to have been augmented by English cattle since in a 
letter to Ogilvie Henries annoijnced the consignment of thirty eight large 
oxen from Poole with the promise of more to follow2 but as in the next 
month Lord Bathurst ordered the cessation of all supply shipments to 
Wellington's army it seems unlikely that this additional resource proved 
of great assistance. Even allowing that the Irish supply, from November 
1813 to the end of the war, maintained the intended level, and overlooking 
any casualties on the voyages still does not account for more than a small 
part of the whole supply to the army, as consumption in the closing stages 
of the war, variously quoted in Fraser's and Larpent's memoirs as three 
hundred g day and one thousand a week3, must upon a consideration of the 
numbers to be fed and probable weight of the animals have amounted to at 
1. P. R. O. W. 0.57/6, Harrison to Herries, 27th October 1813- 
2. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17928 f. 51, Herries to Ogilvie, 1st April 1814. The 
salt sent with the cattle to cure any who died at sea had to be unloaded at 
Bordeaux as the Excise would have seized any brought back to England. 
3. Both Larpent and Fraser spent time at Headquarters and could have had 
access to good information on such a point. Fraser says that his informant 
was Dalrymple, and his certainly seems nearer to a plausible figure than that 
provided by Larpent, who may have been guessing. 
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least one thousand five hundred a week and perhaps as many as two 
thousand. 
While the contribution of the United Kingdom to the army's fresh meat 
supply was confined to a small number of animals in the closing months of 
the war, the home country proved of greater assistance in the supply of 
salted provisions. The army had evidently been well provided with salt 
meat in the period before the spring of 1809 and Wellington wrote on the 
31st May 1809 asking that no more be sent unless it was requisitioned4. 
The circumstances of the remainder of the year which the troops spent 
mostly in Spain would not have entailed a high consumption of salt meats, 
so the quantity shown in the January Ist return of provisions presumably 
represents the large store to which Wellington had alluded in May only 
slightly diminished. The January return showed one and three quarter 
million pounds of salt meat in store and though one million pounds were 
given to the Portuguese government in May 1810, this amount was exactly 
made up by a requisition upon England. Thus the drop in stocks to below 
half a million pounds in the return of the 30th November 1810 represents 
the consumption over the year. Unfortunately, apart from the consignment 
of two hundred tons of salt fish in December 18106, no record remains of 
the shipments of salted provisions between the end of 1810 and early 1813. 
That such shipments did take place, likely, as it is hardly to be supposed 
that the commissariat would have wasted scarce funds buying a commodity 
that could so easily be supplied from England, is also suggested by two 
letters, one in early 1811 confirming that Kennedy's requirement of the 
barrel size to be used for salt meat had been passed on to the commissioners 
for Victualling7, and another in 1812 announcing that the Victualling Board 
had a certain number of hundred pound barrels (Kennedy's specified size) 
remaining and that they were to be sent out8. Perhaps the small amount 
(a quarter of a million pounds) sent in March 1812 represented the tail end 
of a regular supply, since by the end of the year it was necessary for Kennedy 
4. Supplementary Despatches VI p 273. Wellington to Castlereagh, 31st May 
1809. 
5. Except for a short period near Abrantes, see below. 
6. It seems most unlikely that the fish would have been issued to the British 
troops or would have arrived in time to be issued to the Spanish. Probably 
the Portuguese Ordenanca ate it, assisted by muleteers and similar commissariat 
employees. 
7. P. R. O. W. 0.57/3, Harrison to Gordon, 21st January 1811. 
8. P. R. O. W. 0.58/132, Herries to Kennedy, 9th March 1812. 
- 73 - 
to make a requisition for two million pounds, and another two million early 
in 18139. Three of the four millions thus requested had arrived by the 
time the army left Portugal. The supply of salt meat to the North Spanish 
and French coasts appears to have been intermittent amounting to about one 
and a half million pounds between June and October10, and at the end of 
November the Treasury sanctioned a regular supply of one hundred and twenty 
five thousand pounds a month to be sent by the Commissioners of Victualling, 
this comparatively small quantity suggesting that the supply in the previous 
half year had been as much as the army needed. 
The usefulness of the salt meat which arrived in the Peninsula was 
limited by the fact that the army's transport was never sufficient to carry 
it far from the coast or the rivers as well as maintaining the necessary 
supply of bread to the troops. Thus live meat, even if purchased at greater 
expense, was usually a more economical supply inland than the salted variety. 
Indeed salt meat is rarely heard of in the interior. The provision return 
of the 1st March 1810 shows about one and a half million pounds of salt meat 
in store in Portugal of which 73% was held on the coast at Lisbon, Coimbra 
and Oporto and 24jß% on the navigable reaches of the Tagus at Santarem and 
Abrantes. The fact that a few thousand pounds of salt meat were held at 
Almeida and that some issues of the same commodity took place to the advanced 
cavalry at Alpalhao and Monforte in the summer of 1810 should not obscure 
this great inequality of distribution. The field divisions saw little of 
salt provisions in later years either as accounts of issues to the Portuguese 
troops attached to them demonstrate. In 1812 and 1813 the proportion of 
salted meat (and fish) to all meat so issued was only 14 
11. Only for two 
periods of the war does the field army's almost invariable diet of Mesh meat 
seem seriously to have been adulterated. While in the lines of Torres 
Vedras and on the Rio Maior the short distances to be covered by transport 
made it possible to use salt provisions and Wellington ordered on the 26th 
October 1810 that salt meat be issued two days a week to all regiments. 
9. The return of stores at Belem on the 15th December 1812 shows no salt meat 
at all. It was however being universally issued at that time at Lisbon, 
possibly under Sampaio's contract. See P. R. O. W. O. 57/43, Kennedy to Herries, 
13th January 1813. 
10. The sources for this supply, W. O. 62/18 and 58/134 and the Ogilvie papers, 
are all in different ways incomplete for this period so the figure of 1- million 
pounds is strictly a minimum rather than a certain quantity, though the gaps 
are not great. 
11. P. R. O. W. O. 57/45" These do not seem to be complete accounts of all 
deliveries to Portuguese troops in the field, but the above calculation does not 
depend for its point on the total but on the proportion. 
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The second occasion was in early 1814 when the difficulty of providing 
fresh meat from the rear obliged the commissariat to issue salt meat to 
all whose access to the coast was adequate. Even some of the inland troops 
were supplied in this way, and the 3rd and 7th divisions had to be provided 
with extra mules for the purpose12. The usual use of salt meat however 
was as issues to detadhments marching from the rear, to the garrison troops 
in the bases, to the hospitals or to the muleteers and other subordinate 
employees of the commissariat who commonly, at least from 1812, received a 
ration of salt fish in lieu of part of their pay, "with which the Muleteers 
are extremely well satisfied" wrote Bisset13. The salt fish also proved 
useful for making over to the Portuguese government on account of the subsidy, 
so much so that Pipon wrote home in September 1813 for a regular supply of 
it. A note on his letter records that this request was not acted upon. 
While uses were thus found for the salt provisions supplied from home, 
these did not cover more than a small part of the army's consumption and as 
we have seen the fresh meat provided from the United Kin; 
_dom was 
not a very 
considerable supply. The same difficulties of conveyance which hindered 
the sending of cattle from home also prevented any other imports from areas 
far from the coasts of the Peninsula. In the summer of 1812, A. C. G. Purcell 
was despatched to the Azores to report on the supplies that could be obtained 
thence, among other commodities the number of cattle that could be withdrawn 
"without distressing the inhabitants or advancing the price"14. His 
opinion was that eight hundred &nd fifty bullocks could be purchased within 
these conditions but the Treasury, on consideration of his report, decided 
that the difficulties of such traffic would outweigh the advantage and directed 
that "the shipment of cattle should be abandoned"15. Certainly the trouble 
and expense of transport seems hardly justified for the provision of less 
than a week's supply of meat to the army. On the other hand the Barbary 
states, whose wheat contribution had been somewhat disappointing during the 
war years, appear to have featured considerably in the cattle supply, in 
proportion as the stocks in Spain and Portugal dwindled under the combined 
12. In June and July 1809 the hutted troops in and around Abrantes were given 
salt rations, but this was only for a short period, a fortnight at the most. 
13. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17947" Bisset to Ogilvie, 4th June 1812. 
14. P. R. O. W. O. 57/41, Purcell to Bisset, 3rd August 1812. 
15" P. R. O. W. O. 58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 9th October 1812. 
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demands of the army's stomachs and the transport system. Although a 
Portuguese initiative was rebuffed early in 1813, the British, by the 
diplomacy of Sir William A'Court envoy extraordinary to the Barbary states, 
reached agreements with the rulers of Algiers and Oran for the export of 
four thousand oxen at a duty of fifteen dollars per head, and ten thousand 
sheep and two thousand oxen duty free respectively. These arrangements 
however were made too late. Wellington wrote putting off the arrival of 
these animals until the following spring when "the supply of forage (will) 
ensure them means of subsistance"16, and by the time the winter of 1813 
was over the war was nearly concluded. While the official channels had 
been tardy though, private entrepreneurs had been busy. Early in 1813 
General Campbell, Governor of Gibraltar, had complained that the activities 
of Jews and others had raised the duty upon cattle export from Morocco to 
twenty or even thirty dollars where it had been ten before17, and the object 
of the trading activity was explained later in the year by Bisset in a 
letter to the Commissary in Chief. Certain Gibraltar merchants have, he 
stated, "by means of a contraband trade withdrawn about 20,000 head within 
these three months to be sent into the interior of Spain; and, by the way, 
knowing as I do the extreme difficulty of supplying our troops in that 
country with fresh meat it is a Traffic ... that should not be 
too 
scrupulously inquired into"18. By no means all of the cattle that 
reached the army in 1813 can have been of Iberian origin. 
From the preceding paragraphs it will be obvious that the role of the 
commissariat and other public bodies in England in supplying the theatre 
of war with cattle was small, and this fact gave to the provision of meat 
a character different from any other supply. The Peninsular commissariat 
was gradually forced into a complete dependence on private speculators who 
were themselves under no pressure to negotiate since their stock was 
comparatively imperishable and since they were not faced by any significant 
competition from overseas. This situation did not come about immediately. 
In 1809 the commissariat as well as finding some bullocks locally in Spanish 
Estremadura and receiving others under contracts from the rear, sent out 
16. p. M. Add Mss 41513, Stuart to Green, 27th September 1813- 
17- Campbell's interest was that his garrison was supplied, by a contractor, 
with 1j pounds of fresh meat per man per week from Morocco, hitherto at the 
low duty of five dollars per head. 
18. B. M. Add Mss 41512, Bisset to Herries, 24th July 1813. 
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officers on special missions to collect cattle, Boyes and Ogilvie going to 
Asuaga and Downie into the mountains round Castello Branco for this puirpose. 
By the end of the year however the fear of shortage is already apparent in 
Dalrymple's instructions to Downie: "Cattle we must have and whether we 
pay a little more or a little less is a very inferior consideration to the 
actual collection of cattle"19. From this time onwards the steady increase 
in the real price of bullocks marks the increasing power of the dealers in 
meat whose command of ready cash came to monopolise the northern markets 
in the period 1810-12. Only two areas of Portugal produced cattle in 
sufficient quantities to be used as food, the Alentejo and Algarve in the 
south and the areas of Tras os Montes and Entre Douro e Minho in the north200 
The latter, providing a more copious supply and being usually closer to the 
operations and cantonments of the main army, was of much greater importance, 
an importance which can be measured by the higher prices demanded for money 
in the Oporto market compared with the exchange at Lisbon which circumstance 
was occasioned by the large scale cash transactions of the cattle trade. 
If the transactions between the commissariat and the dealers could have 
been restricted to a single channel, if only one commissariat agent or 
officer had been entitled to negotiate for meat although the price must 
still have moved against the department at least the supply could have been 
put on a regular, assured basis and any shortages could have been fairly 
distributed or allocated in a manner calculated to be as little inconvenient 
as possible in the given strategical situation. The experience of 1809 
had already shown that if the field commissaries were prevented from making 
purchases on their own aocount a sufficient supply could not be guaranteed 
from the rear to compensate for this21a The resulting competition among 
various commissariat agencies, all experiencing a different degree of want, 
operated to the advantage of the dealers who could not be expected to 
negotiate a lower price in the rear of the army than they could obtain by 
moving their herds forward towards any division whose stock of cattle was 
running low and negotiating directly with its commissary. The obvious 
solution to this (lifficulty was not to forbid the field officers from 
negotiating for meat when necessity constrained them, but to fix a maximum 
19. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17970. Quoted in Downie to Ogilvie 17th November 1809. 
20. Naturally cattle cultivation did not stop at the frontiers but cattlemen 
in Galicia brought their stock to the fairs of north Portugal in search of high 
prices and similarly animals from Andalusia and Estremadura were provided for 
the troops in the south of Portu a 1. 
21. For an example of a failure in the bullock supply from the rear in 1809 
see Schaumann p 177. 
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price which was not to be exceeded in payments for meat in any part of the 
army. This sytem appears to have come into operation in 1810, the fixed 
price in the south being slightly higher than in the north, reflecting the 
somewhat easier availability of cattle in the northern sector. Unfortunately 
it was subject to a simple and quite unavoidable abuse. Since a herd of 
cattle would be sold alive the price was generally calculated upon an 
assumption of the average weight of the beasts, and it was possible if the 
price per pound was uncompetitive, to compensate for this by assessing the 
average at an unrealistically high figire22. This system of false averages 
was commonplace as early as 1810. "I have known what is no secret", wrote 
Kirton, "thousands of sheep from the Depot at Badajoz, of which unable to 
drag their weakness along, died 20 and 30 every day, and which (averaged 
at 34 lbs each) could not weigh above 16 or 18 lbs. They were more like 
Cats than Sheep. This is a well known fact* .. "23. 
The efforts of the Commissary-General to provide cattle from the rear 
to the forward units and thus reduce the power of the dealers over needy 
field commissaries, were never more than partially successful. Indeed 
Bisset claimed that before he took over from Kennedy there had been no cattle 
contract and the supply had been maintained solely by dealers who bought in 
the fairs north of the Douro and marched the stock to the army. Bisset, 
faced by the extra demand presented by the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo for 
bullocks as draught animals, appears to have taken the first steps towards 
organising and controlling a large scale supply of cattle from the rear. 
He made a small contract initially with Messrs Rozas and Bailey of Coimbra, 
intended to provide a small reserve from which the Commissary-General could 
offer assistance to those field commissaries most in need of a supply, and 
soon afterwards extended the agreement to the provision of four hundred head 
per week, over a ten week period24. Rozas and Bailey failed to honour this 
commitment and attempts to meet the ensuing shortage by direct purchasing 
north of the Douro were confronted by a coalition among the dealers in cattle 
who demanded very high prices. For the main campaign of 1812 therefore, 
22. Various methods of averaging were employed. Two or three of the animals 
might be slaughtered and the issuable remains weighed, or a visual estimate 
might be made of the weight of ten or twenty and the average weight based upon 
this. 
23. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17936 f. 38. Kirton to Ogilvie, 27th June 1613- 
24. Bullock consumption at this time was above a thousand a week. 
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which began only two months after his report to London about these events, 
Bisset was obliged to look to a variety of sources for his meat supply. 
Some cattle were bought by Mackenzie at Oporto and Boyes at Leinego paying 
the prices the dealers demanded, and White at Corunna was asked to collect 
as many as he could in Galicia and the Asturias. An agreement smaller 
than the one envisaged seems also to have been effected for a weekly supply 
of about two hundred and fifty bullocks for a three month period25. 
Bisset's department orders however stress the importance of the field 
commissaries continuing to use their initiative in obtaining meat supplies 
at reasonable prices and it is evident that his measures, originally 
intended to centralise control over the meat supply, failed to reduce the 
competition existing among various commissariat agencies, though going a 
part of the way towards providing a resource alternative to the dealers 
for the commissaries in the field. 
Before 1842 the field commissaries had been very much on their own. 
Some of them must have enjoyed at least partial contracts, a comparison of 
which system with regular purchases was made by Ogilvie in 1810. A depot 
acquired by purchase subjected the public to the loss on averaging weights 
as well as by possible disease or escapes and also threw upon the commissariat 
the task of guarding the herds and providing pasture. On the other hand 
a depot maintained by contract would provide meat by real weight and leave 
the attendant risks and duties to the contractor. The gentleman whose 
contract the above comparison favoured, Mr Dillon, did supply by such a 
contract to Portalegre in 1810 and also to headquarters at the end of the 
year and in early 1811. Local purchases were however so frequent among all 
the scattered parts of Hill's command at all times during 1810 that it cannot 
be said that Dillon's contract, or that of Mr Fletcher who also supplied to 
Portalegre26, formed the major part of the 2nd division's supply and it 
must have been mainly useful as a reserve stock. Kirton, who was serving 
at Portalegre, bought nine hundred and two bullocks and four thousand eight 
hundred and twelve sheep, totalling perhaps four hundred thousand pounds of 
25- Bisset's report mentions this agreement without stating the name of the 
contractor and it is unfortunately impossible to say for certain whether the 
promised supply was forthcoming or not. P. R. O. W. O. 57/41 Bisset to Herries, 
10th April 1812, 
26. Both Dillon and Pletcher refused to supply any cattle if this obliged them 
to have dealings with the incompetent Mr Wechinger who they found both rude and 
dishonest. Mr Aylmer, senior commissariat officer with the 2nd division early 
in the year, was reported to have described Wechinger as a blackguard, but 
subsequently denied using the term. 
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meat between June and September 1810, so the Portalegre depot itself 
by 
no means received all its supplies by contract in this Period 
27. The 
advanced troops in the north also depended greatly upon local supplies of 
cattle, both those provided by the villages in which the troops were 
cantonned and those bought by the commissariat at Pinhel and Almeida, 
and marched forward. 
Bisset's new policy of supplying cattle in large numbers from the rear 
took a little time to come into operation because of Rozas and Bailey's 
failure and the combination among the northern meat dealers. The meat 
supply to Ashworth's brigade between January 25th and April 24th 1812 only 
came one third from the rear and two thirds from contractors or local 
purchases. Even a week before the opening of the main campaign Bisset 
had to remind his officers that meat dealers were "in their way extremely 
useful to the army, and should as much as possible be conciliated" and that 
"it should be the study of every commissary to subsist the troops to which 
he is attached on Sheep drawn from Spain,, in the event of our entering 
that country"28. Notwithstanding these qualifications it is evident that 
the Commissary-General intended to supply the troops in the interior of 
Spain principally with herds marched from Portugal under commissariat 
auspices. The intention was that one thousand and fifty head29 of cattle 
(Bisset's estimate of weekly consumption by the main army) be sent forward 
every week from the depot at Ciudad Rodrigo, which in turn drew through 
Celorico upon Coimbra, Oporto and the cattle markets of north Portugal. 
While the army remained on the Douro these supplies must have been nearly 
sufficient to meet its requirements - the 6th division, starting the 
campaign on the 13th June, received two hundred bullocks on the 24th and a 
further hundred and fifty on the 15th July which supplies, assuming the 
division marched originally with a reasonable stock, should have been just 
sufficient to meet their needs in the first six weeks' operations - but 
when the advance to Madrid extended the line of supply difficulties arose. 
Some problems were caused by errors and incompetence on the part of 
27. This supply bought by Kirton was sufficient for over three thousand men 
during these four months, over a thirt of Hill's British troops. 
28. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17947 f. 65 Department Order, 6th June 1812. 
29. Though one thousand and fifty head seem to have been intended, even 
the Commissary-General eventually lapsed into the neater practice of referring 
to the herds as lots of a thousand head. 
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commissariat subordinates such as the clerk Fenton who abandoned his cattle 
somewhere beyond Salamanca and was next seen, days later, in Segovia ignorant 
of the whereabouts of his charge. "Mr Fenton ought to be drawn & quartered, 
he came here without his cattle & god (sic) of heaven knows where they are 
& all the Divisions badly off"30, wrote Bisset, already sickening of the 
fever that kept him from his duties in the autumn. 
By the beginning of September shortage of cattle in the rear and lack of 
responsible staff to whom they could be entrusted combined to disarrange 
the regularity of the supply herds. On the 2nd of the month the depot at 
Ciudad Rodrigo was reportedly reduced to one thousand head31 and D. A. C. G. 
Kensington decided to deem the order to send a thousand head weekly as no 
longer in force. Urgent letters were written to the senior officers of 
the rear depots, and elicited replies full of zeal and enthusiasm. Mr 
Drake at Coimbra had accumulated thirty four cattle and would send them at 
once, Mr Head at Celorico would hurry forward all cattle the moment they 
arrived, Kensington and Priestley at Ciudad Rodrigo were concerned at the 
impossibtity of finding any cattle locally. Mackenzie at Oporto was the 
only officer in a position to provide assistance and he promised on the 26th 
September to increase his buying to one thousand a week which he would send 
on to Celorico. By this time too, it is evident that the practice adopted 
by headquarters of speaking about 'a thousand head' of cattle was only a 
manner of speaking. Hard marching over long distances so wearied the beasts 
that a thousand head setting out from Oporto might have reduced by a third 
or more before grrivino with the army. No exact figures remain but where 
the Commissary-General was speaking of a thousand head, his subordinates 
acted with numbers like the seven hundred and ninety sent by Price to Valladolid 
on the 9th October, or eight hundred and fifty one sent forward from Ciudad 
Rodrigo on the 7th November. Even the journey to Ciudad Rodrigo itself 
produced casualties and Priest]Qr wrote on the 6th October of three hundred 
and seventy cattle arrived the same day that he would send on immediately 
those still fit to march. The shortages with the troops resulting from these 
delays might be expected to appear towards the end of September, but by this 
30. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17947 f. 146, Bisset to Ogilvie, 12th August 1812. 
31. Ibid No 17940, Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 11th September 1812. 
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time the field army was divided between Madrid and Burgos and it would seem 
that the Burgos troops received priority. The forward depot for cattle 
was stationed in the autumn at Arevalo, a convenient point of departure 
for either half of the army. All the departures from Arevalo after late 
September of which I have found record are in the direction of Valladolid 
and Burgos, suggesting that the burden of the deficiencies fell upon the 
troops around Madrid. These included Hill's force who in any case had 
been excepted from the original commissariat plans for this campaign as 
acting along a different line of operation. It may be presumed that a 
certain supply from the southern markets followed these troops, that the 
contraband trade from north Africa via Gibraltar already referred to was 
mainly for their benefit and probably formed the origin of the supply which 
Routh, senior commissariat officer under Hill, describes himself to have 
obtained in this period: "I made a contract with a Portuguese Jew at Elvas 
for 20,000 head of cattle, which he punctually delivered within four months.. "32 
This statement lends force to the supposition that the resources of the 
south, after the withdrawal of Soult's army, were quite adequate to the 
provision of cattle for all the troops at Madrid and that, although the 
supply from the rear in the northern sector fell short of what was hoped 
the deficiencies were probably made up without the divisional commissaries 
having to fend much for themselves. 
The dispersal of the army into quarters at the end of 1812 brought a 
recurrence of the old problem of cattle dealers playing off one commissary 
against another to push up the price. As we have seen, the stocks in north 
Portugal had been drained by the past campaign and the troops found meat as 
short as everything else. Indeed Conductor Morris found meat even harder 
to come by than the other ration items when he returned to Almeida in 
November. Accordingly Kennedy despatched Ogilvie into the country round 
Braganca with orders to buy cattle for the army at true averages and reasonable 
prices, the field commissaries meanwhile being once more limited in the price 
they were allowed to pay. After a slow start (by the 23rd January 1813, a 
month after his appointment, he had only bought twenty eight cattle) Ogilvie 
achieved some success in rescuing the market from the middlemen by buying 
directly from owners in Galicia and Leon. That his success was not greater 
was due largely to shortage of money. Kennedy in the early part of 
1813 
32. Routh p. 56. 
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was still in the course of paying the huge debts of 1812 and though he 
did 
his best to provide cash, could only afford 100,000 dollars over three months 
rather than the 30,000 per week for which Ogilvie had asked. To support the 
Braganca operations however, Kennedy did order Mackenzie to stop buying at 
Oporto where the price went up in January to 10/0 reis per pound, and also 
fixed 130 reis as the maximum price at the divisions. In view of these 
restrictions it is perhaps not surprising that over three thousand five 
hundred cattle were passed through the Braganca depot in March and April, 
intended initially for the supply of the three divisions (3rd, 4th and 5th) 
quartered on the Douro, but in fact a quantity greater than they would have 
required over the period. Whether this supply proved cheaper than others 
would have been seems doubtful. Though Ogilvie restricted himself to a 
nominal price of 120 reis (he had originally hoped to buy at 100 or 105) he 
was unable to discard the practice of overestimating weight, nor could he 
prevent the bullocks losing meat in their march to the divisions. His own 
opinion was that the real cost, taking both ': hexe factors into consideration, 
was about 16o reis per pound. His sarcastic subordinate Strachan felt that 
200 or more was nearer the truth. 
33 It would have been possible for Ogilvie 
to weigh the cattle before buying as "4 large weighing machines with 
triangular poles -6 small weighing machines"34 for that purpose had arrived 
in Portugal the previous autumn and had been in use subsequently at Coimbra 
and Oporto. A rumour of their arrival up country however caused such alarm 
among the suppliers that Ogilvie feared their presence would do more harm 
than good and they were left on the coast. 
When the army advanced to the Pyrenees it was attenpted, as it had been 
in 1812, to maintain from the rear a supply of cattle previously purchased by 
the commissariat. The distances this time were very much longer and some 
of the journey was over rougher country so that very great losses were 
suffered'. in the cattle h«ards especially in the winter of 181314" Some 
diarists quote figures: William Graham spoke of a herd four hundred strong 
at Santillana of which ninety two arrived in France35 and Larpent, after 
33. Judging by the complaints from the divisions about the discrepancy between 
the weights on the waybills and the real weight of the beasts when slaug1iered, 
Strachan was probably right. "The cattle sent here are so enormously over-rated 
that no guess even can be depended upon for their issuable meat if the way bill 
be taken as the guide", wrote A. C. G. Purcell, N. L. S. Ace 4370', No 17928, Purcell 
to Ogilvie, 3rd April 1813. 
34. P. R. O. G1.00 58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 19th August 1812. 
35" W Graham, Travels in Portugal, Spain and France 1812-14,1820, p 81. 
- 83 - 
reckoning that "about two thirds only of the flesh which leaves Palencia 
etc... falls under the butcher's knife, besides the number which die on the 
road", quoted a case where "five hundred .. fresh bullocks, collected at 
Palencia, were marched all the way, three hundred only have reached Vittoria, 
and all the bad road and scarcity of food is yet to come"36. Dalrymple, 
the best authority, may be allowed the last word. "It is quite lamentable 
the reports of cattle from the rear even at Palencia itself they are dying 
in 50 per day"37. Thus although a good deal of commissariat energy and 
manpower were expended in maintaining the depot at Palencia and keeping a 
succession of herds ambling forwards to the army, it proved impossible, even 
during the better weather in summer and autumn of 1813, to dispense with the 
services of the meat dealers. These contractors no longer appear to have 
approached the divisional commissaries directly however, their cattle being 
either sold to headquarters and thence distributed, or supplied to the 
divisions under contracts made with the Commissary-General rather than with 
the field commissary. Thus some kind of regulation was maintained and the 
worst perils of competition avoided. 
The fact that the dealers were enabled to bring cattle to the army in 
quite large numbers presumably without suffering the losses on the road that 
the commissariat experienced and which would surely have deterred a private 
speculator, suggests that the department's arrangements are open to criticism- 
A large part of the meat supply in the Pyrenees and France came from contracts 
and large scale purchases. Local purchases were rare, though a few head 
were obtained from the Baztan valley and near Arrauntz when the army first 
arrived, until March when the military operations opened wider stretches of 
French countryside and meat became temporarily plentiful to the advancing 
forces. It is true that some of the cattle provided under contract came from 
France. Dalrymple bought three hundred and fifty French cattle from Don Ramon 
Martinez in January and the Maire of Hasparren supplied meat from France to 
the 6th division and some cavalry units between December 1813 and the following 
February. Nonetheless it appears that the speculators took better care of 
their cattle than did the commissariat. This may probably be attributed 
partly to their having more money, which enabled them to employ more responsible 
herdsmen and more easily obtain food for their herds on the march, and partly 
36. Larpent, vol II, pp 92 and 132. 
37. N. L. S. Acc 4370 Lo 17940, Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 31st January 1814v 
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to the shortage of efficient manpower in the commissariat, which 
led to 
cattle often having to be entrusted to very junior or inexperienced employees. 
Although clerks were sent with many cattle herds it was often necessary 
to 
use conductors and similar junior grades for this duzty38 and while an 
experienced conductor was probably a better herdsman than a newly arrived 
clerk, the necessity for his employment demonstrates the personnel shortage 
which may have led to poor care being taken of the cattle on long marches. 
It is evident that the meat supply remained precarious in the Pyrenees as 
shortages and near shortages are continually being complained of by 
divisional commissaries particularly in January and February as might be 
expected, and as has been noticed earlier, salt meat was used in these 
months to assist the supply to the main army. That the commissariat was 
able to maintain a barely sufficient supply was due in great part to the 
private speculators from whose assistance they were very rarely enabled 
to break loose in the whole course of the war. 
38. For example Conductor Stone, see B. M. Add Mss 38257. Kennedy to 
Priestley, 28th October 1813. 
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CHAPTER III, Part C: Alcohol. 
Wine was available for purchase almost everywhere in the Peninsula and 
France and since it was as heavy to transport as other less obtainable provisions 
the most sensible course was to buy as close to the army as possible. 
However it was more economical to provide alcohol distilled, partly because 
each pint then provided three rations where previously there had been only 
one, and partly because per ration spirits were generally cheaper than wine1. 
Indeed as the presence of the army for long in any one place pushed up the 
price of local produce reasons of economy also made it desirable to supply 
the troops as much as possible from the rear but it was not until 1811 that 
it was decided to send a regular quantity from the United Kingdom. Shipments 
before that time were intermittent and the total quantity sent was probably 
very small. Indeed so rare an occurence was a supply from England in 1810 
that D. C. G. Boyes who had made large purchases of wine in early June for 
the depot at Abrantes, was disconcerted to learn on the 10th of the arrival 
at Lisbon of rum from England. Five thousand gallons were to be sent to 
him and he re6, xetfully admitted to having overbought wine though consoling 
himself with the reflection that the price was cheap. 
2 
Even when there were spirits at the depots transport limitations sometimes 
prevented their being enjoyed by the advanced units. The rum that took 
Boyes by surprise was to be sent on towards Portalegre soon after the 10th 
June but had not arrived there by the end of the month because of difficulties 
of carriage. The advanced troops and the depots which supported them were 
very dependent on the neighbourhood where they were stationed for their 
alcohol supply. The light division on the Coa drank wine almost exclusively, 
much of it obtained from Almeida which depot in turn received wine only 
partly from the commissariat at Pinhel and partly from several Juiz de Fora 
of the locality. The fact that it was wine strongly suggests that it was 
not purchased far from its place of consumption. In the southern detachment 
of the army wine was also considerably drunk in 1810 although the Portalegre 
1. A pint of wine weighs nearly 14 lbs. Contrary to the case of bread, the 
more convenient issue was in the case of alcohol the more popular. "I believe 
the doctors don't approve of rum for the men but if it is to be used as the men 
like it and it keeps them in good humour.. " wrote Ogilvie. N. L. S. Ace 4370 
No 17936, Ogilvie to Herries, 17th July 1813. 
2. Ibid No 17902, Boyes to Ogilvie, 7th and 10th June 1810. 
son, 
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depot usually kept at least a small stock of spirits3. Such spirits as 
the 
brigades received from the rear were normally kept as a reserve and local 
wine provided where possible which it generally was save in the thinly 
populated area near Castello Branco where several units received only 
occasional alcohol issues in August. This pattern of local wine being 
drunk and spirits stored in reserve for sudden marches or other emergencies 
remained the same late into 1811, the army drawing only a small part of its 
alcohol from the rear though the practice of individual units depended 
greatly on how close to a major depot or how well endowed with transport 
they happened to be. 
In summer 1811 Messrs Idle & Co offered to arrange a regular supply of 
rum from the United Kingdom and Kennedy was asked for an estimate of his 
requirements4. It gras arranged. that two hundred and eighty four thousand 
gallons of rum per quarter should be sent, a quantity sufficient over three 
months for approximately 75,000 men. Imported rum was much consumed in late 
1811 and during that part of 1812 when the army was close to its depots, but 
the sensible plan of importing spirits to save money and to reduce expenditure 
in the Peninsula where cash shortage was a constant embarrassment was only a 
partial success because the pressure on transport was too great to permit 
every commodity to be brought from the rear when the forces advanced 
into 
Spain. Naturally spirits were the first supplies to be left behind because 
of their relatively easy availability, albeit at a high price, in the 
interior5. For this reason the first two shipments were not used up and 
Bisset wrote in April to postpone the next delivery. Thereafter no more ruin 
arrived in the Peninsula until a certain Nkr Newman shipped out to Lisbon 
towards the end of the year a cargo which he hoped the commissariat might 
buy 
6 
Kennedy decided the rum was overpriced and declined to purchase it7 
3. For example 565 gallons of rum on the 11th May 1810 which would have been 
barely two days' supply to the southern army. The receipts preserved in the 
Ogilvie papers show that both Ogilvie and his deputy Kirton bought large quantitieE 
of wine in the summer of 1810. Ogilvie alone bought about 85,000 pints 
between the 25th Jr.. ne and 24th July. 
4. P. R. O. W. O. 58/131, Gordon to Kennedy, 25th July 1811. 
5. This scheme also suffered from the fact that at this time of year the 
Victualling Board's transports found it "attended with some inconvenience and 
hazard" to cross the bar either at Oporto or Figueira and the rum had accordingly 
to be landed at Lisbon whence it could not so easily be transported to the army, 
at that time preparing for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Ibid 57/4, Harrison 
to Herries, 17th February 1812. 
6. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134, Herries to Kennedy 24th October 1812 and 3rd February 181? 
7. Apparently Newman had already sold part of the consignment to the Lisbon 
agent of the Commissioners of Victualling and wanted a higher unit price for the 
remainder. Ibid 58/57 Herries to the Commissioners of Victualling, 16th 
February 1813. 
- 87 - 
presumably having plenty still in store as he asked for only thirty 
thousand gallons per month from home in the first quarter of 1813. It 
is clear from these figures that at most half the quantity of spirits 
consumed by the army in 1812 can have been imported and very likely less 
than that as in early 1813 the army was in winter quarters well located to 
receive supplies from the coast yet Kennedy only asked for the resumption 
of shipments at one third of the old rate, which suggests that a good deal 
of the 1812 rum must still have been in the magazines at the end of the 
year8. The practice of importing spirits for the army was never dropped 
during 1813 - quantities of rum are discovered among the earliest shipments 
to arrive on the north Spanish coast in July and August - yet never restored 
to the proportions envisaged in late 1811. Any conclusion must be 
tentative yet it would seem reasonable to estimate that the army in 1813/14 
depended upon imports for less than a half, probably about a third of its 
alcohol intake. 
The precise experience of individual units confirms the intermittent 
nature of the supply from the rear even during the period of regular imports. 
In 1812 every kind of supply was brought into service, local purchase, 
small contracts and purchase in the rear. In the three months from the 
25th January to the 24th April 1812 Ashworth's brigade received two thirds 
of its alcohol from the depots, almost exclusively rum, and the remaining 
third, of which nearly 60% was rum, from contractors. Later in the year 
the proportion of wine was normally much greater as the transport was 
increasingly unable to cope with the army's demands for both bread and 
spirits. Indeed Bisset wrote in August that unless the bread supply was 
assured alcohol was not even to be bought locally with the commissary's 
scarce funds, and hinted that it did not matter if this meant occasional 
lapses in the alcohol issue, "which does not form any part of the soldier's 
ration"9. In fact there is no direct evidence of any serious failures of 
the supply, but certainly the 6th division during July and August was living 
mainly off wine obtained from day to day. 
8. P. R. O. W. O. 57/40. Pipon's controversial return of stores at Belem on 
the 15th December 1812 shows over ; 0,000 gallons of spirits in store. 
9. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17947, Bisset to Ogilvie, 9th August 1812. 
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Both rum and wine were also procured by the intermediate depots. 
Salamanca for example benefited from a regular contract, at least from 
July onwards, with Sr Antonio da Pessoa who undertook to provide eighty 
to a hundred thousand quartilhos of wine at three thousand rations per 
day10. The agreement presumably proved satisfactory as it was renewed 
in September. Apart from this contract, the depot also made purchases of 
rum when supplies ran short and the price was right. Indeed rum was 
easily aailable in the interior but the merchants demanded Very high 
prices. Salamanca was offered some in September at 440 reis the pint but 
headquarters was only paying 380 reis so the tender was rejected To 
save paying these rates efforts were made to keep up at least a partial 
supply from the rear. During July Mr Major forwarded wine through Vila 
Velha towards the northern depots and in September A. C. G. St Remy tried to 
meet Ogilvie's request for twenty five pipes of wine per week, a small 
enough quantity in itself, sent forward to Salamanca from San Joao and 
Quinta dos Carvalhos but was unable to do so for lack of transport12. 
That these attempts had so little success indicates that the depots of 
Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were being effectively supplied with bread and 
corn only at the expense of spirits, and so usually had none of the latter 
to forward. The result appears in the Salamanca depot's return of stores 
acquired and despatched between the 15th and 25th September 1812. 
Rum 229345 pints) is "received by purchase" which must often have been 
the case in Spain during the summer and autumn of 181213. 
In 1813 and 1814 the practice of forwarding spirits as much as possible 
from the rear was maintained but once again a complete supply could not be 
kept up. There were even deficiencies while the troops remained in 
10.1,248 quartilhos comprised a Lisbon pipe, reckoned to equal 140 English 
gallons. Thus a gallon equalled nearly nine quartilhos and the quantity 
supplied by Sr Pessoa would have lasted twenty four to thirty days. 
11. The department's insistence on the lowest price had the obvious dis- 
advantage that the quality was often low too. "Don Marizo's rum is really 
two parts water" complained Cairns in October. As he supplied the hospital 
this was possibly no bad thing. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17891, Cairns to Ogilvie, 
20th October 1812. 
12. Ibid No 17936, f. 124, St Remy to Ogilvie, 12th September 1812. 
13" Ibid No 17879, f. 15. 
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cantonments, as appears from the fact that Mr Cairns had to buy rum for 
the 2nd division in May 181314. Later Ogilvie bought various wines and 
spirits at Santander15, sufficient for the troops in the vicinity and to 
keep a certain supply going forward to Passages, but not at all enough for 
the twenty thousand rations per day he reckoned were issued from the 
Passages depot 16. Even these purchases were stopped by Kennedy's order 
in the middle of July. Towards the end of the year various means of 
supply were in use among the divisions, recourse to contracts being the 
most common. "Rum is furnished by a contractor for that article"17 wrote 
D. A. C. G. Head, attached to the 3rd division, in November. The 7th division 
also employed a contractor for rum but bought wine in the country as well18 
and even the 4th division, well supplied from the rear in all other articles 
according to Mr Carey's account, required a contract for the supply of rum 
alone. It is evident that the army's needy state in the matter of spirits 
attracted so many merchants that a rum surplus developed in 1814, not in 
the army's stores but in the hands of would-be contractors, who proceeded 
to dispose of it by making deals in other commodities contingent upon the 
commissary buying a certain amount of rum as well, "a proportion of rum to 
enable the dealers to come forward upon fair terms" 
19 
as one commissary 
expressed it. 
It should not be imagined that an agreement with a contractor necessarily 
guaranteed a trouble free supply, for not all the arrangements were as 
convenient as that enjoyed in December by the 7th division where, besides 
the low price already noted, the supplier agreed to keep his stock always 
immediately in rear of the division and receive payment for it only as wanted. 
In January a new contract for the supply of the 4th and 7th divisions was 
14. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 16541 f. 1. He bought 5,150 pints which would have 
lasted the division two days. 
15. French and Catalonian brandy and Cuba rum, altogether about 80,000 rations. 
16. On the 17th July 1813 there were at Passages only 609 gallons of rum 
equal to 14,616 rations. 
17. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17875, Head to Ogilvie, 30th November 1813- 
18. The wine cost 4 reals a pint (one ration) whereas the rum was supplied at 
10 reals a pint (three rations). Nir Cuming had negotiated a competitive price 
from his contractor; the 6th division were paying 1261 reals a pint for rum at 
this time and the 4th division 11 reals. 
19. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17902, Buckham to Ogilvie, 10th February 1814, 
0 
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made by Dalrymple with Sr Ribeiro, supposed to commence on the 10th. No 
spirits however a;; -peared at the 7th division cantonments until the 14th 
and then only two three day batches arrived during the next ten days. 
Despite the failure being mentioned to Dalrymple matters did not improve 
for on. the 4th February the supply to the 7th division remained "most 
irregular and uncertain"20. In the middle of February the supply to the 
4th division failed entirely and. ultimately the division commissaries were 
permitted to make their own arrangements elsewhere for the spirit supply 
in early March. Such failures as these were, along with the high cost of 
such procurement, the penalty for the commissariat's inability to keep up 
the rum supply from the rear. It should however be remembered in the 
department's favour that reserve stocks were at all times held, at the 
coastal depots and also inland, against sudden emergencies so that the 
army's dependence upon contractors for spirits was never complete. It 
should also he noted that of the four main heads of supply we are considering 
alcohol was by fLr the least important as regards the health and nourishment 
of the army, and the policy of concentrating the department's resources 
upon providing bread (meat being a rather different case) as the first 
priority seems thoroughly sensible. 
20. N. L. S. Ace 4370, No 17960, Coming to Ogilvie, 4th February 1814, 
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CHAPTER III, part D: Forage and Forage Corn. 
The horses' ration was made up of two component parts. The first 
almost always consisted of some variety of grain, barley or oats or Indian 
corn (maize) being most commor., and although local species of pulse or 
beans also featured occasionally these commodities were collectively known 
as forage corn. The other element in the supply was simply described as 
forage and was intended to consist of straw (long forage) or hay but shortage 
of these foodstuffs regularly compelled reliance on alternative means of 
nourishment. The quantity allotted to each animal was a matter of some 
calculation since the constitution of either part of the ration might affect 
the amount issued in the other. Thus although the basic ration may be 
taken to be ten pounds of barley or Indian corn or twelve pounds of oats 
to fourteen pounds of hay or straw (only ten pounds for English hay) a 
shortfall in either part would be made up in the other on the principle 
that one pound of corn was equivalent to two pounds of forage which was 
equivalent to four pounds of green forage (grass or unripe corn) if dry 
forage were unavailable. The complication arises therefore, at least in 
retrospect, of deciding at any given time what a horse's full ration comprised, 
how far a magazine's stock of forage corn might be expected to go and whether 
or not the animals of a particular corps were being adequately nourished. 
Nothing in General Orders for example enables one to measure the adequacy 
of the ration Schaumann provided for the 1st K. G. L. Hussars in April 1811, 
a mixture of barley, beans, garvanzos (apparently a vetch like plant), rye, 
wheat and maize1. The practice of the commissaries themselves appears also 
to have varied. On the 26th December 1812 Frazer, on his way from Lisbon to 
the Mondego, drew twelve pounds of corn and twelve pounds of straw for 
each horse2(itself a proportion not in keeping with any order I have seen) 
while only five days later Larpent at headquarters stated that "ten pounds 
of straw a day is the allowance for the animals"3. C:, nsic9. ering these 
discrepancies and reflecting that the bulky nature of all these supplies 
1. Schaimmmann, p 298. 
2. Frazer p 24- 
3- Larpent vol I, Letter of 31st December 1812. 
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rendered their transport to and from magazines an awkward business, it will 
be apparent that what was available rather than General Orders must have 
dictated the precise nature of the horses' rations4. 
This is partithilarly true of the forage supply which was intended to 
be procured locally under most circumstances. Kennedy's rule of thumb that 
a cavalry regiment needed one mule for every two horses show that the units 
were not intended to be equipper: with transport sufficient to carry their 
full ration more than a short distance from the depot and the recollections 
of cavalry diarists and commissaries abound with references to foraging 
parties and the difficulties they encountered. Very little forage was 
provided from England in the course of the war, three million pounds of hay 
in the summer of 1809, two million pounds in February 1810, a further two 
million pounds or so early the following year and four and a half million 
pounds in the winter of 1813/14 being the only shipments that appear in the 
commissariat papers5. At the ten pound ration for English hay these 
quantities would have fed an average of 609 horses a day between April 1809 
and the end of the war. Besides these shipments at least two experimental 
supplies arrived in Portugal. Six hundred 'Forage Cakes' went out in 1809 
and a further supply of oil cake (about 200,000 pounds), used for the 
draught cattle, in 18126 but neither of these arrivals can be felt to have 
had an important effect on the supplyio the cavalry and artillery horses. 
Thus the supply of forage from overseas during the war years was scanty 
and furthermore transport difficulties prevented even those supplies that 
did arrive being available far from the coast or the navigable rivers, rather 
in the same way as has already been observed in the case of salt meat. 
4. For the contingent nature of cavalry rations see for example Despatches 
VIII p 243, Wellington to Messrs Slade, Anson, Alten and Calcraft. 
5. P. R. O. W. O. 57/2, Harrison to Murray, 18th April 1809 and Harrison to 
Coffin, 29th April 1809 and 57/40 Kennedy t6, Herries, 20th November 1812. 
6. See variously P. R. O. W. 0.58/130, Gordon to Murray, 17th February 1810 
and Gordon to Kennedy, 21st November 1810, ': J. O. 57/2 Arbuthnot to Coffin, 20th 
July 1809,57/4 Harrison to Gordon, 13th March and 13th April 1811 and 57/6 
Harrison to Herries 9th and 26th November 1813" However Larpent, vol II p 6, 
mentions obtaining English hay on the 17th October 1813 so possibly some figures 
are missing for the summer and autumn of 1813. One of the hay vessels of the 
last shipment apparently was lost into Bayonne. Larpent vol II p 83. 
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Forage gathered inland was sometimes collected into magazines for future 
use - large stocks of hay for example were gathered at Celorico for the 
winter of 1812/13, and similar collections were made on the borders of 
Portugal for that winter? - but in general it is true to say that forage 
was collected as locally as it could be found by the exertions of the 
individual units and consumed from day to day as it was brought in. 
"This duty", as Frazer explained "... is severe everywhere, and renders the 
winter no season of rest for the cavalry", 
8 
Difficulty finding forage was an almost universal complaint in Spain 
and Portugal and various substitutes for the hay or straw preferred as the 
forage ration were consumed9. In summer the green crops could be eaten. 
This was the mode of subsisting the animals during the spring and summer 
of 1813 though anticipating the harvest was an inadvisable resort if the 
army would later be wintering in the same area and was not always permitted. 
At other times field grass, river grass, fern and chopped furze all went 
into the horses'diet. This shortage of forage necessitated the dispersal 
of the cavalry and artillery units as widely as was possible to keep the 
horses adequately fed and when the requirements of active service did not 
prevent it this was done so thoroughly that Kennedy grumbled about one 
issuing commissary being too few for a cavalry regiment since the day was 
not long enough for him to visit all their quarters10. Wellington was not 
exaggerating greatly when he wrote to Hill "officers are much mistaken if 
they suppose that any town in the Peninsula, however large, will furnish 
forage for a large number of animals for a length of time. The horses of 
a brigade of cavalry, or even of a brigade of artillery, must be separated 
by 20 or 30 in each village"11. Such disperral was not possible of course 
on active service when, in exhausted country or during the winter, the 
animals must have always gone short of forage. Two examples out of many 
illustrate the extent of the problem. Conductor Morris near Almeida in 
December 1812 recounted two foraging expeditions, the first of which ultimately 
yielded two cartloads of hay at the third village visited but the second 
produced nothing at all after two days of journeying and searching. Nor 
7. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17946 f 103, Kennedy to Ogilvie, 29th November 1812. 
8. Frazer, p 43- 
9. Regarding Spain Graham wrote "Of hay they make but little; and a field of 
green grass is a rarity the eye is very seldom regaled with". Graham p 65. 
10. P. R. O. W. 0.57/39, Kennedy to Gordon, 10th July 1810. 
11. Despatches IX p 605, Wellington to Hill, 9th December 1812. 
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was this ill success the product of lenity, as although "the inhabitants 
some of them wept bitterly in parting with their little stock of straw 
which they had laid up to serve them the winter... our orders were peremptory 
in case of not opening the stable doors to break the locks of (sic)"12. 
Morris, fortunately, was only trying to supply a few mules and staff horses. 
Cavalry brigades the previous winter had taken the duty of watching Ciudad 
Rodrigo in turn, a month at a time, and found "there was no straw in the 
country, and from the horses being so starved, they eat the withered grass 
with so much avidity that they swallowed many of the stones at the roots, 
and died in consequence"13. "Some hundreds of horses" are represented by 
Tomkinson as being lost on this service for lack both of forage and regular 
supplies of corn. 
Finding forage for cavalry horses was an arduous and time consuming 
business even in most cantonments and under normal circumstances of active 
service it proved impossible to provide the full forage ration. This is 
shown clearly enough by the regular deterioration produced in the horses' 
condition by campaigning as well as by the evidence of memoirs and letters. 
The difficulties experienced led to irregularities, like Morris's peremptory 
orders already cited, which repeated General Orders (orders reproving 
irregular foraging appeared seven times between summer 1311 and late 181214 
were unable to quell. Forage however was not required for cavalry animals 
only. The artillery too needed horses in good condition to enable it to 
keep up with the army, General officers and their staffs needed to be well 
mounted and the transport mules both those carrying supplies and those on 
regimental duties had to be fed occasionally on their journeyings. In the 
Pyrenees shortage of forage, combined with some shortages of corn at the 
depots, became so acute that even these services were affected. It has 
already been seen how the cattle needed for meat suffered from hard marches 
and lack of fodder in the winter of 1813/14- Mr Buckham, one of whose duties 
in that winter was to supply Lord Beresford's staff horses wrote "Our horses 
would starve, were it not for the furze bushes; and even to obtain these, 
it is necessary to seek them at two leagues distance"15. "The mountain 
12. N. A. M. Acc 7508-24. 
13. W. Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer, ed J. Tomkinson, 2nd edition, 
p 121. 
14" The General Orders of the Duke of Wellington, ed J. Gurwood. See 'Forage', 
15" P. Buckham, Personal Narrative of Adventures in the Peninsula, published 
anonymously 1827, p 334. 
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brigade of artillery are ... for three days without either 
forage or corn, " 
wrote Ogilvie, Buckham's superior, the following month. "The staff horses 
are wasting & my own has been four days living on what my servants can 
collect from the Hedges"16. In December the headquarters staff were even 
sending to beyond Tolosa from St Jean de Luz for straw, a distance of forty 
miles or more. The harm done to the mule transport system by the need for 
hard work in such a denuded country will be pointed out in chapter V but 
can be said here to have been the most serious consequence of the forage 
shortage in the Pyrenees17. At no other period of the war however did 
scarcity of forage make itself so seriously felt among the transport animals, 
the cattle or the staff horses, although the cavalry horses often suffered 
and lost efficiency when on campaign. 
The bad effects of forage shortage could to a great extent be prevented 
by keeping up the full corn issue. Unfortunately it was at precisely those 
times when the forage supply was inadequate, in winter or when the horses 
were forced to concentrate for operations, that the corn supply too was 
most likely to fail owing to difficulties of transport or lack of local 
supplies. Like the men's bread supply the horses' corn was intended to be 
supplied from the rear, the commissariat receiving assistance from England 
and other overseas sources at various times during the war. Until 1811 
the United Kingdom did not prove a very fruitful source of supply. Two 
separate consignments of oats, eight thousand four hundred and ten thousand 
quarters respectively, were sent in the summer of 1809, but 1810 saw only 
one series of shipments, of a slightly smaller quantity, during May, June 
and July18. These three consignments considered over the period from 
April 1809 to December 1810 yield a daily ration for about 1,050 horses, 
under a quarter of the number to be supplied. Other overseas sources in 
this period were also few. On the 10th August 1809 one thousand six hundaibd 
quarters of barley brought to Lisbon by Mr John Phillips were purchased 
by the commissariat and in November, Mr Phillips being apparently desirous 
of organising a trade in corn from various parts of the Mediterranean to the 
commissariat at Lisbon, the Treasury ordered that Commissary-General Murray's 
16. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17959, Ogilvie to Dalrymple, 31st January 1814, 
17. Forage shortage also necessitated leaving the cavalry to winter in the 
Ebro valley, but since the terrain of the Pyrenees was not suitable for cavalry 
action anyway, little harm can be felt to have resulted. 
18. P. R. 0. W. 0.57/2, Arbuthnot to Coffin, 26th June and 20th July 1809, 
58/56, Gordon to the Commissioners of Transports, 11th April 1810,58/130, 
Gordon to Murray and Kennedy announcing shipments on various dates. 
- 96 - 
attention be called to the possibility of dealing with the merchant19. 
The offer was well timed as doubts were being expressed in Portugal as 
1809 drew on about the adequacy of local corn supplies to see the army through 
the winter. Murray therefore bought Mr Phillips' next cargo, a mixture 
of wheat and barley, but although further transactions of the same kind 
were obviously intended it does not seem that the commissariat received 
any more supplies from Mr Phillips. The reason f )r this sudden breaking off 
cannot be seen for certain but three possible causes suggest themselves. 
In the first place Mr Phillips' second cargo was apparently much smaller 
than had been expected, a mere one and three quarter million pounds instead 
of the twelve thousand quarters hoped for, and it may be that he found it 
impossible after all to make large scale corn purchases in the Mediterranean 
at a satisfactory price. In any case on the arrival of the 1810 consignment 
Phillips became involved in an argument with Lieutenant Fleetwood, the 
Transport Agent at Lisbon, over payment for the transport he had used and 
if he was unable to recover any of his transport costs it-may be that he 
found it unprofitable to continue the trade20. The final possibility 
arises out of a letter from Gordon to Murray covering unknown enclosures 
"in order that you may be fully on your guard in all your dealings with 
Mr Phillips" 21. The nature of the enclosures may have induced Murray 
himself to discontinue such dealings. 
Whatever the reason for the cessation of Mr Phillips' operations, it 
certainly did not lie in the plentiful stocks of forage corn already held 
by the commissariat. The movement of a large part of the army to the Beira 
frontier during the winter of 1809/10 had placed it in a country less well 
stocked with corn than its previous cantonments and even before the breach 
with Mr Phillips Murray had investigated the possibility of drawing corn 
from Morocco only to discover that little was available from that source 
and that even that little was earmarked for Cadiz22. The Azores were 
another potential source of corn where Murray opened negotiations although 
the first arrivals thence did not appear in Portugal until after Kennedy 
had taken over as Commissary-General. In the late summer of 1810 Mr Harding 
19. P. R. O. W. O. 57/2, ? to Gordon, 4th November 1809. 
20. Ibid 57/38, Letters from Phillips 24th January, 10th and 24th February 
1810. 
21. Ibid 58130, Gordon to Murray, 26th February 1810. 
22. Ibid 57/38, Murray to Gordon, 16th May 1810. 
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Read the Consul-General consigned nearly one and a quarter million pounds 
of forage corn to Portugal for the benefit of the British commissariat23. 
Considering these import sources over the period it appears that a further 
400 horses a. day, on average, were catered for in addition to the supply 
provided from the British Isles. It would therefore seem reasonable to 
assert that in the years 1809 and 1810 about one third of the necessary 
corn supply arrived in Portugal from overseas, the remainder being obtained 
in the country, less of course that amount not issued since both while the 
army was in Spain24 and in the Beira cantonments the full corn ration 
could not always be kept up. 
This impression of the corn supply being mainly locally collected while 
the army remained in the south is supported by the experience of the 
individual units. The cavalry at Vila Vicosa obtained barley from the 
local villages in exactly the same way as they have already been seen to 
hive obtained bread. A large part of the supply however came not from the 
immediate localities where the units were stationed but from the wider 
hinterland of southern Portugal. The neighbourhoods, first of Estremoz 
and then of Evora and Beja, yielded supplies of barley and Indian corn 
while that quantity of oats which was transported forward from Lisbon was 
evidently considered as supplementary. "A depot of oats collected at that 
place (Evora)" wrote Coffin in October "will be a certain resource for the 
Cavalry at Villa Vicosa and Borba, when ever the supplies of the country 
may fail"25. Later in the year it became necessary to search further afield 
and Boyes and Ogilvie were sent into Spanish Estremadura around Azuaga to 
buy forage corn, on which duty they successfully collected four hundred 
thousand pounds. The transfer of much of the army to Beira relieved the 
pressure on the resources of the south, which it had been feared might not 
have been great enough to preserve the cavalry during the winter, and also 
enabled the troops to draw upon the reserves on the Tagus and Mondego during 
the change of position. The stock of oats and barley in the depots can be 
seen to have fallen sharply in January of 1810 reflecting this new dependence 
upon the rear supply, and the combined quantity of these commodities fell 
23. P. R. O. A. 0.1 569/460. Indian corn contributed over half of this supply, 
with beans being nearly all the rest. A very small quantity of barley made 
up the total. 
24. The deficiency of the supply in Spain may be seen from the fact that 
Tomkinson, rejoining his unit over six months later, reckoned "the regiment was 
by no means recovered from the effects of the Talavera campaign"; Tomkinson, 
p 21. 
25. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17926, Coffin to Ogilvie, 11th October 1809. 
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steadily in the returns between January and the 1st May. Though this is 
evidence of a rear supply which must have provided nearly a half of the 
horses' requirements in these months the continued importance of the 
locality is reflected in the increase in the same period in stocks of 
Indian corn and rye all of which are likely to have been bought locally. 
26 
Unfortunately the provision returns cease after May and for'tho way the 
cavalry were supplied in the remainder of the year it is necessary to 
consider other evidence. Kennedy writing in July observed that the horses 
had 'often' bees: on half rations which seems likely to have been more from 
shortage of transport than lack of supplies27. Tomkinson, who spent much 
of the summer at the outposts, found corn plentiful both there and earlier 
near Celorico, and stated that "the regiment was supplied in everything 
from the country"28. Since only a small force of cavalry was employed in 
a forward position, it may well have found local subsistence easier than its 
colleagues'iri larger numbers further back into Portugal. In fact however 
the local supplies to the forward cavalry appear mostly themselves to have 
been collected further back, at least in the early part of the year. 
Ogilvie's arrangements for the supply of the 1st K. G. L. Hussars depended 
on fetching their corn from Almeida and Pinhel29 which depots themselves 
were partly stocked with local produce but drew also on Viseu and Celorico 
where more stores were bought and assembled. It appears altogether reasonable 
to suppose that the shortfall in the imported supplies was usually made up 
by local purchase, particularly after the new corn began to appear on the 
market in July30, rather than by reducing the horses' rations but that 
transport difficulties may have created temporary stoppages in the supply 
to some units. The rear supply was only partial too to the horses in the 
south. On the 20th May, after a period of high water had stopped all 
transport up the Tagus for some days, D. C. G. Boyes wrote asking for a regular 
supply of twenty eight thousand rations of forage corn per week for the 
benefit of Hill's troops, 
31 
but this request was apparently not met - indeed 
26. See provision returns in P. R. O. W. 0.57/38 and 39" Almeida and Viseu 
were the places where much of the Indian corn was held in March suggesting that 
the inland regions rather than the coastal markets were the major sources of 
this supply. 
27. P. R. O. W. 0.57/39, Kennedy to Gordon, 10th July 1810. 
28. Tomkinson pp 23,29/30 and 37- 
29.14. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17953 f. 22 seq. 
30. Kennedy : issued a circular reminding commissaries to pay a lower price for 
the new corn than had been current for the old, on 1st July 1810. Ibid No 
17983 f. 68. 
31. Ibid No 17902, Boyes to Ogilvie, 20th May 1810. 
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in the last three weeks of June only seven thousand six hundred and thirty 
rations arrived32 - and the troops near Portalegre and towards Castello 
Branco fell back on other resources. Mr Fletcher the contractor already 
encountered, provided barley, various receipts are extant from local 
authorities and individuals for small quantities of corn, and the horses 
near Castello Branco were obliged to take rye as part of their ration since 
it was the only corn obtainable in that region. Short rations were possibly 
more common with the southern army, especially north of the Tagus, than 
with the horses in Beira, the 13th light dragoons in particular having to 
forage widely to keep up their supplies of both corn and hay. 
On the 30th November 1810 Kennedy sent home a report about the alarmingly 
denuded state of the army's magazines and two days later requested a supply 
of three and a half million pounds of oats and the same quantity monthly 
thereafter33. The reason for urgency was that the calls on the commissariat 
had risen since October by the presence of the auxiliary forces called to 
help defend the lines of Torres Vedras at the same time as the area open 
for commissariat purchasing activity had been reduced by the French invasion. 
So large a demand caused consternation in London, Gordon writing in reply 
"The amount actually exceeds that which is provided by me monthly for the 
whole army now in Great Britain"34, but the Commissgry-General was fortunate 
that his request arrived at a period of low grain prices in the British 
market and the year 1811 saw a determined attempt to provide at least a 
high proportion of Kennedy's demand. Between the 22nd December 1810 and 
the 21st September 1811 nearly thirty thousand quarters of barley and six 
thousand six hundred quarters of oats were shipped from England for Portugal, 
being an average quantity of about one and a half million pounds per month. 
After a short gap in the despatch a further quantity of over four million 
pounds was shipped in November. The corn crisis in Portugal was also the 
opportunity for a certain Mr Porcas to interest Lord Liverpool in a 'compound 
forage' of his own devising said to be lighter than barley though 
unfortunately more expensive. Gordon was ordered on the 30th March to 
contract with Mr Porcas for the delivery of eight hundred and forty thousand 
pounds at Lisbon, but was evidently not keen on the venture as he had to be 
32. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17902, f. 91, Boyes to Ogilvie, tat July 1810. 
33" P. R. O. W. O. 57/38, Kennedy to Gordon, 2nd December 1810. 
34" Ibid 58130, Gordon to Kennedy, 18th December1810. 
ýi 
a: 
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reminded of the order on the 1st clay and finally on the 22nd May was allowed 
to agree for a much reduced quantity instead35. No comment from Portugal 
on the value of the compound forage has survived, though it arrived in 
July or August and a certain amount of it appears on a way bill in transit 
between Lisbon and the Belem depot on the 12th August 
36. No more appears 
to have followed the trial consignment. The total supply from the United 
Kingdom to Portugal during 1811 appears to have been slightly less than 
half of consumption during the year, some of the difference being made up 
by the arrival of Indian corn from America under Charles Stuart's arrangement 
with Sampaio, and the rest evidently by purchase either in the Lisbon 
market or inland, probably to as great an extent as had occurred in 1810 
though representing a much smaller proportion of the total supply. 
As has been seen, by November 21st 1811 the poor harvest and high grain 
prices in England obliged the government to prohibit the further export of 
corn thence. The oats and barley in course of shipping were not delayed 
by this measure but when Bisset applied in March for a further supply the 
Treasury refused and urged him to look to America and the Mediterranean 
to meet his needs37. By this time however Bisset had already followed 
Wellington's suggestion and made an arrangement with Sampaio to draw corn 
from Ireland, a proceeding which concerned Herries who felt that one of the 
home departments would make more economical purchases in a home market38. 
Although Herries issued no reprimand regarding the purchase of Irish forage 
corn, indeed complimenting D. C. G. Pipon on the 'zeal & intelligence' which 
his explanations evinced, he apparently intended his disapproval to put an 
end to the trade39, and was surprised to infer from Pipon's report of stores 
at the end of the year that Sampaio was still active in Ireland. Kennedy's 
reply to his inquiry has not survived but was evidently only a partial 
disclaimer and by the summer of 1813 Herries had discovered that in fact 
"Mr Sampayo has contrary to your belief acquired by your engagement with 
him an unlimited power of exporting from Ireland, where I find by a 
35. The reduced quantity was ¬300 worth which must have been less than fiflty 
thousand pounds. P. R. O. W. 0.57/4, Harrison to Gordon, 30th March, 1st and 
22nd May 1811. 
36. N. A. M. Ace 7701-36 G. 101. 
37. P. R. 0. W. 0.57/5, Wharton to Herries, 4th April 1812. 
38. See variously Despatches VIII p 446, Wellington to Bisset, 17th December 
1811 aild P. R. 0. W. 0.57/41, Bisset to Herries, 27th March 1812 and 58/132 Henries 
to Bisset, 20th April and 23rd June 1812. 
39. Herries, who seems to have supported Bisset's request for more corn in the i 
spring, may have been diplomatically attempting to convey the substance of the 
Treasury's instructions without binding the Commissary-General with a plain veto. 
The matter hinges on a private conversation between Herries and Kennedy in the 
summer of 1812. 
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communication ... from the Commissioners. -of Customs he has been considered 
4s an officer of the Commissariat"40. The probability is therefore that 
Sampaio was exporting from Ireland at least intermittently throughout the 
period between February 1812 and July 1813 when the arrangement came to an 
end this time as positively ordered by Herries. Only two records of 
quantity remain but judged by these the supply must have been a considerable 
one. The total for the months of May and July 1813 is roughly ten million 
pounds, an amount at least equal to two months' consumption without taking 
into account any other sources at all. It seems unlikely that these 
figures typify the supply, in view of the continued concern displayed by 
the Commissary-General to obtain forage corn from other overseas sources 
during 1812 and 1813, but the Irish supply is probably a great part of the 
explanation as to how the commissariat had both acquired a six month reserve 
stock of oats, barley and Indian corn by the end of 1812 and had been enabled 
in the course of the year to make over large quantities of these commodities 
monthly to the Portuguese government in lieu of subsidy4l. 
The ending of the official supplies from the United Kingdom led the 
Peninsular commissariat to search even farther afield than previously to 
maintain stocks of corn in face of the increasing number of horses to be 
supplied. North America again provided various commodities including Indian 
corn as it had done the previous year and these efforts were seconded by 
the new departure of 1812/13 in the commissariat's trading activity, the 
purchase, through the medium of Lord Straeord the ambassador, of "31 Cargoes 
of Wheat, Flour, Rice, Indian Corn and Beans"42 in Brazil. The Mediterranean 
also contributed, five thousand quarters of forage corn being bought at 
Cadiz for Portugal early in 1812 while shortly after Kennedy returned to the 
Peninsula he made enquiries of the Gibraltar merchant Abuderham about the 
possibility of obtaining corn from the Barbary States. The further pursuit 
of this object was entrusted to Sir William At Court on his mission to the 
north African coast early in 1813. In the event the only agreement for 
forage corn he appears to have concluded was for one thousand loads of barley 
from Oran but in view of internal commotions in that state it cannot be said 
40. P. R. O. W. 0. '. 58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 13th June 1813. 
41. Bisset provided nearly six million pounds of forage corn to the, Portuguese 
in the first four months of 1812. Pipon said in December that he issued them 
one and a half million pounds per month. B. M. Add Mss 57377 Bisset to Herries, 
18th May 1812 and P. R. O. W. O. 57/40 Pipon to Herries, 15th December 1812. 
42. P. R. O. A. 0.1 571/469 and 470. One cargo was lost another captured by an 
American privateer. 
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with confidence that any part of this supply arrived in Portugal. Purchases 
in the Azores, apparently suspended during 1811, also recommenced early in 
1812 when Pipon made an arrangement with Mr Read under which the latter 
agreed to buy and dispatch to Portugal about three and a half million pounds 
of Indian corn, of which nearly two million pounds had arrived by the middle 
of May43. Although in July the Treasury officially approved of Mr Read's 
activities some doubts evidently remained about the expediency of purchasing 
such a large quantity of corn in so localised a market and the mission of 
Mr Purcell, already referred to in the section dealing with meat, was 
primarily for the purpose of ensuring that the islands were neither being 
stripped of forage corn nor excessive prices paid. As a result of Purcell's 
report and Bisset's covering letter Herries was informed in September that 
the Treasury "do not think it desireable (sic) to pursue this object further 
than in so far as the procuring of India Corn from the said Islands is 
concerned"44, and by December even the India corn was felt to be too expensive. 
The supply from the Azores probably died out after December 1812 not from 
the issue of orders to stop it, but from Mr Read's finding it impossible 
any longer to market Treasury Bills in the islands. 
The proportion of forage corn supplied between January 1812 and June 1813 
(the recommencement of consignments from England) from overseas sources cannot 
be more than guessed at owing to the complete uncertainty about the 
Irish 
supply. It may however be confidently stated to have been at least a half 
and reasonably assumed to have been two thirds or more. In any case it is 
clear that throughout the period from 1811 to June 1813 the commissariat 
obtained at least enough corn from overseas to provide a much more substantial 
reserve behind the continuing local purchases than had been arranged in 
1809/10. It is also clear however that the greater part of the import supply 
never arrived at the horses of the field army, being used instead to amass 
(over less than two years) a six month reserve supply, and in payment of the 
Portuguese subsidy which service probably received in 1812 half as much dbrn 
as the army's horses needed. In other words even had the imports for 1812 
been equal to the army's consumption, three quarters of them would still 
have remained on the coast and that proportion would have had to be provided 
by inland purchases. Bisset's report indeed of January 1812 
(but based on 
figures from the later months of 1811) states that over 70% of supply 
43" P. R. O. W. O. 57/41, Bisset to Herries, 16th May 1812. 
44" Ibid 575, Wharton to Herries, 21st September 1812. 
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expenditure at that time was made inland at the divisions or at interior 
depots and, as has been seen, even if all the meat and alcohol consumed 
were supposed to have been bought locally, Bisset's figures would still 
imply the local purchase of half the bread and corn supplies45. Thus 
although the situation of December 1810, when Dalrymple on the Tagus could 
write to a subordinate "Pray send us some forage corn if possible, we have 
come to a sudden stop at the fountain head and without assistance from the 
alentejo or other source we shall be sadly distressed"46, was never likely 
to be repeated in the succeeding two and a half years, interior purchases 
obviously remained important in the forage corn supply with the army. 
The army in the field evidently did rely oonsiderably on local supplies 
of corn in 1812 and the early months of 1813" Purchases were made with 
the units and at the interior depots. In the months of July, August and 
September 1812 it was specifically forbidden that mules from the army at 
Salamanca or Ciudad Rodrigo should be loaded with corn, so completely was it 
intended that the horses should live from the land. Even nearer to the 
coast it was also preferred to let the neighbourhood do the work as may be 
seen in the case of the new depot at Sta Comba Dao. "It is very probable 
tiat the forage corn & spirits may be had by purchase on the spot. This 
will be a great saving of transport and of time47 wrote Kennedy. Considerable 
efforts were made to collect corn locally during the summer of 1812. 
Sometimes this was done by dealing with merchants, like Francisco Liano who 
provided Dalrymple with nearly half a million pounds of barley, or like 
Francisco Lopez who supplied barley to Salamanca. At other times the 
Spanish authorities were applied to, the Intendente of Salamanca supplying 
a small quantity of barley from the Crown lands48 to that depot, his colleague 
of Zamora being asked to do likewise while the obliging authority at Avila 
lent Mr Price an officer to help enforce his requisitions when the cavalry 
depot was being collected in October. A similar emphasis on local piirchases 
is apparent in the preparations north of the Douro for the advance of 1813. 
45. B. M. Add Mss 38247 f. 29 Bisset to Herries, 16th January 1812. Bisset's 
figures are surprising at first sight but tally well both with the record of 
Bills drawn from November 2nd 1811 to January 18th 1812 (P. R. 0. W. 0.57/41 enc. 
in Bisset to Herries 19th February 1812) and with the costs of the individual 
rations quoted in the estimate of 10th March 1812 B. M. Add Mss 57393. 
46. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17980, Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 5th December 1812. 
47. Ibid No 17946, Kennedy to Ogilvie, 30th November 1812. 
48. He supplied less than 50,000 pounds between August 24th and October 15th ij 1812. Ibid No 17981 f. 104. 
16 
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Mr Johnstone went ahead of the troops to Tavara where he collected barley 
with the help of the Intendente of Alcanizes, and more barley was bought 
at Braganca to increase the depot there. The experience of the commissaries 
with the army and at the interior depots thus endorses the view that, 
whatever the precise import figures, much of the forage corn gathered 
from overseas and bought with Bills in the coastal markets remained on 
the coast, leaving the army to make up its requirements with local purchases. 
The local purchases themselves seem to have taken place more at the inland 
depots than at the units themselves49, except in that period of the summer 
of 1812 when corn was supplied exclusively from the country which arrangement 
will be considered in greater detail in chapter VI. 
From July 1813 until the end of the war it was intended that the army 
be completely supplied with forage corn from the United Kint-dom. Herries' 
method of providing the supply rested largely upon a contract whereby Hr 
John Atkins Jnr of Walbrook in the City of London would ship between twelve 
thousand and fifteen thousand quarters of oats or barley to the north Spanish 
coast each month. In addition to these consignments the Commissary in 
Chief also intended to provide monthly a much smaller supply of six thousand 
sacks (probably about one and three quarter million pounds of meal50. 
Unfortunately little is known for certain about how much corn arrived in 
Spain under these arrangements. Atkins' shipments began in the middle of 
July and by the 11th August he had despatched about one and a half million 
pounds, or about four thousand quarters, of barley. Although this quantity 
is clearly less over four weeks than that envisaged by Herries it must be 
supposed that Atkins fulfilled his part of the contract to the reasonable 
satisfaction of the Commissary in Chief because no complaints about his 
contract survive and he was still supplying to Santander in December51. 
The exact fate of the meal supplies is equally unknown. The initial 
quantity of one million seven hundred thousand pounds promised by Herries 
in July had all been shipped by the middle of August but the regular supply 
49. Ashworth's brigade for example only received 12% of its corn supply directly 
by contract or purchase during four months in the first half of 1812. N. A. M. 
Acc 7701-36 E Nos 89 to 92. 
50. P. R. O. W. 0.58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 18th June 1813- 
51- Ibid 57/42 enclosed in Drake to Herries, 12th December 1813 may be found 
the arrivals of one solitary five day period, 6th to 10th Degember. The 
quantities are 1,421,256 pounds of barley and 393,356 pounds of oats. 
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promised thereafter cannot be said for certain 
to have arrived. The 
extant list of provisions sent to Santander between 
11th September and the 
27th October includes only five hundred and fifty casks 
(under two hundred 
thousand pounds) of meal which suggests that this supply may have 
been 
intermittent52. If the maximum supply promised was forthcoming between 
August 1813 and the end of the war it should have been just enough 
to 
provide the twenty thousand forage rations per day spoken of 
by Kennedy, 
even from December when the Commissary-General raised the ration to 
twelve 
pounds of corn in view of the forage shortage53. Certainly 
in November 
the corn supplies in stock seem to have been plentiful, five and a half 
million pounds or cver three weeks' issue, being held at Santander, at 
Passages and at sea which suggests the autumn supply, from Lisbon as well 
as from England of course, had been as much as the army's transport could 
distribute. 
Apart from a period in July and August before stores had been accumulated 
at Passages or Santander, the difficulties experienced by the commissariat 
in providing forage corn to the units were mostly difficulties in sending 
the supplies forward to the new bases established on the French coast after 
the army's successes in October and November 1813. Considerable shortages 
resulted at the front in December although as we have seen the overall 
situation at the Spanish ports was favourable. "The fact of there 
being 
no forage corn whatever either at St Jean de Luz or Renteria at this present 
moment is the cause that I do not now .. keep up a regular supply 
of the 
article"54, wrote Dobree on the 6th December, and eight days later the 
situation had not improved as "our artillery are without corn for this 
day 
& Mr Browne has no means of getting any without sending out a forage party 
at some distance & going himself to give the receipts"55. The combination 
of winter, the relatively barren locality and the difficulties of shipping 
along th_ coast not only made life hard for the staff and artillery horses 
in the front line (the bulk of the cavalry wintered in the more fertile 
Ebro valley and drew on the depot at Bilbao) but also hampered the transport 
of all supplies since the mules, needing to subsist on their journeys by 
carrying their own corn, were kept waiting at the magazines. 
The extreme 
52. P. R. O. W. O. 62/18. 
53" Ibid 57/43, Kennedy to Herries, 5th December 1813- 
54. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17952, Dobree to Ogilvie, 6th December 1813, 
55" Ibid f. 31, Dobree to Ogilvie, 14th December 1813. 
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shortage of early and middle December improved later in the month as more 
corn was provided to the French coastal depots. The 1st and 5th divisions 
with their attendant cavalry and guns stated themselves to be well supplied 
at the end of the year but difficulties obviously remained, at least until 
the operations of February gave the army a wider area for local 
requisition. The 3rd, 4th and 7th divisions had all been without corn 
for the four preceding days according to the state of the 1st February56. 
Thus even in the closing stages of the war, while the direct supply from 
the United Kingdom was in operation, local resources, such as they were 
in the Pyrenees, remained a necessary part of the horses' corn supply 
though certainly not to the same degree as in previous years. More than 
this unfortunately cannot be said in view of the missing figures respecting 
the shipments from Britain. 
56. N. L. S. Ace 4370 140 17879 f. 25 seq. 
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CHAPTER IV : Money and Credit in Spain and Portugal 1809 - 14. 
The Commissary-General, as well as being responsible for obtaining 
supplies and transporting them to the troops was also required to provide 
money for all the needs of the army. In the peninsula these resolved 
themselves under the following heads, presented here in roughly diminishing 
order Of cost: Supplies of provisions and forage, Ordinary expenses on the 
Deputy Paymaster's account, Transport by land and water, Subsidy payments 
to the Portuguese government, Ordnance department (including engineers), 
Medical department, Commissariat contingencies, Officers' allowances like 
bat and forage money or staff pay, Money advanced or given to the Spanish 
forces, Pay of the commissariat department, Pay of hired labourers, 
Stationery and printing costs, Military contingencies,, Purchase of horses 
and mules, Purchase of clothing and field equipment, Indemnifications, 
Secret service payments and Expenses relating to prisoners of war. Plainly 
these items differed greatly in importance, the first head from 1811 onwards 
counting over a half of the total and the first four heads between them 
always constituting the greatest part of it. 
1 
Thus any deficiency in the 
supply of money would be most severely felt in these categories of expenditure, 
failure in any of which might involve the most serious consequences. 
Inability to pay for supplies would create hostility among the local people, 
necessitating forced requisitions most damaging to army discipline and 
distracting to the strategic planning of the commander, while failure to 
pay the troops would have a bad effect on morale, stimulate desertion and 
might eventually lead to mutiny. Leaving transport expenses unpaid would 
also alienate the inhabitants and provoke the desertion of hired transport, 
while withholding the Portuguese subsidy would constitute a breach of faith 
with the ally upon whose assistance Wellingt)n's strategy utterly depended 
and who had already been induced to undertake commitments beyond her power 
financially to support on the promise of British aid. It was thus of vital 
importance that the Commissary-General was able to obtain enough money, if 
not to cover these expenses, at least to maintain an appearance of 
creditworthiness in the eyes of the inhabitants of the Peninsuh, who were 
in the first instance the beneficiaries of most of the supply and transport 
expenditure. 
1. Supplies, Ordinaries, Transport and the Portuguese subsidy comprised nearly 
90% of all disbursements in the Peninsula in 1811,1812 and 1813. B. M. Add Mss 
38272 f. 152. 
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Shaded area denotes that proportion of disbursements applied to expenses of 
supply and transport. 
Sources: B. M. Add Mss 38272 f. 152. 
P. R. O. A. 0.1 569/459. 
* The totals and sub-totals for these years are approximations only. 
1809* 1810* 1811 1812 1813 1814 
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To demonstrate the primary importance of expenditure upon supplies and 
their transport, the total annual sump, disbursed in the Peninsula between 
1809 and 1814 are s'iowr on the attached diagram (tbe figures for 1809 and 
1810 being rather more a, proximate than the others) with the proportions 
of those sums spent on the purchase of supplies and on the transport system 
appearing as a sub-total in each column. Too muc) importance should not 
be attached to the annual division, made only for convenience of presentation, 
as the y-ar in which a debt was paid is not necessarily that in which the 
expense was incurred. The worsening of the exchange against sterling which 
was the general trend of the war years has not been removed fron these 
figures, nor has any allowance been made for price fluctuations, generally 
upwards as the war progressed though always attended by seasonal and regional 
variations, so part of the increase in the annual totals is not due to any 
real increase in the goods and services prävided for. 
Two methods of providing the necessary money suggested themselves. It 
could either be obtained by the Treasury from the Bank of England or bought 
abroad and then sent as cash or specie to Portugal, or it could be raised 
on the :. pot ly the commissariat out of the money which naturally passed 
through the major trading centres of the Peninsula. Continuous friction 
resulted fron the existence of these two separate sources of money. On 
the one hand the Treasury and the Commissary in Chief sometimes felt that 
the 
Peninsular department was not adopting the best methods to raise cash and 
reduce expenditure, and on the other Wellington and the Commissary-General 
often thought the Treasury was wilfully obstructing their efforts and 
deliberately failing to supply as much money as it could. It is the army's 
side of this dispute that has been most reproduced by historians of the war 
from Napier onwards, and although it is now generally accepted that the 
Treasury did indeed do its best in the face of most difficult economic 
circumstances to supply Portugal with money, it is still often felt that 
they objected unreasonably to measures taken by Kennedy and Bisset to 
procure money locally2. The Treasury is rather harshly treated by this 
view as we shall see. 
2. See for example S. G. P. Wasd's opinion of Herries' interventions in 
financial matters, Op cit p 93. 
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When Wellington returned to Portugal in April 1809 by far the most 
important local source of cash was the sale of Treasury bills3 by Sir James 
Duff, the consul at Cadiz. In the second half ofthe year, at the suggestion 
of Charles Villiers then British minister in Portugal, an a, ency to raise 
money by similar negotiations was established at Lisbon and very soon the 
Lisbon market became the principal money resource of Wellington's army. 
The dole employment of Duff at Cadiz aroused criticism from Villiers among 
others who suggested that more activity and exertion might raise more money 
and was in favour of employing extra agents at Cadiz. Wellington's 
opinion (supported by Henry Wellesley and General Graham) was that "Duff 
got as much money as can be procured"4 and "I should. doubt that two or 
three shops would sell more bills than one"5. The Treasury intended to 
have Commissary-General Drummond investigate the matter during his trip to 
the Peninsula at the end of 1810 but in the event so many other questions 
came to occupy Drummond's time that he never reported on Duff at all. 
Perhaps his silence can be taken for approval. In any case Wellington's 
wishes were realised and Duff continued to sell bills, at aj commission, 
until the end of the war though whether he did prove to be the best man 
for the job is doubtful. This passage from a letter of 1812 written by 
a prominent merchant and financial speculator certainly implies otherwise. 
"Of Cadiz I do not speak; the exchange there is merely nominal, although 
Mr Duff has raised the government course to 48jd the takers of Treasury 
bills will whilst the commercial rate is 49- consist of those only who like 
the agents of Manufacturers are by their principals restricted in the 
selection of firms and who have positive orders to invest but in government 
paper"6. 
Just as the employment of Duff rather than a commissariat officer to 
negotiate the sale of bills at Cadiz suggests an attempt to employ a man 
with local commercial knowledge and contacts in this important duty, it is 
not surprising to find as Lisbon agent a man displaying similar attributes. 
3. Properly Bills of Exchange . ipon the Lords 
Commissioners of His Majestyis 
Treasury. These negotiable instruments were parable in London, normally at 
thirty days after sight within which period they bore interest at 5;.. Hereafte r the word 'bill' will refer to a Treasury bill unlecs otherwise specified. 
4. Despatches VI p 455, Wellington to Berkeley, 3rd October 1810. 
5. Ibid p 184, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, 13th June 1810. 
6. B. M. Add Mss 31236. Macdonnel to Pipon, 24th July 1812. 
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What is more surprisin;; perhaps is that r; cirique äar j aio, the PortLl uesý mu"i 
of business selected for the task, should not have b, en disqualified from 
thus interesting himelf it the exc'h,, n_es from the British side by his pre- 
existent interest in them, as a major supplier of provision,,; under contract 
to the British army, from the 'ortujuese point k"' view. Very likely his 
appointment was a reward for useful services already re-'-red the British 
back in 1508, many of them still unpaid, an, i once a. --in Wellington's opinion 
of him as a man of intelligence and inteLrity may have been important. In 
any case criticism of his activities when it came wa directed not at hi3 
efficiency but at his rate of com-mi sion, Deputy Commis_ary-Gene al ýweetlan-1, 
head of the Gibraltar co-Ami, 3sari"=at, feeling it excessive that he be paid 
J /8th per cent on bills "for merely endorsinL his narre upon then, "7. Upon 
Sampaio pointing out the amount of work his job really involved, the 
Commissary in Chief allowed the commission to remain and indeed it was 
exactly the same as that allowed to Duff for the same service at Cadiz 
8. 
Bills at Lisbon were normally negotiated weekly and raised various uriP "e Lictr_Lbl, 
sums, half in cash and half in paper money issued by the rortueve-e Luverniue, 
_t 
This paper suj)posedly paid interest anrýually9 and was legal ten(ler for up to 
half of any one tra; ioaction, but since the interest had not been paid for 
several years10 it circulated at Lisbon and Oporto at a rate of discount that 
fluctuated between about twenty and thirtdr per cent. In the provinces it 
did not pass at all, and the uses to which it could be put by the army were 
very limited. In effect it had to be dispo-: e] of to the PortuEuese 
goverrmant as subsidy or to a merchant at Lisbon or Oporto or as pay to 
officers only, but since it was only admissible to the amount of half a 
transaction, without cash to back it up it was of no u=-e at all. 
The idea of supporting the Peninsular operations by selling bills at 
Lisbon 
11 
, assisted by occasional shipments from Cadiz of money sur,, lus to 
the garrison's requirements, was not treated with much enthusiasm in PortuLa, l. 
7. P. R. O. O. 58/130. Gordon to Kennedy, 26th June 1810. 
8. Sampaio's commission was of which 1185 went on brokerage and 4i covered 
the expenses of counting and transporting money at which jobs he claimed to 
employ five men. W. C. 57/39. Enclosed in Kennedy to Gordon, 18th July 1810. 
9" 55, less 2i tax each year. 
10. Though Drummond was told that the French while in Lisbon had ordered the 
payment of half a year's interest, the assertion being that Junot had previouuly 
collected a large sup ly of the paper and took advantage of the consequent drop 
in the rate of discount. Drummond was an uncritical collector of rumours, but this story might be true. B. M. Add Mss 57375, Dr, 
-unmond 
to Herries, 6th Oct. 1810 
11. Some cash was also raised in this way at Oporto, but very small quantities 
compared to the sum, at Lisbon. The proceeds of bills sold at Corunna and other coastal commissariat station- were apy)lied almost exclusively to the expense;; 
of those stations. 
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Wellington felt that this speculative resource was insufficiently reliable 
to support the very large expenditure that the war would inevitably demand 
and while he was right in supposing that the Lords of the Treasury in no 
way foresaw the soaring cost of his campaigns, he appears to have under- 
estimated the market for bills at Lisbon. Charles Stuart, while agreeing 
with We''lington that the system was 'precarious' pointed out a different 
disadvantage of selling bills, namely that it was expensive in its effect 
upon the rate of exchange. He was unfortunate inasmuch as shortly after 
he made this point in the summer of 1810 the exchange rate fell sharply in 
the financial panic produced by the fall of Almeida and the advance of 
Massen , but his observation was nonetheless true 
in a general sense and 
in December he was able to return to the attack. "The endeavours of the 
commissaries to collect £70,000 for the public service have this week raised 
the exchange from 68 to 70 Rs which brings the dollar to the price of 5/Sd. 
12 
Every payment to the British army at the usual rate of 4/6d thus subjects 
his Majesty's Government to the loss of 1/2d per dollar". 
13 His solution 
for these evils was for the government to send more money, a remedy that 
Murray, Kennedy and Wellington had also been suggesting in the course of 
the year. After all as Wellington with his customary practical acuity 
observed, if the existing traffic in money is to the profit of the individuals 
engaged in it why should the government not be enabled to participate and 
save the profit? 
14 
The Treasury did not ignore these appeals, though some confusion was 
created early in 1810 when Murray wrote home reiterating a request for 
£200,000 in cash and asking for £50,000 per month thereafter 
15 Since a sinn 
equivalent to about ¬250,000 was sent from Britain in the first three months 
of the year Gordon was surprised to continue receiving gloomy news about 
the state of the military chest and wrote in May to inquire where the over- 
spending was occurring. His letter crossed with a revised estimate from 
Murray stating monthly expenses to be £300,000 at the new rate of subsidy to 
Portugal. 
6 
This too proved an underestimate but even as it stands it is easy 
to see why the Commissary-General as"zed for more support since he was selling 
bills for cash in the first third of the year, at Lisbon, only at the rate 
12. This implies a discount on paper of about 35% which was unusually high. 
At the normal discount of early 1811 the dollar would have cast about 5/6d. 
13. B. M. Add Mss 38361 Memorandum of February 1811. 
14" Supplementary Despatches VI, Wellington to Liverpool, 6th June 1810. 
15. P. R. O. W. O. 57/38, rturray to Gordon, 4th January 1810. 
16. Ibid Murray to Gordon, 16th May 1810. 
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of about 0200,000 per month. In May however the exchange rate was put up 
and money became easier for his successor, Kennedy, at least until the end 
of the year. All this while the Treasury were still attempting to provide 
money. They were unfortunate in that the time was one of bullion shortage 
caused by the revolts in South America which interfered with mining 
operations and confidence alike, and the problem was compounded by the 
French capture, early in 1810, of the quicksilver mines of south Spain, 
mercury being a necessary part of the silver mining process. To the general 
shortage of specie was added the disruption of the usual pattern of British 
trade brought about by Napoleon's Milan and Berlin decrees, recently vigorously 
restated by the Bnperor as a result of his perusal of the, imprudently 
published, conclusions of the Bullion Committee regarding the damage these 
economic measures were doing to the British economy17. In spite of these 
difficulties more money was sent in 1810 than had been in 1809 - about £650,000 
against £450,000 in the earlier year - but the expenses of the war climbed 
sharply in the same period and the larger sum was a smaller proportion of 
what was required. 
The money sent came from a variety of sources and even included a shipment 
of 110,000 dollars by H. M. S. Pylla "much defaced by Chinese characters"18. 
Throughout 1810 however it was principally to South America that both the 
Treasury and the Peninsular department looked in hope. In July the opinion 
of Sir Francis D'Ivernois, Genevan pamphleteer and financial expert, was 
consulted and he thought that it might be possible to send paper to South 
America and thus draw out the specie circulating there, but that on balance 
any attempts to raise a loan in the colonies were merely anticipations of 
19 funds that should in the normal course of trade become available anyhow. 
The summer and autumn were full of rumours of large sums open to speculators 
in the New World and an expectant atmosphere accordingly surrounded the 
arrival of H. M. S. Bulwark from Vera Cruz at the end of the year but her cargo 
proved very disappointing to English and Spanish hopes. Captain Fleming, 
commander of the Bulwark, went so far as to assert that the British agent at 
17. Properly the 'Select Committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the 
. 
kaigh price of Gold Bullion and to take into consideration the state of the 
circulating medium and the exchanges between Great Britain and foreign parts'. 
The Committee's revelation of the true British export figures was unfortunate 
and its conclusion that convertibility should be re-established was no compensatiry 
help. 
18. P. R. O. W. O. 58/130, Gordon to Kennedy, 3rd September 1810. 
19. B. M. Add Hiss 57403, D'Ivernois to Herries, 29th July 1810. 
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Vera Cruz had "facilitated a preference that was given to the French". 
It seems more likely that the agent's instructions which forbad the payment 
of more than a certain price for specie explain his being outbid by other 
purchasers. Wider instructions were at once despatched with H. K. S. 
Inconstant to bring back whatever could be procured but Kennedy was warned 
that for at least four months he "must look to resources within the Peninsula 
for his supplies of specie". 
20 
If more money could not be provided for Portugal, at least the commissariat 
could be assisted by advice about means of local financing and possible 
economies that could be practised. Thus it was that in June 1810 Commizeary- 
General Drummond, under orders to proceed to the Mediterranean as commissary 
of accounts, received a letter from the Treasury secretary apprising hir, of 
a change of plan. He was directed to Lisbon "to collect and transmit to 
their lordships the fullest information upon certain points relating to the 
pecuniary resources and arrangements for the British Service in that country"21, 
and more precise orders followed the next month when he was told to suggest 
any means that occurred to him of increasing the money supply or of lessening 
the demand for cash in the Peninsula. At the same time it was observed 
that he might find Exchequer bills to be a more negotiable commodity in 
Portugal than bills of exchange. Obediently Drummond devised a scheme for 
selling certificates of entitlement to Exchequer bills, which certificates 
he called 'exchequer actions', and having discussed the idea with three major 
financiers at Lisbon22 referred it back to London for sanction. By this 
time however the news of the much improved results from selling Treasury 
bills that followed the early summer raising of the exchange rate23, and 
most recently of the great success of the August ? iegotiations24 that resulted 
from the military situation already alluded to, had arrived in London and 
the Treasury, anxious not to disturb a system at present looking s> much more 
promising than anyone had supposed, directed him after all to confine himself 
to his inquiring brief and drop the 'exchequer action' preparations. Thus, 
20. P. R. 0. W. 0.57/3, Harrison to Gordon, 15th January 1811. 
21. Ibid Harrison to Drummond, 15th June 1810. 
22. Namely Quintella and Brancamp the tobacco contractors and Bandeira 
supposedly the third richest man of commerce in Lisbon. Drummond described them 
as the "'fermiers generaux' of this country". B. M. Add Mss 57375 f 51, Drummond 
to Herries, 22nd September 1810. 
23. From 68d per milrei (1,000 reis) the rate rose to 69d and 70d in successive 
weeks in the middle of May. 
24. Over ¬500,000 worth of bills were issued in August 1810 at Lisbon, most of 
which were negotiated for currency (half money, half paper). 
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for the time being at least, the Treasury came down firmly in favour of the 
system of financing by bills of exchange, and in view of the apparent upward 
trend of sums available in the second part of 1810 their decision does not 
seem to lack a basis in good sense25. 
Though Drummond assimilated a good deal of information about the general 
economic situation at Lisbon, his stay there after the suppression of the 
'exchequer actions' idea was barren of any useful consequence, in great pari 
owing to the suspicion and lack of assistance he received from headquarters. 
In the absence of information which only the goodwill of either Wellington 
or Kennedy could supply, he was reduced to making vague unsupported suggestions 
about how cash expenditure might be lessened. On the 30th October he 
eventually received from Kennedy in answer to a series of questions about 
financial matters a sheet of replies to each in turn which he described as 
'evgsive' and which were indeed as much devoid of good grace as of information. 
On the 3rd December he left Lisbon for Cadiz havin, ° achieved little more than 
to irritate Wellin, *ton and Kennedy by his mere presence in an investigatory 
capacity and to be made a sounding board for one of De Souza's interminable 
plans for founding a Bank of Portugal whose ultimate guarantor in some 
ramification or another was always to be the British goverrmºent2b. Being 
present at Cadiz on the occasion of the disappointment over H. M. S. Bulwark, 
Drummond became involved in the discussion about how to raise more money in 
South America and in April 1811 departed for Lima armed with British securities 
and a licence to export up to three million dollars. Thus it was that in 
spite of Secretary Harrison's assurance on his departure that "this service 
will probab__y be of short duration"27 he did not become available for other 
duty until the spring of 1812, one year and nine months after leaving England, 
when he returned to Cadiz bringing for Portugal as the sum of his year's 
efforts 337,823 dollars 7 seals, approximately three and a half days' 
expenditure for Wellington's army at the rate of early 1812. At least his 
efforts, for if not the most intelligent officer he was a very zealous one, 
25. The August figure was not achieved again but after a sharp drop in September 
to below the old June/July level the trend climbed once more until the figure for 
January 1811 which was again around the £500,000 mark. B. M. Add Mss 38361 f 119. 
26. Ibid 57375, Drummond to Herries, 3rd November 1810. 
27. P. R. 0. W. 0.573, Harrison to Drummond, 15th June 1810. 
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bear witness to the difficulty of finding precious metals protested by 
the Treasury against its army critics. 
28 
In spite of the resentment inspired by Drummond's investigatory 
instructions, implying as they were felt to a lack of confidence in 
Kennedy's willingness to make all reasonable economies, the Commissary- 
General was naturally very interested in saving the expenditure of cash 
as far as possible. The easiest target for economy was the Portuguese 
subsidy, not because its payment could be suspended but because, with the 
two armies operating so closely in conjunction one with another, it was 
both convenient and a simple matter to make a contribution towards the 
upkeep of the Portuguese forces in kind. 
29. This method was approved of 
in England but caused great accounting complexity and tras one of the many 
details of the Portuguese subsidy that caused friction between the allies 
since because of their poverty and consequent inefficient system of 
transport and distribution large magazines of food in the rear were of far 
less use to the Portuguese government than their money value might have 
suggested. Since the aim of this chapter is to show the financial 
limitations under which the commissariat laboured an examination of all 
the confusion arising out of the subsidy to Portugal is not relevant30 
except to observe the very small proportion of it that was normally paid 
in ready money. Even in the first year of its payment, from the 14th March 
1809 to the 24th March 1810, only about £380,000 in money passed from the 
British chest to the Portuguese, although the British calculation of the 
total obligation over the period came to ¬800,000. later, as the amount 
of the subsidy grew alongside all the other calls upon the army's money 
supply, the proportion fell much lower. The first six months of 1812 saw 
28. It cannot even be said that the sum Drummond brought back from Lima 
represented a net input into the British holding of specie since, before the 
commissary left Cadiz, Henry Wellesley had lent the Spanish government 500,000 
dollars on the assurance of its being repaid in Peru. Much to Drummond's fury 
the viceroy at Lima could or would not honour the debtl B. M. Add Mss 57373, 
Drummond to Wellesley, 14th December 1811. 
29. If the British had had to buy locally the provisions thus passed to the 
Portuguese there would have been no saving in cash expenditure but as has been 
seen they frequently made over supplies sent from England. 
30. Herries wrote "I do not exactly understand upon what principle the subsidy 
of 2 millions is drawn for", at the head of a letter who. '3 queries make it very 
plain that he meant what he said. Yet this was on the 10th May 1812, when the 
subsidy had been being paid for three years already, and he had been Commissary 
in Chief for over six months! BM Add Mss 57393 f 36. Memorandum for the 
Commander of the Forces, 10th May 1812. 
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only about £260,000 paid in cash out of the total owed of ¬1,000,000. 
The British answer to complaints about the shortage of money provided was 
always to produce ideas for improving public credit or reforming the 
Portuguese financial administration, while what the Portuguese wanted was 
a loan from Britain. The ingenuity that was expended planning these 
reforms and the lively disputes engendered by various schemes however 
do not affect the central point which is that the combined efforts of 
the Treasury and the Peninsular commissariat were inadequate to provide 
money to cover all the army's expenditure and that one of the effects of 
this was the payment of the Portuguese subsidy to a great extent in kind 
rather than cash. 
As well as by somewhat abusing the subsidy agreement, a saving in 
expenditure could be effected by paying suppliers with bills rather than 
money. Naturally this recourse was only possible towards those creditors 
who had a use for a bill of exchange on London but at least some of the 
merchants who provided supplies at Lisbon fell into this category. It 
was customary in such circumstances to make the recipient promise not to 
negotiate the security in the Peninsula, to avoid the future competition 
with the commissariat's normal money raising activities that the continued 
presence of these bills in the Portuguese market would have offered. 
From the figures used by Bisset at the start of 1812 it seems that the 
proportion of the army's total expenditure that could be financed directly 
by bills in this waywas 14 , enough to be a useful amelioration 
in a 
difficult situation but not sufficient to prevent the build up of debt. 
As many of the merchants who accepted payment in bills were American it may 
be supposed that the usefulness of this practice was at its height in 1811, 
1812 and the first half of 1813 when the volume of American trade was at its 
greatest. Accordingly the 14Lý, figure probably represents somewhere near the 
greatest benefit derived by the commissariat from this money saving device. 
The growth of commissariat indebtedness, insignificant in the first year 
or so31 but accelerating to an alarming extent between the spring of 1811 
and the end of 1812, may be observed by the steadily increasing prominence 
of a species of security generally referred to as a commissariat bill but 
31. Fcr example the debts passed on from Murray to Kennedy on the 10th June 
1810 totalled £350,583 7/1d against which the military chest contained £301,975 
3/1d, leaving a net debt of only £48,608 4/-. 
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which, to avoid confusion with the other varieties of bill with which 
this chapter deals, I shall describe henceforward as a draft. In a letter 
to Stuart Wellington described the origin of these pieces of paper. 
"I issued a proclamation32, requiring all those who furnished supplies to 
the army to demand payment for them within one month after the period at 
which the supplies had been furnished and I promised that they should be 
paid, if possible, in ready money; or if not possible, that the Commissary 
who had received the supplies should be directed to give a bill for their 
amount on the Commissary General"33. The purpose of this order was to 
regularise the system of giving receipts, preventing various abuses whereby, 
from the receipts being incorrectly made out, great difficulty had arisen 
verifying claims for payment and injustice had been done to some whose 
demands had been inadequately certified and were no longer provable when 
presented for remuneration. Under the new system all holders of receipts 
who could not be paid promptly were given a draft which was simply intended 
to be an irrefutable proof of their entitlement to the money and of which 
they were to take advantage when the commissariat were ultimately able to 
pay. Since however the drafts bore on their face the sum of money for 
which they constituted a claim it is not surprising to discover that they 
were negotiated, against the commissariat's intention, and so came into 
circulation at a discount which grew in proportion as the normal delay in 
repayment was extended by the department's increasing shortage of funds34. 
A further proclamation by Wellington in May 1812 directed commissaries to 
give drafts on the spot to the value of commodities received if money was 
not available35. The only effect of this change of system was to increase 
the quantity of drafts upon which floated what was in effect a loan by means 
of which the commissariat covered the difference between its income and its 
exenditure36. 
32. Wellington says this proclamation appeared in 1809. He certainly issued 
an order to the above effect on the 4th January 1810 as various references 
testify. The order can be found in B. M. Add Mss 49481 f 132. Perhaps his 
memory misled him or else an earlier order to a similar effect has not been 
preserved. 
33" Despatches IX p 80, Wellington to Stuart, ? 2nd April 1812. 
34. The discount rate from its early days at only 2-3% grew to as much as 25` 
at the height of the money shortage of 1812 and settled back to about 21/2%% in 
1813- 
35. B. M. Add Mss 57377, Bisset to 1-ierrie, 2nd May 1812. 
36. I was tempted to describe this practice as obtaining a forced loan without 
interest. Since ''owever the suppliers were sometimes at liberty to decline to 
supply, the adjective 'forced' would be exaggerated. Furthermore, since the loan 
was made originally not in money but in goods for which there were no fixed prices, 
the absence of interest was often compensated for by the . bility of the supplier 
to charge an unduly high price, so the bare word 'loan' seems the most fair, 
though covering a multitude of peculiarities. 
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It was not the existence but the neg: tiability of the drafts that 
caused terrible embarrassment to the commissariat as the war proceeded 
and was the cause of the dangerous crisis in financial operations that 
developed during 1812 and which would if not calmly handled have prevented 
the campaign of 1813 ever being undertaken. Kennedy on several occasions 
pointed out that the drafts were never intended to be transferable, but 
obtained no sympathy from the Treasury. "These latter (drafts) are upon 
the face of them, to all Intents and Purposes negotiable instruments ... 
all of them to the order of the individual in whose favour they are drawn37. 
The difficulty arose because the drafts, expressed in Portuguese or Spanish 
currency, were said at a discount by the owners usually country people or 
small contractors who could not afford to wait for their money as long as 
the commissariat insolvency required and for whom in any case a journey to 
Lisbon or to army headquarters, the only two spots where payment could be 
made, was often an impossibility. The purchaser could then take the draft 
and obtain a bill for its face value at Lisbon, thus in effect buying 
sterling via the medium of the depreciated draft at a cheaper rate than 
that possible on the open market'8. Not unnaturally holders of speculative 
money in Portugal took advantage of the existence of two exchange rates by 
sending agents into the hinterland and buying up all the drafts they could 
in the army's wake and then presenting them for payment by bills at Lisbon. 
The result was that the money making operations of the department at Lisbon 
were increasingly unsuccessful because the exchange rate offered was 
hopelessly uncompetitive. Some amelioration of this effect was achieved 
by Wellin,, tonts policy, practised since the Oporto campaign of 1809, of 
paying last those holders of drafts who had purchased them from the original 
recipients. This meant that a small discount on drafts produced little 
attention among speculators since it would be cancelled by the opportunity 
cost of holding illiquid assets for six months or more awaiting payment. 
As the discount grew these objections no longer applied in such force and 
37. P. R. O. W. O. 57/5. Wharton to Herries, 13th January 1813, 
38. For example a draft for 1,000 milreis is bought at a discount of 20%. It 
cost to the purchaser is thus 800 milreis metal equal to (at 25 ,? discount on 
paper) 914 milreis currency. For it he receives a bill for 1,143 milreis 
currency at 70d each which makes 2333 6/8d. Since this bill has only really 
cost him 914 milreis currency he has actually obtained 87-ß-d per milrei, the 
increment of 25, corresponding to the original discount of 20%. 
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by the end of 1811 the situation was already beginning to cause alarm in 
Portugal. 
The normal recourse when the bills offered for sale proved an insufficiently 
attractive proposition to tempt merchants to buy would have been to raise the 
exchange rate, but under the peculiar conditions the Commissary-General 
found himself this would only have had the effect of increasing the profit 
to be made exchanging drafts for hills. On the other hand without worsening 
the exchange it would not be possible to attract money to Lisbon from other 
financial centres. Kennedy's answer to the problem and Bisset's after him 
was to institute a second, unofficial, exchange rate which was that offered 
in a succession of private arrangements to a firm called Brown and Reid who 
contracted to deliver specific sums to Lisbon for which they were to be 
given bills on England. The first such arrangement was agreed in November 
1811; Brown and Reid were to provide 400,000 dollars at 67d each39. Early 
the following year Bisset continued the new policy and made two further contracts 
for a total of 1,000,000 dollars, the price having risen to 68d. Not 
surprisingly the Treasury were immediately alarmed by this practice. Why 
was the Commissary-General going to so much trouble to arrange for the 
delivery of money at a price higher than that which he was prepared to pay 
in the market? "The terms of this bargain appear ... to be extravagant" 
wrote Harrison40. A misleading circumstance was that the system of private 
bargains had been brought to the Treasury's notice back in 1810 when Commissary- 
General Burgmann, head of the Mediterranean department in Sicily, had entered 
into several. His motive for this step appears to have been a fear of 
publicising his pressing need for money leading to his preferring to pay a 
little more now privately, than ultimately to pay the sort of prices he 
feared the merchant community would extort if he approached the market 
publicly. Naturally, as the Treasury foresaw at the time, the result of 
his operations was to drive money off the open market entirel-Ir and to force 
him into complete dependence upon specie contractors who accordingly charged 
extortionate prices41. The first reaction of the Commissary in Chief was 
39" The official exchange rate valued the dollar at 64d at the end of 1811. 
40. P. R. O. W. 0.57/4. Harrison to Herries, 18th December 1811. 
41. And incidentally could afford to pay high prices in the Peninsular markets, 
thus reducing the funds open to other departments using open marke* operations. 
The prices Burgmann had to pay were truly enormously inflated; as much as 75d 
in 1812. 
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therefore to suppose that-'Kennedy and Bisset had erred in judgement as had 
Burgmann previously, and Herries explained carefully to the Commissary-General 
how, at the price he offered them, Brown and Reid could buy in the Lisbon 
market in order to sell to him. "The repetition of the offer on the part 
of those gentlemen tends very much in my opinion to confirm the conjecture 
... stated"42 Herries added, 
in self-congratulatory vein, upon learrning öf 
Bisset's second contract. 
When the home authorities learned more about the situation, the tone of 
the letters arriving in Portugal became immediately placatory. Harries 
seems to have realised the difficulty sooner than his Treasury colleagues 
who ordered him to send Bisset, upon the occasion of his first contract, 
copies of their letters to Kennedy and Burgmann upon the subject although 
neither were relevant to the Peninsular situation. Harries sent the letters 
as ordered, adding in his covering note "a. ltho I am aware that there is a 
great dissimilarity between the two cases"43. Shortly afterwards the 
Treasury appear also to have seen the problem for Bisset was informed that 
no blame or discredit was attached to him over the transactions and that 
their Lordships recognised laying down fixed rules at such a distance from 
the events to be impossible. While they maintained their opinion that 
specie contracts were a most undesirable resort the Treasury did not intend 
to issue any orders upon the subject and left the decisions to the judgement 
of the men on the spot. In return Wellington and Bisset quite agreed that 
contracts for specie were undesirable but asserted that there had been no 
alternative. The contrast between these standpoints does not seem to 
justify the ill-feeling aroused by the issue at the time nor does it support 
the theory of an uncooperative attitude in Londcn44. The Treasury, 
thoroughly in the right over their criticisms of Burgmann, retracted their 
similar criticism of Bisset upon the whole case being made clear to them, 
and although not convinced that no better means of financing could be found 
bore with silent dignity the news of Bisset's third contract in June45. 
42. P. R. O. W. O. 5B/132. Herries to 2isset, 3rd. April 1812. 
43. Ibid. Herries to Bisset, 13th April 1812. 
44" For the ill-feeling see Wellington's letter to Herries in justification 
of the specie contracts. B. M. Add Mss 57368, Wellington to Herries, 9th June 
1812. 
45" This time for 684d bit the extra 34d does not represent the growing power 
of the supplier only the increase in the official rate for metal between 
February and June. B. M. Add Mss 38363 f 53 Statement of the rate of exchange. 
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The Commissary-General too was justified in his claim that he entered into 
contracts only when necessary and he certainly never placed all his 
dependence on this method since he frequently turned down offers of lump 
sums in the course of the year. 
The steady invasion of the Lisbon money market by depreciated drafts 
and the growing expense of the war created a cash shortage in 1812 which the 
specie contracts certainly could not fill. The army's debt grew from 
3,750,000 dollars in January to 11,000,000 dollars in the autumn of which 
5,000,000 dollars' worth was assigned upon drafts. Still very little 
money could be sent from England. In reply to repeated demands from portugal46 
Herries did his best to explain the government's difficulties. Most of 
the country's internal circulation was carried on by means of bank notes or 
tokens and if the Bank of gland were to accumulate coin without regard to 
price a disastrous depreciation of this paper and consequent credit crisis 
would ensue47. The recent report of the bullion committee amply proved the 
fragile nature of commercial confidence in England. Wellin ton, grasping 
for expedients in the face of difficulties, made an effort to pass Bank of 
England notes as cash in Portugal but the suggestion was not enthusiastically 
greeted by the merchants. This was fortunate as such a practice could only 
have had the effect of instituting yet a third rate of exchange against 
sterling to the great detriment of British credit. Some help however the 
Treasury could give in raising money abroad. The early part of 1812 saw 
the Gibraltar market established as a resource for the supply of Portugal 
only (once the garrison's needs had been met) and th, 3 Admiralty were asked 
to provide vessels regularly to transport the money thence to Lisbon. 
The business side of the undertaking was handled by Sampaio and the sums 
realised in this way certainly exceeded those obtained under the system of 
. private bargains48 
The desire to shift the weight of the commissariat's financial operations 
away from the Lisbon money market where they were carried on under such 
46. About ¬. 4.50,000 went in 1811. Altogether in 1812 about £600,000 was sent 
but almost all in the last four months of the year. 
47. Officers joining the army found shortage of ready money to take with them 
a problem and paid high prices for it. For example William Graham bought 
dollars at Cork for 6/3d towards the end of 1812. Graham op. cit. p 2. 
48. The only figures I have discovered covering this trade show that between 
the 7th July and the 10th October 2,800,000 dollars arrived at Lisbon from 
Gibraltar under Sampaio's arrangement. P. R. O. W. O. 57/40. For the samo trade 
in 1813 see "d. 0.771. 
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disadvantageous circumstances can be seen reflected in two further measures 
of late 1812, the appointment of Bisset to command the Gibraltar commissariat 
and to enjoy a general supervision of all money raising in the Mediterranean, 
and the employment of Messrs Staniforth and Blunt as mercantile agents to 
collect specie "in aid of the Foreign and Continental Military Expenditure"49, 
also in the Mediterranean region. These confusing sounding arrangements 
were clarified for Kennedy's benefit by a letter from Berries of the 27th 
October, stating that Bisset at Gibraltar was to be under Kennedy's orders 
and that the mercantile agents were ordered to avoid the Gibraltar market 
as far as possible and at all times to take second place there behind 
Kennedy's own operations. More than just the difficulties at Lisbon lay 
behind these measures which were also greatly inspired by the muddle Burgmann 
had made of money raising in Sicily and the consequent complaints of his 
drawing cash away from the Peninsula by his high prices. Bisset's real 
role at Gibraltar, apart from keeping the garrison fed, was to extend the 
control of the Peninsular Commissary-General and stem future money drains 
to the eastward, while the mercantile agency was seen not as a desideratum 
but as a last resort to handle Burgmann's job for him. "The Commission 
given to Messrs Staniforth & Co has only been resorted to after the most 
earnest, persevering, but ineffectual endeavours by the .. Treasury .. to 
rescue the money negotiations from the control of a set of speculators who 
had conspired to thwart (Burgmann)"50. While admitting the force of these 
reasons it may be argued that the arrangement only partly achieved the real 
goal, which was surely the unifying of all the Mediterranean and Peninsular 
financial operations under a single direction. This step however would 
have necessitated the separating of the financial and operational duties 
of the Peninsular Commissary-General as it was impossible that one man 
should run the whole business of the army's supplies and such a great 
financial concern51. Both Berries and Bisset supported the idea of such 
49, P. R. O. W. O. 58/134 Herries to Kennedy, 16th October 1812. Staniforth 
subsequently declined the agency and Blunt exercised it alone for a while through 
the medium of a Mr Goodchild. Ibid, Herries to Kennedy, 4th November 1812. 
50, PoL. O. W. O. 58/134. Herries to Kennedy, 27th October 1812. 
51. An undated memorandum which appears to belong to the year 1811 concerns 
setting up a financial commission to deal with money raising in Portugal, which 
body would have three members, one of them Charles Stuart, and would be prepared 
to take emergency measures in the event of the failure of regular operations. 
The idea behind this was that the stores and money responsibility in Portugal 
alone was too much for one man even before there was any question of bringing 
the Mediterranean command too under consideration. Nothing appears to have 
come of this idea. B. M. Add Mss 57393 f 15. 
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a separation but the loss of control over financial concerns was not found 
satisfactory to Kennedy or Wellington. 
fltogether Vansittart spoke with 
some justice when he commenced a memorandum in September with the thought 
that, taking into account the orders given to the various commissaries, 
the mercantile agents employed to assist them, the efforts made to raise 
money at home, "it does not seem possible that this government can take 
any further steps for the support of our armies in the Peninsular (sic)"52. 
Offering new securitiecý in the attempt to raise a loan in the interior 
of Spain had been considered, but the idea proved unworkable after an 
exchange of opinions between London and headquarters. The scheme was to 
offer interest bearing certificates in return for dollars. Since repayment 
was not envisaged until after the war when the exchange should have fallen, 
the dollar, if repaid in sterlin--, was to be valued at five shillings and 
the whole operation could be financed by government purchases in the English 
stock market, very low in early 1812, the capital appreciation upon which 
investment it was hoped would finance both the repayment of the loan and 
its half-yearly interest payments. As a long term investment such a loan 
might have proved attractive to Spanish money holders, particularly since it 
carried a built in element of currency speculation fixing as it did the parity 
of five shillings to the dollar, yet in a manner whereby the investor could 
not lose since it was at his option to receive payment of interest and 
principal in dollars or sterling53. Wellington hiowever felt that the 
certificates were useless without a specified term after which repayment 
was possible. He suggested two years as a sensible period, but agreed 
that if repayme, -t was undertaken before the exchange should have fallen it 
would be impossible to use bills to meet the demands. Herries advised Lord 
Liverpool against guaranteeing any fixed expiry date for the certificates, 
pointing out that failure to pay in the Peninsula was inevitable if a large 
r_unber of certificate holders all presented their paper at the earliest 
possible opportunity and that the ensuing loss of credit would be too damaging 
to be risked. Thus, although Wellington was authorised to raise a ban upon 
the open-ended certificates, he issued none in the event and the scheme came 
to nothing. It is hard to see in any case how the certificates could have 
52. B. M. Add Mss 31236. Memorandum on financial resources, 2nd September 1812. 
53- B. M. Add Mss 57393. Memoranda of 23rd and 27th March 1812. 
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competed against drafts as speculative instruments, to say nothing of the 
danger that they might also have become subject to a discount54. As 
Stuart observed; "The immense outstanding claims which the Commissariat 
are unable to answer with any degree of regularity... is... decisive against 
the circulation of new paper in the shape of Exchequer Bills, a proposition 
discussed and rejected two years ago55 for the same reasons when the 
pressure on that Department did not by any means approach the difficulties 
of the present moment"56. It was the existence of the drafts, their 
transferability and depreciation that was at the root of all the difficulties 
over money raising in the Peninsula during 1812. 
Before the close of the 1812 campaign the slims of money being received 
into the military chest from the sale of Treasury bills had dwindled to 
very little and the money crisis had grown serious. By September the army's 
pay was six months in arrears, with bat and forage money owing for a much 
longer period, the commissariat department was owed for ten months and the 
muleteers for fifteen57. Greater than any of these debts however was the 
tale of unpaid drafts, to a total of nearly 5,000,000 dollars. The money 
to hand was only sufficient to pay the arrears of the hospitals and the Douro 
boatmen, leaving hardly any surplus to apply to the indebtedness of the 
other services. Under these circumstances it was clearly of vital importance 
that new measures be implemented to draw money out of the Lisbon market. 
The first step to this end appears to be a rare example of indepp dent 
initiative from Commissary-General Dalrymple, in charge of the commissariat 
between Bisset falling sick at the end of August and Kennedy's return to 
headquarters a month later. On September 7th Dalrymple wrote to Ogilvie 
about an arrangement to buy supplies with bills on England that, "This is a 
system of payment which I have lately discontinued considering the same 
prejudicial to the raising of specie at Lisbon58". Prejudicial it certainly 
was that suppliers should be enabled to obtain bills at a cheap rate either 
54. This, granted the repayment in England provision, might have created yet 
another exchange rate. 
55. Drummond's 'exchequer actions' idea. 
56. B. M. Add Mss 31236. Stuart to Wellington, 17th June 1812. 
57. P. R. O. W. O. 57/41. Kennedy to Tierries, 14th February 1813 contains these 
figures which are of course approxi'ate as regards the muleteers who were not 
all paid up to the same time. 
58. N. I. S. Acc 4370 No 22080, f 135. Dalrymý9le to Ogilvie, 7th September 
1812. 
- 126 - 
by virtue of the discount on their drafts or by means of their initial high 
prices, and the result of such a system was that, bills being either at first 
or at second hand obtainable more cheaply than the commissariat had them on 
offer, little money accrued to the department. Dalrymple's measure, as 
the Treasury were quick to observe, paved the way for a raising of the 
exchange, not hitherto practical as we saw in the case of private bargains. 
"Their Lordships.. " wrote Herries on the 7th October, "will highly approve 
of your exertions to ameliorate the prospect of our pecuniary resources & 
support the credit & stability of the Military Chest. 
The continued existence of a floating debt assigned upon Bills to be drawn 
at Lisbon upon the Treasury at home is so obviously disadvantageous to the 
credit & prompt negotiation of those Bills for the purchase of specie that 
their Lordships cannot be other than satisfied.. that the Practice of making 
Payment in the Interior in that manner can in future be avoided"59. 
Much to the surprise of the Commissary in Chief no news of any rise in 
the exchange rate reached London, only complaints from merchants whose drafts 
were no longer being paid. The sums of money raised at Lisbon in September 
and early October remained exiguous 
60. 
Early in October, by Kennedy's account, 
a suggestion was made to him by some holders of drafts at Lisbon that they 
might be given bills in payment if they were prepared to hand in a quantity 
of specie equal to the value of the drafts in exchange for a further bill. 
Kennedy agreed to this proposal and in the second week of the month paid off 
about ¬50,000 worth of debt while raising an equal quantity of cash in this 
way. This practice rapidly became regular, and was reported as such to the 
Treasury in a letter of the 2nd December. Another letter of the same date 
reported the increase of the exchange to 72d at Lisbon. Even the normally 
impassive Mr Archer, clerk to the Commissary in Chief 
61 
, was moved to write 
on the reverse of the letter "I am surprised that this has not been done sooner" 
prefiguring Herries' remark in his reply "I am surprised. this measure had not 
been resorted to at an earlier period62". The 'half and half' system however 
did not receive the same approbation although it was a while before its mode 
59. P. R. O. W. O. 58/134. Herries to Kennedy, 7th October 1812. 
60. About ¬90,000 in the five weeks following September 1st, approximately 8% 
of expenditure in that time. 
61. Mr Archer was also good friend of Bisset therefore probably no admirer 
of Kennedy. 
62. P. R. O. W. 0.58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 4th January 1813, 
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of operation was properly understood in England. This was partly because 
of an ambiguity in Kennedy's letter when he spoke of the "current rates of 
exchange and discount". "Is the 'current rate of discount' to be considered 
as that which is current on Commissariat Bills? " 
3 inquired Herries, appalled 
at the thought of the department thus contributing to the depreciation of 
its own paper. In the event it proved that Kennedy had meant simply that 
the 'agio' or premium for an all metal payment was to be allowed to the 
merchant on the 'half and half' transactions64o Fortescue wrote of the 
65. 'half and half! system that "it was too much for the official mind " 
Certainly the Treasury were instinctively suspicious of the scheme even 
before it had been fully explained to them and wrote to Kennedy on the 16th 
January asking why new measures had been necessary. The reply took the 
form of a demonstration of commissariat insolvency over the past two years 
coupled with an exposition of the number of debts from the past campaign 
he had been able to eliminate thanks to the adoption of the new money 
raising method. In conclusion he stated the impossibility of making do 
any longer with the old system of selling bills, but the Treasury, unimprewsed, 
ordered that the 'half and half' transactions should cease. This order was 
indignantly countermanded by Wellington who wrote that "at this promising 
moment I ca'not see the affairs of the country fail for want of money"66, 
and the Treasury, although not at all revising their opinion upon the 
transactions thereafter allowed the practice to continue until the beginning 
of the following year67. 
The issue was most important because of the undoubted truth of Kennedy's 
assertion that the service could no ion 'er be carried on under the system 
63. P. RQO. W. O. 58/134 Herries to Kennedy, 4th January 1813. 
64. Kennedy used the word 'discount' loosely since the agio in question was 
derived from the rate of discount on paper. Drafts were treated as specie since 
they had for the most part been issued to creditors who would not have accepted 
a currency payment or indeed in Spain inhere the Portuguese paper was not current 
65, Fortescue R. A. S. C. vol Ip 101. Fortescue does state that he "cannot 
presume to say" which party was in the right in the 'half and half' dispute but 
he implies that the Treasury behaved weakly in the face of complaints from the 
merchants. See also Fortescue's History vol IX pp 92-4- 
66. Despatches Xp 312. `, Iellinyton to Bathurst, 21st April 1813, 
67. I have not seen the letter by which the system was finally halted but it 
appears from Kennedy's letter to Herries of the 5th May 1814 that the 'half and 
half' transactions ceased after the 22nd January 1814. P. R. O. W. 0.57/44. 
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prevailing in the summer of 1812. Drafts could not be circulated indefinitely 
without their credit falling so low that the inhabitants would stop accepting 
them altogether leaving the army a blunt choice between forcible requisition 
or starvation if it wished to operate away from the coast. The advance of 
1813 could not have been conducted upon these terms any more than it could 
have taken place without the services of the muleteers, many of whom would 
have deserted had they not been paid for 1812 before commencing the hard 
work of 1813. Viewed in this light the Treasury's attempt to prohibit the 
new system appears positively mischievous. Their defence rests upon two 
grounds; firstly that they did point out one undoubted drawback to the 'half 
and half' scheme, and secondly that they were not rejecting it without having 
in mind an alternative solution to the army's difficulties. The drawback 
was that by adopting this system Kennedy obliged any merchant wishing to 
obtain bills other than at the uncompetitive market rate to buy up commissariat 
paper, aggravating thereby the central problern68. Furthermore the more 
uncompetitive the market rate grew, the more it was in the interests of the 
money holders further to depreciate the drafts. The Treasury therefore 
rightly observed that the 'half and half' system did not tend to overcome 
the root cause of the difficulty. Their alternative remedy was of great 
simplicity at first sight. As we have seen, now that drafts were no longer 
redeemable directly for bills there was no longer any objection to raising 
the rate of exchange offered, and this solution was what Herries propounded 
in a memorandum of 5th May 1813. Before penning this memorandum the 
Commissary in Chief had been in receipt of a letter 
69 
setting out in ill- 
expressed, complicated but accurate calculations the profit to speculators 
that resulted from the 'half and half' system and also the adverse fluctuations 
in the exchange rate that it necessarily provoked70. The writer concluded 
his analysis with the opinion that the issue of bills should be divorced 
entirely from the payment of drafts. This idea Herries took up in the 
memorandum emphasising the need to raise the exchange, which should in any 
case have been done in the autumn, in order to bring the money forward. 
68. There was another point also made in objection to the system, namely that 
it was unjust to oblige creditors to provide more money before their debts were 
paid off. True though this was in principle, Wellington disposed of it easily 
by showing that kflowledge of the system's existence had not in any way deterred 
the speculators from continuing to buy up drafts. 
69. Anonymous in the Herries papers. Add Mss 57415 Dated Lisbon 13th March 
1813 and addressed to William Burn 'of this city'. The writer appears from the 
internal evidence to have been Portuguese. 
70. His calculations, based on accurate figures as far as I can see despite 
Wellington's scepticism (see the letter to Bathurst, Despatches Xp 312 v. s. ), 
show that the department were in effect offering nearly 80d per milrea currency 
in each 'half and half' transaction and that the profit to the speculator in each 
deal was 2o. 
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He wrote of the 'half and half' system that "It cannot be imagined that 
the specie was created by this measure", and accordingly that the same money 
must be available to be obtained by other means. 
Whether or not the policy of a higher exchange rate, coupled with an 
attempt to pay the drafts as close to the army as possible in order to reduce 
their discount in the interior (plainly the main regulating factor over their 
discount at Lisbon) would have enabled Kennedy to pay his debts and support 
the operations of 1813 is not known because it was not tried. The evidence 
of early 1814 when the 'half and half' system was abolished at the Treasury's 
insistence is inconclusive; more specie was certainly raised from the sale 
of bills after the abolition than had been before but whether this increase, 
appropriated to the early payment of drafts near the campaigning area, would 
have sufficed to keep down the discount which the cessation of payment by 
bills at Lisbon would otherwise have tended to increase remains impossible 
to say. Kennedy, upon comparison of the figures for the last two months 
of the 'half and half' system with those for the two months following, was 
dissatisfied at the change as, although more money was received into the 
chest in the second period71, the debt grew considerably, while previously 
it had been slightly declining. It is probable that Ogilvie's mission in 
late 1813 to pay debts in the immediate rear of the army represents Kennedy's 
awareness of the need to keep the discount down locally but unfortunately 
there are no reli. ble figures for the discount on drafts by the end of the 
year so any effect this measure may have had cannot be observed. It would 
accordingly be dangerous to castigate Kennedy and Wellington for their 
stubborn adherence to such a tortuous and commercially discreditable system, 
since despite all the argument it provoked it was successful in achieving 
the important object of its adoption, namely the paying of the most pressing 
debts of 1812 and the financing of the campaigns of 1813, while any rival 
scheme might have proved less lucrative. Although Wellington blamed the 
merchant interest for putting pressure on the Treasury, the most impprtant 
ammunition against the 'half and half' system appears to have been produced 
by the Commissary in Chief, Kennedy's direct superior. Yet when in Bisset's 
time the private bargains for specie produced a disagreement between London 
and headquarters, Herries had adopted a mediating role and the whole case 
71. £434,843 15/id against £323,918 14/11d. 
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had been smoothed over. The mutual dislike of Ferries and Kennedy may 
have contributed to the violence of the later disagreement and its eventual 
outcome against the Commissary-General's wishes. 
Another factor in the improvement of the army's financial situation 
from the nadir of 1812 was the increase in shipments of money from . 
England, 
starting on the 17th A'ovember 1812 with the arrival at Lisbon of H. M. S. 
'Stag' bringing ¬100,000 in guineas, the first of several consignments of 
gold. Great care was taken over the first guinea shipment72, as its legal 
justification rested upon a very dubious loophole. Indeed Herries in his 
memoir flatly states (with pride: ) that the export was against the law. 
Soon however the weakening of Napoleon's grip upon Germany, consequent upon 
his disaster irf Russia, gave Britain access again to many European markets 
and greatly eased the difficulty of finding specie. Herries himself 
directed operations in Europe, through the agency of Nathan Rothschild, and 
raised firnds sufficient to meet the British subsidy obligations to all the 
allied powers and to promise in addition £100,000 per month to the Peninsular 
army, not of course nearly sufficient to meet its expenses but a great deal 
more than had been possible before. In fact the reality exceeded the 
promise, for shipments between the 19th November 1812 find the 15th July 1813 
73 
totalled about 91,150,000 all in gold. Even in this last period of the 
war however, when money was at its easiest, the main support of the Peninsular 
army was its credit and the security of British Treasury bills just as the 
case had been from 1809 onwards, and to the very end of the war the commissariat 
were to be plagued by the constant lack of ready money. 
This war-long dependence on credit arose from several circumstances for 
some of which, like the influence of international affairs upon the British 
economy, the commissariat was not responsible. However organisational 
inefficiencies contributed to aggravate the situation. The dual responsibility 
of the commissariat both to the Commissary in Chief and to the Commander of 
the Forces led to divisions in which the Commissary-ueneral and the Commissary 
in Chief were more often on opposite sides than co-operating as they should 
72. It was to be transported directly to headquarters immediately upon landing 
and was to be spent only as personally directed by Wellington. 
73. The last date on which specie was sent to Lisbon rather than to the north 
coast of Spain. There was also received at Lisbon in this period about 
E500,000 from Gibraltar and 0280,000 from Cadiz, making nearly £2,000,000 in 
all over eight months, probably about a quarter of the army's expenditure. 
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have been in support of Wellington's plans. The whole responsibility of 
the financial, stores and accounts sides of commissariat business was, in a 
theatre as extensive as the Peninsula, too great for one man, and since neither 
Kennedy nor Bisset were expert in financial matters the money raising side 
of their business was inevitably treated superficially by successive 
expedients. Faulty economic thinking seems often to have guided local 
commissariat policy, in particular the idea that their great demand for money 
alone would be a sufficient magnet for specie, such that money circulating 
in the market would eventually be attracted at their price simply because 
there was nowhere else for it to go. 
74 
They neglected the fact that the 
financial opportunities of the merchants were international and included not 
only Lisbon and the Mediterranean but also North America, Britain and Russia 
and that only a small proportion of the specie could be tied down in one 
market. Had it proved feasible to centralise fund raising operations in the 
Mediterranean and Peninsular markets it would have been much easier to operate 
on this principle, but such a measure was hindered as we have seen by the 
impossibility of still further extending the powers of the Peninsular Commissary- 
General and by the financial entanglements of the Mediterranean commissariat 
from 1810 onwards. Any central collecting agency, if the sole money gatherer 
for the whole area, would have begun life as much at the mercy of the merchants 
as Commissary-General Burgmann had become. 
If we grant that the money raising was conducted less efficiently in 
Portugal than it might have been, it remains true that it was energetically 
pursued and proved far from unsuccessful. As Herries wrote in May 1812 the 
commissariat's "operations have been carried on to an extent which has vastly 
exceeded the point which had been considered by the best judgements (particularly 
Ld Wellington's) as the utmost limit to which they could possibly be taken"75. 
The army's ddbt did not begin to grow serious until operations out of Portugal 
were undertaken, that is to say until 1811, a year which saw two abortive 
sieges of Badajoz and the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. 
76 
The increase in transport 
74. See B. M. Add Mss 31236 Macdonnel to Pipon, 24th July 1812. "Where (sic) 
it not that you had few competitors in the negotiation you could raise little 
at 70d. " "I am aware that one maxim is sedulously impressed upon your ear.. 
namely that let your Department fix the exchanges on the price of silver where 
it pleases your supplies will still be the same. To a certain extent you may 
go but not beyond". 
75. B. M. Add Mss 57393 f 46. Observations on a proposed arrangement for 
increasing our means in the Peninsula, May 1812. 
76. The Talavera campaign of 1809 had of course taken the troops far from 
Portugal but they were only operating at a distance from the border for those 
two months in the whole period between April 1809 and March 1811. 
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and supplies expenditure brought about by the increasing military success 
of the army could not be afforded in cash and thus the successful campaigns 
of 1812 and 1813 were only made possible by the credit attached to commissariat 
drafts. Whence derived this credit? Party from the established and 
justified reputation of the department for paying its debts, although very 
slowly, but this alone would not have been sufficient to establish credit 
in the eyes of someone who, like the usual original recipients of drafts, 
could not afford to wait months for payment77. To the much maligned merchants 
who bought these debts in the countryside must go a part of the credit, for 
their purchases, albeit at a discount, made it practical for a peasant to 
accept payment in paper, and had such payments not been acceptable the offensive 
operations could not have been carried out. Wellington always abused the 
purchasers of debts and the comriissariat attitude towards traders in general 
was one of suspicion78, but without the men whose commerce provided the 
accumulation of money garnered by the commissariat at Lisbon, Cadiz and 
Gibraltar, and whose eye for a profit turned even commissariat paper into a 
speculative proposition, where would the de; artment have looked for cash or 
for credit? It is naturally true that the merchants were in pursuit of profit 
before any military interest and true too that this profit was generally at 
the department's expense. Nonetheless it seems a small price to pay for 
the service afforded - nothing less than the very financial survival of the 
British army in the Peninsula; a minor triumph of laissez faire economics. 
77. Ward indeed states that the debt holders had sometimes to wait two years 
for their money. Op. cit. p 93- 
78. "Sh. 3rks, called British merchants.. " Wellin;, ton to Bathurst, 21st April 
1813, already cited. Compare the following statement by Macdonnel, who as party 
to the Malta contracts would certainly have been included in the above category; 
"I am .. more .. 
interested in the re-conquest of Spain than in the success of 
any single mercantile operation... Deplorable indeed would it be if .. a narrow 
system of Finance should by leaving him destitute of money unnerve Lord 
Wellington's aim". Add Mss 31236. Macdornel to Ituart, 24th September 1812. 
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CHAPTER V: The Organisation of Transport 1809-14" 
It is intended to examine the Peninsular transport system in two sections, 
one dealing with the methods used to bring provisions forward to where they 
would be collected for the military formations, and the other considering 
the means of conveyance attached to the units to enable them to make this 
collection. Almost all transport between the rear depots and those in front 
whether of provisions imported for army use or bought in the Lisbon market 
began by water as this was the quickest way of carrying large quantities 
over any distance. This might involve shipping the supplies in question 
to the port at the mouth of the river up which they would travel, and suitable 
transports were generally retained on the coast for this purpose. Thus 
when in the winter of 1812 the Commissioners of Victualling refused to risk 
sending their own transports into Figueira or Oporto Herries pointed out 
"that there are now at Lisbon several transports which from their draft of 
Water are well adapted to the purpose of conveying such quantities of the 
Rum as may be req'd"1, From the ports the supplies proceeded up river in 
smaller craft as far as the navigability of the river permitted. The boats 
used appear to have been owned by local people and requisitioned for army 
use in the same manner as will be considered later respecting carts, since 
the regulations of 1811 for registering and making available means of 
transport applied equally and in similar manner to both carts and boats. 
That the Portuguese local officials were the intermeäiaries between the 
commissariat and the owners in the matter of boats as well as carts may be 
seen from the payment authorised in 1815 to Sr Botelho, described as 'a 
magistrate', for "assisting in the management of the Land and Water Transport 
of the Commt at Lisbon"2, and altogether it appears that the two services 
were organised upon a similar system. 
The Tagus was the first stage for provisions on their way to the troops 
in southern Portugal. Although some goods proceeded from Abrantes to the 
northern sector this must have been a rare event since the distance from 
Abrantes to Guarda by the direct route was twenty six leagues, nearly twice 
1. P. R. O. 1.0.59/132, Herries to Bisset, 19th February 1812. 
2. Ibid 58/133t Herries to Kennedy, 14th October 1815. The same gent1man 
is also spelt Batalho and Botalho in the same letter. 
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as far from the up-river depots on the Douro and Mondego 
3. Towards the 
end of 1809 it was suggested that a shorter route might take supplies by 
sea from Lisbon round Cape Espichel into the river Sado as far as Alcacer 
do Sal, which although on the map looking no closer to the army at Badajoz 
than was Abrantes, was five leagues closer by road. An experimental cargo 
of oats went by this route late in 1809, and it was later to be followed by 
the siege artillery in transit between Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The 
departure of the main army to the north however almost immediately after 
the oats shipment relieved the pressure on transport in the southern sector 
as well as shifting the centre of gravity of the forces deployed in the 
south from Badajoz to Portalegre, thus nullifying the saving in distance of 
the route via Alcacer do Sal. Higher than Abrantes it proved impossible 
to ship supplies in any quantity. This was demonstrated by the experience 
of Captain Cleves of the Royal Artillery who, although successfully bringing 
ammunition by boat as far up-river as Vila Velha, complained that "had I 
known the difficulty of the navigation I never should have undertaken the 
business. I lost one boat entirely and risked many times to lose the 
whole"4. The lower river too was not without its hazards, and when the 
water was particularly high no stores could pass the mouth of the Zezere 
but in general Abrantes may be taken as the point of transition from water 
to land carriage for supplies proceeding to forces in the southern sector. 
Provisions for the troops in Beira might use either the Mondego or the 
Douro. The former river was generally navigable to Foz Dao, or to Raiva 
in the dry season, although high water might interdict this supply also and 
prevent the boats travelling higher than Coimbra. The Douro, subject also 
to intermittent spells of inclement weather in winter which might render 
the journey impossible, 5 could be sailed as high as San Joao da Pesqueira. 
For the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo a new depot was established at Barca D'Alva 
3. Distances from Sebastian de Minano, Diccionario Geografico-Estadistico de 
Espana I Portugal, Madrid 1826. See Vol II p 292. The league cannot be 
trusted as a precise measurement but probably equals about four miles. The 
direct road referred to above was rendered impassable in 1810 as part of 
Wellington's defensive preparations and probably not repaired until after the war:, 
the resulting detour through Castello Branco added four leagues further to the 
journey. 
4. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 22080. Cleves to Ogilvie, 13th July 1809. 
5. See N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17899. Lavers to Ogilvie, 26th November 1812. 
"Nothing could be got up the river, it being so very high and rapid". See also 
Daniel p 68 for problems in 1811. 
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near the confluence with the Douro of the Agueda and the Yeltes, after 
engineering work had improved the navigation to permit of the boats reaching 
so high. This advanced depot, although helpful for the siege and later 
for the opening weeks of the main campaign of 1812, was of seasonal 
usefulness, not this time on account of occasional high water in winter 
but because of invariable low water in summer. After July 1812 it appears 
to have played no further part in supplying the army in Spain and not until 
the middle of November could it be restocked, too late to provide support 
for the closing stages of the campaign6. Even when Barca D'Alva was not 
in use the Douro provided a closer approach to the Spanish border than did 
the Mondego yet cannot be said to have been the busier of the two routes. 
This was partly because it was desirable to spread the load between the two 
waterways, not so much to save water transport as to overcome the shortage 
of carts felt on the land stage of both routes, but also because any retreat 
would tend to lead the allied army back upon Lisbon and away from the Douro 
which could not therefore safely be made the major line of supply. Indeed 
when Wellington redistributed the army in 1810 with an ultimate retreat very 
much in mind, the Mondego depots were made the more important repositories. 
In January 1810 three bread rations were held on the Douro to every two on 
the Mondego but by March there were three on the Mondego to every one on the 
northern river. In succeeding years both rivers appear to have been fairly 
equally used and the dispersed quarters occupied by the forces at different 
times between April 1811 and May 1813 were evidently calculated with a 
view to drawing supplies from both. 
When the army advanced to the Pyrenees its dependence upon coastal supplies 
became greater than before. In the summer of 1813 supplies both from other 
ports in the Peninsula and from the United Kingdom were shipped to Santander 
and forwarded thence to Bilbao or Passages as required. "Santander will be 
our great depot but Gilboa the point from and to which our transport will 
be employed"7, explained Kennedy in June. The success of the army in 
driving the French across the Py iees soon left Bilbao further in rear than 
had been expected and by the 8th July the commissariat was chartering vessels 
at Santander for the trip to Passages instead8. After the battle of the 
6. The other drawback to Barca D'Alva as a depot for supplying forces in Spain 
was the poor quality of the road thence to Freixenada which was impassable for 
carts. 
7. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 16541, f 118. Kennedy to Ogilvie, 27th June 1813- 
8. Ibid No 17916 f 149. Bilbao remained a depot after this, although many 
of the provisions accumulated there were forwarded to Passages which became the 
larger magazine. 
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Nivelle on November 10th the port of St Jean de Luz became available and 
succeeded Passages as the closest harbour to the army, while the same 
victory secured the course of the Nivelle and enabled the formation of an 
up-river depot at St PP-e. The capacity of the harbours used soon became 
a problem - even in October Frazer noted "Our battering train ships are 
ordered out of Passages harbour, already much too full"9 - and accordingly 
other coastal magazines to which mules could be sent were established, at 
Iienteria, Fuenterabia and. a 'floating depot' at Socoa. Provisions 
nonetheless accumulated in the Spanish ports of Santander and Passages 
owing to various circumstances, the shortage of transport, the frequent 
bad weather of December and January and the refusal of the Victualling 
Board's hired vessels to wait for unloading or to be sent forward to other 
ports. At the end of the war Passages had acquired such a mountain of 
supplies that they were being thrown into the sea to make room for further 
arrivals10. While the war lasted this plenty had not been able to transfer 
itself to the forward depots which often during the winter found themselves 
embarrassed by the demands of the divisions. 
Most of the transporting of supplies between the off-loading points on 
the rivers and the forward depots was done by the Portuguese bullock carts 
of which Schaumann wrote this well known description. "They consist of 
rough planks nailed onto a massive pole or shaft. At right angles to the 
shaft & under the planks 2 blocks of semi rounded wood were fixed, having 
a hole in the centre & through these holes the axle was fitted"11. Not all 
of the transport vehicles were of this pattern of course. Mule cars, 
wider and more cumbersome than the ox w , ons, were 
frequently encountered 
in the south and also 'quadrilhos' pulled by wild cattle which marched 
more slowly than their domesticated cousins12. In the north some of the 
sturdiest cars were those owned by the wine companies along the Douro, 
though the influence of these bodies was so great that "the magistrates do 
everything in their power to protect them from any other duty"13. 
9. Frazer p 307. 
10. P. R. 0. W. 0.57/42 Drake to Herries, 12th December 1813 and 57/6 Lushington 
to Herries, 27th May 1814. 
11. Schaumann p 24. See also J Weller, Wellington in the Peninsula, 1962, 
facing page 128 for a picture of such a cart. 
12. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17922 f. 38, Da Pinna to Ogilvie, 4th July 1809. 
13. Ibid No 17936 f. 124. St Remy to Ogilvie, 12th September 1812. 
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Generalisations about cart transport therefore, while convenient, should 
not be supposed to imply perfect homogeneity among the vehicles. Nonetheless 
the carts of Schaumann's account may fairly be said greatly to have out- 
numbered the others in the supply of the army. While evidently of spartan 
design and tough construction, many of these carts were in bad repair and 
breakdowns were frequent. Wellington attributed this to overloading and 
issued an order in August 1809 that no cart was to carry more than 600 lbs 
of cargol4. This instruction, never rescinded though sometimes rather 
loosely interpreted as meaning six hundredweight, was perhaps useful in 
calling the fragility of some carts to the notice of those officers who 
were not familiar with their properties, but by depriving the commissaries 
of any power to exercise initiative caused sound carts to be underloaded 
while many of the weak ones broke just the same15. Mr Lees, employed in 
1809 to procure transport for supplies at Estremoz, wrote that "it is 
asserted that so many cars break down because they are overloaded - which 
certainly is not absolutely the case - for great numbers break down in 
16 
coming to load when they are empty". 
The cause of cart breakages was in great part the deliberate neglect of 
their owners who did not want them taken for service. Two further factors 
contributed. First, whatever may have been the situation regarding over- 
loading, it is clear that both the carts and the animals that pulled them were 
sometimes worked excessively hard and consequently rendered unserviceable. 
In the letter already quoted, Ices commented on a case where carts carrying 
regimental baggage had been obliged to travel six leagues in twenty four 
hours17, observing "this is certainly the way to knock up all the carriage 
on the road". The same Captain Cleves who travelled so perilously to Vila 
Velha by water proceeded in July from Castello Branco to Talavera with 122 
carts and 280 bullocks embargoed on his behalf by Acting Assistant Commissary 
Downie. The owners only saw the return of four carts and sixteen bullocks 
"that were not fit for working"18, besides another forty two beasts they 
collected having been left behind on the road. By no means all of the 
14. Supplementary Despatches VI. General Order of 20th August 1809. 
15. For example, for a cart carrying a pipe of wine falling to bits on the 
road and destroying its cargo, see N. L. S. 9cc 4370 No 17974 Major to Ogilvie, 
July 1812. 
16. N. L. S. gcc 4370 No 17907 f. 110. Lees to Ogilvie, 8th October 1809. 
17. This was nearly twice the daily distance permitted in the Portuguese 
Government's transport regulations. v. i. 
18. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17893 f. 4. 
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missing carts can have broken down, many doubtless being stolen by the 
regiments of the army, but the incident makes the point that the draught 
animals as well as the fabric of the carts were vulnerable to long journeys, 
the mortality of bullocks under such circumstances having been considered 
already in the section of chapter III dealing with the meat supply. The 
second factor contributing towards damage to the carts was the poor state 
of the Portuguese roads, abused by every diarist who noticed them at all, 
and particularly difficult in dilly areas. 
19 Even the main routes appear 
to have been poor and the secondary roads were atrocious. Massena, 
lacking information, had the misfortune to pick minor roads for his advance 
on Coimbra in 1810 and according to Pelet by the time the French reached 
Viseu from Almeida "we were obliged to make repairs on all the artillery 
waggons of the army corps since they were badly damaged by the poor roads"20. 
Carts in the employ of the commissariat operating in the same area were 
subject to the same wear and tear. 
It was originally the design of the Commissary-General to obtain transport 
by contractual agreements with the owners of carts and mules2l. Or the 
27th May 1809 after Mr Downie had declined the appointment, Ogilvie 
'reluctantly' 
accepted "exclusive superintendance and payment of all carts, Horses, 
Mules, 
oxen & boats employed or to be employed for the transport of stores and 
baggage for the service of the army"22. He found the voluntary principle 
fairly successful in the case of mules but a failure with regard 
to carts 
and qui-e early in the year it became necessary to resort to embargo and 
other means of compulsion. The disinclination of the inhabitants of Portugal 
to supply their carts, and more particularly their draught animals, for the 
service of the army was as marked in 1809 as it was to prove throughout the 
war, and desertion, often taking the oxen with them, by men pressed into the 
service was commonplace. "The different parties of Portuguese militia who 
were sent out to impress carts sent in twenty two last night but the drivers 
have all fled" 
23, 
wrote Ogilvie on 30th June. Four days previously he had 
19. Graham described the main road from Villafranca to Abrantes as 'terrible' 
and claimed that the branch at Punhete towards Tonrar was worse! Morris, 
travelling on the same route, wrote "The roads aie very indifferent that is 
called the principal road to Spain the worst of our by roads in England is better 
than some part of it". Graham pp 16/17 and N. A. M. Ace 7508 - 24. 
20. Pelet op. cit. p 169. 
21. "He (the Commissary-General) at the same time by no means wishes you to los( 
sight of the original intention of binding them 
(cart owners) by a voluntary 
agreement... " N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17926, Coffin to 
Ogilvie, 7th October 1809. 
22. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17935 f. 70. 'Reluctantly' was Ogilvie's own word. 
23. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17958 f. 68. Report by Ogilvie, 30th June 1809. 
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requisitioned the Juiz de Fora at Abrantes for twenty five drivers to replace 
some who had deserted24, and the following month thirty cars carrying medical. 
stores between Zarza la Mayor and Moraleja were abandoned by their owu rs 
2 
who took the animals away with them The need for carts while the array 
remained in Spain was so great, not enough mules being available to cover 
all the transport requirements, that force had often to be used both to 
impress carts and their drivers into the service and afterwards to retain 
them in it. Mr Cooper at Portalegre, finding the local authorities 
unhelpful, bypassed them and used soldiers to seize carts 
26' but generally 
the magistrate's assistance was obtained, Mr Lees finding the Juiz of 
Montemor o Novo particularly zealous and helpful for burning carts broken 
down by the roadside as a deterrent to those who damaged their own property 
to avoid having it employed by the commissariat. Such carts as were obtained 
had often to be kept longer than expected because of the general shortaR. 
Sixty five Portuguese carts carrying reserve ammunition for the 1st division 
could not be replaced at Castello Branco andiwere taken on (the fifty six 
that had survived the journey) into Spain contrary to orders27. Tupper 
Carey later brought Spanish carts back to Elvas and, when ordered to return 
them to Badajoz 
1 
e=used himself by asserting that the vehicles were all 
"wanting yokes and other necessary articles without which they cannot proceed"28. 
Not all the carts used by the army in 1809 were requisitioned or compelled 
to serve. A variety of hiring agreements were also concluded, a confusing 
variety fnflm the point of view of commissariat sub-accountants. Reny 
Callow at Elvas complained that "their Guias29 vary in price; some at 
1200 @ 1000 @ 800; and some are paid the same working or not"30. He might 
have added that some were paid at half rate when not workin6 and others by 
weight per league travelled rather than daily3l. Even at the most expensive 
rates limwever, carts remained far cheaper than mules as a means of transport, 
24. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 22080 f. 14, Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 26th June 1809. 
25. Ibid No 17907 f. 33, Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 25th September 1809. 
26. Ibid f. 254. Cooper to Ogilvie, 1st October 1809. 
27. Ibid No 2? 06© f. 87. Sparks to Ogilvie, 14th July 1809. 
28. Ibid No 17907 f. 52. Carey to Ogilvie, 13th September 1809. 
29. A Guia was a document stating whdn and where a vehicle was hired, for what 
service or for how long a period and by what route it was to travel. When 
signed by the commissaries at all the successive stages it constituted a claim 
for payment of the hire. 
30. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17907. Callow to Ogilvie, 23rd October 1809. 
31. The commodity transported was also a factor in some arrangements. See 
K. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17907 f. 16, where cart owners offered to serve for 9 reis 
per league per alquier for barley or 11 for wheat. 
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even allowing for their not being loaded beyond six hundred pounds. 
Whether calculated by weight or by time, mule transport cost about a third 
more than cart transport on the basis of the most expensive agreements. 
This economy, combined with the fact that the army was short of mules (which 
were always used first to meet the needs of the regiments) until late in the 
year, ensured that the unwillingness of the inhabitants to make their carts 
available did not deter the commissariat from the attempt to gather a large 
body of cart transport. It did however make it impossible for them to rely 
on voluntary agreements as they had intended and obliged them instead to 
work in co-operation with the civil power under regulations passed by the 
Portuguese Regency. 
The Portuguese measures were designed not only to regulate the requisitioning 
of carts but also to compel the vehicles to serve and by punishment to deter 
desertion or theft of the cargo carried. By October 1809 there was already 
in existence a legal penalty for desertion and on the 16th November 1809 the 
Intendant General of Police was given control over transport requisitions 
under the new title of Inspector General of Transports. The ineffectiveness 
of these arrangements and the unreliability of the register of all available 
transport, evident at the end of 1809, was highlighted in 1810 when the 
transfer of most of the army to Beira necessitated the establishment of new 
transport routes. Enormous difficulty was experienced in finding the carts 
to ply from the Mondego and Douro depots to the troops32. In May a Special 
Commission, headed by General Leite, was established to try recalcitrant 
magistrates but does not appear to have been effective in solving the problem33 
which in any case often lay lower down the social order in disobedience to 
the magistrates themselves. Lieutenant Simmons discovered this at Sampaio 
where he arrived wounded in July 1810 and "sent to the juiz de fore to 
request him to procure me two bullocks. He told me the people would not 
obey him now, but directed me to send my servant armed and to take the first 
two bullocks he could find"34. Wellington's complaints about the inadequacy 
of all the legislation designed to assist him with transport continued and 
ultimately bore fruit in a new regulation completed on the 7th December 1811, 
to come into force as from two months later. "This regulation.. will be .. 
32. See for example Despatches Vp 71, Wellington to Beresford, ist May 1810. 
"We have great difficulty about the carts to move forward only fourteen leagues". 
Also P. R. O. W. 0.57/39, Kennedy to Gordon, 10th July 1810. 
33. Leite was a curious choice as head of the Commission since he was Governor 
of Alentejo and Commandant of Elvas while the difficulties over carts were 
occurring in the Mondego valley. 
34. George Simmons ed. Verner, A British Rifle Nan, London 1899, p 84. 
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as ineffectual for the purpose of carrying on the war, as the former 
regulations on the same subject"35, wrote Wellington, and it certainly does 
not seem to have rendered the commissaries' task any easier. Its two main 
defects were vagueness - for example an ox cart was not to march further 
than three or three and a half leagues a day and was not to be absent from 
its district for longer than twenty or thirty days - and insufficient severity 
to deter deserters or truants, the former being punished with a month's 
imprisonment, the latter with a fortnight plus a fine to represent the 
value of the transport witheld. Such a relatively short imprisonment was 
deemed by many preferable to service with the army 
36. 
The only important 
new departure in the 1811 regulation was the institution of a collecting 
fee for the magistrate, a measure suggested by Wellington, and although 
this was no doubt an encouragement to exertion on their part, it was no 
inducement to the cart owners themselves. 
The great demand created by the 1812 campaign for carts in the north 
produced shortages and irregularities reminiscent of those we have observed 
in the south during 1809. Consider Mr Buckham's account of a requisition 
for carts at Almeida. "The order from the Intendant of the province was 
immediately circulated among the different frontier villages gn interval 
of some time elapsed, sufficient for the accumulation of the whole - but 
neither cars nor any information respecting them ever coached us. Upon 
this mockery of the Intendant's order Mr Flanner thought it necessary to 
assume towards the alcaldes of the different villages an appearance of 
determined resolution supported by a portion of Military force which was 
required from the Governor of Almeida for that purpose. The effect produced 
was trifling and temporary, fourteen cars only out of the fifty being convened 
and those too principally owing to the exertions of the (illegible) of Villar 
de Curvo - Two days ago six of these cars upon their return from Ciudad 
Rodrigo deserted to their different homes, leaving us 8 only for the use 
of the depot"37. Breakages and desertions among the Spanish and Portuguese 
carts were again frequent. "Few carts of those that I am now dispatching 
return to do effective duty afterwards"38, wrote Head at Celorico. Hired 
35. Despatches VIII p 580. Wellington to Stuart, 18th February 1812. 
36. This was Wellington's opinion, see Despatches VIII p 413, Wellington to 
Stuart, 28th November 1811. It is supported by the view expressed in N. L. S. 
Acc 4370 No 17958 f 68. Report by Ogilvie, 30th June 1809. 
37. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17977. Buckham to Dalrymple, 16th September 1812. 
38. Ibid No 17954 f 17. Head to Ogilvie, 23rd November 1812. 
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carts had to be watched every minute of the day and night39. The 
situation was aggravated by the chance that the greatest need for carts 
was felt in October and Yovembýr, a time of year when the cattle were 
normally beginning their winter rest and when their owners were even more 
reluctant than usual to have them worked. The natural consequence of 
these difficulties was that the commissariat was obliged to break faith 
with the cart owners and employ force to retain as many carts as they 
needed. Spanish cars were to be sent forward "by persuasion or compulsion"40 
wrote Kennedy from Olmeda, and again four days later, "Their services are 
at present indispensable and you must endeavour by fair means to prevail 
upon them to go on willingly+º41 
One reason for the difficulties experienced by the commissariat in 1812 
was the greatly increased number of carts that they employed. The growth 
of the transport system can be seen by comparing the number of cars based 
at Ciudad Rodrigo in late 1812 with the resources deployed at Badajoz towards 
the end of 1809. On the 8th November 1809 Badajoz employed 168 carts (21 
of them mule carts) and 894 mules, mostly on the road to Elvas and thence 
either to Portalegre or to Estremoz, though other local routes also 
featured42. By August 1812 there were based at Ciudad Rodrigo no fewer 
than 1,990 carts, nearly half operating between that place and Almeida while 
others acted towards Celorico, Pesqueira, Salamanca and the Quinta dos 
Fulhos variously. This large number dwindled as the season advanced and 
the rest period for cattle approached, by the 21st September the total being 
reduced to 1,421 and by 18th October further diminished to 1,038, but the 
increase in the scale of operations is nonetheless evident43. The simple 
comparison does not however represent the increase of effectiveness in the 
supply of provisions as two further factors should be noticed, first that 
the ration strength for which British commisaariat were responsible had 
nearly doubled in the interim and second that the carts from Ciudad Rodrigo 
were operating over a distance on the road about half as great again as 
39. It was ordered that all escorts arriving with carts should deliver them 
personally to the commissary. PLxveyor Dickson wrote of a case where this had 
not been done, "eleven of these cars are actually in the possession of the 
commissariat and .. the rest made their escape". L L, S. Acc 4370 No 17918 f. 1. 
Dickson to Ogilvie, 26th October 1812. 
40. Ibid No 17879 f. 53. Kennedy to Ogilvie, 30th October 1812. 
41. Ibid f. 38. Kennedy to Ogilvie, 3rd November 1812. 
42. Ibid No 17256 f. 73. 'Return of the means of transport at Badajoz+, 
8th November 1809. A mule may be taken to have carried 250 lbs, a cart 600 lbs. 
43. Ibid No 17931 ff 13-21, for all three figures relating to carts. 
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those from Badajoz had had to cover. Taking into account these considerations 
the August figure alone represents a real increase in the capacity of the 
transport relative to the calls upon it while the October figure represents 
a substantial decrease. 
Regarding the degree to which Ciudad Rodrigo was enabled to maintain its 
stocks by employing these quantities of transport it is impossible to state 
with certainty. For one thing the above figures take no account of the 
carts hired at Quinta dos Fulhos, Almeida and Celorico and despatched to 
Ciudad Rodrigo. For another, not all of the carts were employed in the 
carriage of provisions44. Perhaps the greatest uncertainty and surely the 
greatest cause for suspicion about the adequacy of the transport derives 
once again from the popular unwillingness to co-operate with the department 
in the matter of carts. The enormous variety of turn around times taken 
by these vehicles and the invariable discrepancy between the speeds the 
commissaries expected and those the cart convoys achieved can only be 
explained by the sluggishness of the carters themselves. The journey 
between Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, provides one example among many, the 
di$tance being roughly thirty miles in each direction and the time expected 
over the round trip being six days, an average of ten miles a day without 
aaowance for loading time. None of the 851 carts engaged on this journey 
when the August statement of transport was prepared had returned within six 
days. This is not surprising since a day might easily have been lost 
loading and twelve miles a day for ill repaired carts on poor roads was a 
large demand, but that some should have been unable to cover the sixty miles 
in twenty three days is amazing and might be felt to be an unrepresentative 
freak were it not paralleled on almost every other route the depot operated45. 
The harm done to the transport system by suck recalcitrance cannot be 
estimated but must have been the principal reason why the progress' of the 
1812 campaign gradually drained the depots of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida 
of provisions so that the army on its return to Portugal found further 
privations in its new quarters and the wounded retiring in convoys were 
6 
reduced to begging biscuit from passers by4. 
44" 'Carts were also required for carrying ammunition, clothing and field 
@quipment besides such minor items as stationery and medical stores. 
45" See also Despatches VIII p 514, Wellington to Liverpool, 7th January 1812. 
"What do you think of empty carts taking two days to go ten miles on a good 
road? " That at least was in winter. 
46. N. A. M. Acc 7508-24. Morris himself was without rations for seven days 
in November, two on the retreat from Salamanca and five in his quarters at 
Pinhel later in the month. 
- 144 - 
In the course of 1812 an atteinpt to assist the cart service by establishing 
a regular formation of commissariat owned carts was introduced. The idea 
originated in autumn 181.1 when Wellington and Kennedy decided to form two 
'Grand Divisions' of 400 carts each, staffed with regular commissariat employees 
and built at Lisbon, Almeida, Oporto and in England to a constant pattern47. 
On his return to England in November 1811 Kennedy brought with him a cart 
as a model for the contractor and although some delay was caused when the 
customs at Portsmouth seized the pattern car and the Treasury's intervention 
was required to restore it, 200 buch bullock carts were shipped for Portugal 
in April and May 1812. Kennedy had is reservations about the design of 
these carts. In February he apparently felt the model car to be "much too 
heavy" 
4-8 
and was asked at the end of the month to examine five completed copies 
and give his further opinion. Possibly not wishing to risk taking an 
initiative that would be disapproved of by Wellington49, Kennedy waited 
until the 26th May before thinking of some improvements to the pattern of the 
j 
cars, by which time the first 200 were mostly already at sea and the 100 
subsequently demanded were in the course of being built. It proved too late 
to incorporate Kennedy's modificatidns- and the final 100 cars were completed 
to the original specifications and sent to the Peninsula in July. Although 
belated, the Commissary-General's suspicions about the pattern50 may have 
been well founded. D. A. C. G. Kensington described the Car Train as "very 
irregular as their (sic) being nought for the cattle to feed they knock up & 
the cars break so much, that they are generally 7 to 12 days before they 
recommence after unloading to proceed to their respective depots for loading 
again"51. Notwithstanding these criticisms, the carts did useful service 
in 1812 at the siege of Badajoz and in the north later in the year, and when 
the army went into winter quarters they were established on the route between 
Raiva and Celorico, "the road upon which we never could collect any considerable 
number of country cars for the service of the army"52. 
47. The scheme is explained in two memoranda Iiy Wellington. Despatches VIII, 
pp 625 and 629. 
48. P. R. O. W. 00 58/132. Herries to Kennedy, 4th February 1812. 
49" "The car must be made in every respect according to the pattern". 
Despatches VIII, memorandum of 21st December 1811. 
50. The main difference between the commissariat cars and the local ox-carts 
must have been that the former had iron axle trees and presumably a fixed axle. 
51, N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17904 f. 5. Kensington to Ogilvie, 9th October 1812. 
52. Ibid No 17946, Kennedy to Ogilvie, 28th November 1812. 
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Before passing on to more -eneral considerations, the role of the 
Royal Waggon Train should be noticed though its numbers were never great 
enough to render it of much importance in the transport system. The 
officers and men of t'nis corps had a certain number of spring waggons, 
appropriated after the autumn of 1812 solely to ambulance duties and 
frequently used to transport sick and wounded prior to that date53. 
Besides running and maintaining these carts, of which there were never a 
great number, the effectives of the Waggon Train assisted the commissariat 
by doing temporary duties of the kind one would have expected to find 
performed by conductors or junior clerks. Thus two non-commissioned 
officers and eight privates of the corps went to Oporto in May 1809 to 
superintend the muleteers, and officers occupied themselves in the summer 
collecting carts and tending to the public mules. Helpful though it must 
have been to have odd transport duties carried out from time to time, the 
Royal Waggon Train was never a sufficiently n merous force for its assistance 
in this manner to have been important. 
For the transport of supplies between depots the Peninsular commissariat 
relied heavily on local carts, hired or requisitioned for each stage of the 
journey. Although mule transport was also used for this purpose in 1809 
the mules were thereafter, as we shall see, re-assigned to military units and 
their use in rear, although by no means unheard of, became much less common. 
Requisition, the usual mode of procurement, was only resorted to because it 
proved impossible to acquire enough carts by voluntary hiring agreements and 
its operation became systematised. At the large entrepot depots a park of 
carts would be maintained, not hired for any particular service but kept until 
used for a journey after which they would be paid off and allowed to return 
home, unless of course necessity required their continued service54. The 
disadvantages of this system have already been pointed out and can almost 
all be traced back to the resistance of the cart owners to the conscription 
of themselves and their carts. Since there seem to have been few large 
scale cart owners, the commissariat were mainly dealing with men of no great 
wealth who were not cushioned by large ownership against the risks of loss, 
breakage or casualty to the draft animals, who could not afford to wait the 
53. See Ward p 89, also General Orders 5th October 1810 (under 'spring waggons') 
and Simmons p 81. Simmons, shot in the thigh, found the motion of the spring 
waggon "ten times worse, if possible" than that of the bullock carts. 
54" See for example Head p 274 for an account of the transport at Celorico 
in late 1811. 
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long periods that often elapsed before payment could be made and whose 
reluctance to co-operate is most understandable. The alternative to a 
requisitioning system must have been to buy or build carts sufficient for 
the army's needs. Although several hundred carts were built and some bought 
or otherwise acquired by the department, there were serious hindrances to 
either method upon a large scale. In the first place the organising and 
staffing of a large body of public transport would have required more 
manpower than the commissariat ever had at its disposal55, and in the 
second, public ownership would have thrown the immediate cost of losses 
to vehicles and animals upon the commissariat. Among the mule transport 
it was notorious that the public animals were much worse treated than those 
hired, and it might be expected that public carts would have received no 
gentle treatment at the hands of the local labour employed to operate them. 
The third serious consideration was the bullock supply. By requisitioning 
the army made the agricultural bullocks double as means of transport, 
whereas had the commissariat bought to buy bullocks for its carts they 
would have been competing not only against the demand for meat but also 
against the continued need for draught animals in agriculture. Even greater 
scarcity and higher prices than those that prevailed must have been the 
result. Altogether the system of requisitions appears the best possible 
in the circumstances, its inefficiencies deriving from lack of firm 
administration on the civil side and a certain shortage of manpower to 
supervise, for neither of which circumstances was the Peninsular commissariat 
to blame. 
The supplies were collected from the more forward depots by a separate 
body of transport part of which was attached to each of the units of the 
army and which was under the control of the various brigade commissaries. 
This transport duty was almost exclusively the province of mules (and asses) 
rather than carts from early 1810 onwards and these mules are distinct from 
those belonging to the regiments for the purpose of carrying baggage. 
Each infantry regiment was allowed thirteen bagg&ge mules, ten (one for 
each company) to carry the camp kettles, one for the pay books, one for the 
medicine chest and one to carry entrenching tools. All but the latter, 
which was at public expense, were to be provided respectively by the captains 
55" For the 800 projected carts of the Commissariat Car Train alone, the 
Treasury had to provide sixteen more clerks. P. R. 0. '. J. 0.57/3. Harrison 
to Herries, 1st January 1812. 
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of companies, the paymasters and the surgeons who all received an allowance 
for this purpose. Sir John Cradock, while commanding the army early in 
1809, had ordered the commissariat to provide the animals but their 
replacement thereafter was the responsibility of their new owners, the 
Commissary-General only being expocted to provide a dollar a month towards 
the cost of re-shoeing 
6. 
In early 1813 when the army adopted a smaller 
pattern of kettle which did not require a mule for its carriage, the camp 
kettle mules were officially re-assigned to transporting tents, themselves 
issued to the regiments on a regular basis for the first time in this 
campaign. Ammunition reserves were also generally cärried on mules but 
this aspect of the service was the responsibility of the Ordnance officers 
to whom the beasts were made available by the commissariat who had owned or 
hired them in the first place. The number of mules allocated to the 
carriage of ordnance stores was settled upon by the General Officer 
commanding the headquarters of which the brigade commissary and the senior 
ordnance officer were alike members. A similar practice was followed in 
the transporting of stores that were the responsibility of the Quartermaster 
General's department, the Medical department and the Engineers though these 
were more occasional services than that of the Ordnance. 
Although the greatest number of the mules 'zed by the army were hired, 
a proportion of the supply mules as well as t'ýose used for regimental 
purposes were 'public', that is to say owned by the commissariat and served 
by muleteers who featured on the roll of regular commissariat employees. 
All supply mules, public or hired, were grouped in brigades which were units 
of no consistent size but which remained administratively distinct even 
when losses whittled them down to very low numbers. The average strength 
of a mule brigade may have been about fifty animals, with muleteers provided 
at the rate of one to every three beasts, but in practice the number of 
mules to a brigade might have been found as high as a hundred or more, or 
as low as twenty57. The mules were, at least from November 1810 orwards, 
branded in the neck, or, if the muleteers objected, "in any other conspicuous 
part"58 and in the department orders of rather later date, it is explained 
56. Cradock seems to have intended that a cart should be provided to each 
regiment to carry "the Medicine Chest or 2 voyage chests, a canteen of utensils 
and 20 sets of bedding". N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17972 f. 64. By 1st June however, 
Wellington speaks of a mule as the proper bearer of medicine chests and baggage 
carts were not officially sanctioned thereafter. 
57. Ward p 88, mentions a brigade of 132 mules which is the largest I have 
heard of. I have not discovered a brigade taken on with fewer than 20 animals 
though some which were reduced below that number by losses. For several 
details about mule brigades, see P. R. O. W. O. 61108. 
59. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17886 f. 25. 
- 148 - 
that the beasts were to be marked D, C, A or HA according to whether they 
served an Infantry division, cavalry regiment, the artillery or horse artillery. 
In the first two cases they bore also the number of the division or regiment 
to which they were attached59. This practice had the advantage of hindering 
the illicit sale or exchange of army mules as well as making it possible to 
distinguish a commissariat mule train from one belonging to a private merchant, 
but did of course make it less convenient to switch mules from one formation 
to another. The muleteers of each brigade were under the immediate super- 
vision of a 'capataz'60 who was himself a muleteer and who kept the pay 
books, routes and records of work done that were required by the department 
orders. This same basic organisation was maintained whether the brigade 
was publicly owned or hired, and if hired, whether from one single proprietor 
or from several smaller mule owners whose animals were brigaded together 
for convenience. 
The practice of attaching mule brigades to the units of the army was 
followed from the beginning of 1810 onwards. In 1809 supplies had been 
carried to the troops and kept up with the troops by more heterogeneous transport 
formations, among which carts seem to have predominated. Thus in June the 
transport resources of the 14th Light Dragoons totalled 6 mules and 15 bullock 
carts61 and the situation of an unidentified infantry brigade in September 
was similar, 2 mules and 12 carts sharing the carriage of its supplies. 
The commissariat had only been enabled to issue a Mw mules to the units 
beff re the Talavera campaign, Hill's and Tilson's brigades receiving only 
ten each, and this paucity evidently necessitated the field commissaries 
using whatever means of transport they could obtain. From 1810 onwards 
however carts are rarely found attached to the troops in the field and never 
in great numbers62 One reason for the scarcity of supply mules in 1809 
was that the commissariat took some time to collect a large number of these 
animals. Some came from the Barbary Coast, arriving in the summer of 1809 
63 
but most were obtained locally by purchase or by hire, mule owners evidently 
59" N. A. M. 6807/22. Department Orders, Article 39" 
60. The word 'capataz' simply means headman and its use is not peculiar to 
the mule service. 
61. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17907 f. 8. Dillon to Ogilvie, 18th September 1809. 
62. The 2nd Division for example possessed 10 bullock carts beside its 769 mules 
on the 6th November 1810, and was probably not alone in this. Ibid 17984 f 53. 
63. At least some of the Barbary mules seem to have been unbroken and wild. 
See the report of Captain Turner, Royal Waggon Train, Ibid No 17907 f 35. The 
export of mules from North Africa also featured in Sir William A'Court's dealings 
with the Barbary powers in 1813, and may be supposed 
to have occurred on private 
account in earlier years also, in a manner similar 
to the cattle supply 
discussed in chapter III. 
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being more co-operative than proprietors of carts as no resort to 
requisition proved necessary. By the end of the year, apart from the 
regimental baggage mules having been provided, many hundreds of mules 
were employed, mostly on depot duties. At Badajoz on 8th November 894 
mules were in service, 681 being hired and 213 public 
64. 
Only when the 
greater part of the army moved north was the system of attaching mule 
brigades to the various units gradually institutionalised. Schaumann, 
on his regiment leaving their southern cantonments, received 48 mules 
"for the transport of supplies" 
65 
though he also took 4 carts with him 
at least as far as Abrantes, and by the 15th March 1810,28 Brigades of 
mules (totalling 1,578 beasts) were attached to the units while a further 
66 
18 brigades were held at Headquarters for general transport duties. 
The number of mules normally attached to units grew larger in the years 
succeeding 1810. While an equal division among the units of the 1,578 
mules in service in March 1810 would have given each about 100 animals, the 
usual transport strengths of an infantry brigade and a cavalry regiment in 
1812 were about 200 and 250 respectively 
67. 
This increase in strength 
represents an increase in the mobility of the units which could now operate 
at a greater distance from their depots without having recourse to local 
supplies. At no time however were there enough mules available to keep 
the troops fully supplied very far in advance - even the comparatively 
short distance to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo was beyond the capacity of the 
mule transport wholly to sustain68 - and when the army took the field the 
best the mule brigades could do was provide a partial supply. The evidence 
for this will be considered in the following chapter, it being now intended 
to point out the various causes of inefficiency in the mule transport 
which combined to bring about the incomplete success of the system. In 
the first place, the system was attacked by natural wastage among the mules 
themselves. This would occur at any time when a rapid movement of part of 
the army made unusual demands on the mules attached to it69, but under 
64. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17256 f. 73. Return of the Means of Transport at 
Badajoz, 8th November 1809. 
65. Ibid No 17907. Dalrymple to Schaumann, 20th December 1809. 
66. Ibid No 23100 f. 37. These figures exclude mules serving with the 2nd 
Division or any of the troops in the south. 
67. See Daniel pp 106/7 and P. R. O. W. 0.57/41, following Bisset to Herries, 
12th May 1812, for numbers of mules attached to units in 1812. 
68. P. R. O. W. 0.57/41 Ibid. 
69. For example see Bisset to Cairns, 7th September 1812, asking him to give 
the mules some corn as "we have been flying through this part of Spain but you 
can have no idea how much our transport is broken up". N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 
17954. 
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more normal circumstances was mainly affected by the season. During the 
summer few mules were lost, Hulse's brigade of the 6th Division for example 
claiming the same strength in its attached mules from the end of June to 
the start of September 1812, but serious losses might be incurred when the 
animals were required to operate in the winter or over long distances or 
difficult terrain. The difference between summer and winter operations 
is illustrated by the experience of Pedro Llorente, who brought 20 mules 
to serve Head-Quarters in early August 1812. One only had died by the 
15th November but between that date and Christmas Eve, 9 out of 19 were 
lost or "gone deficient"70. The winter of 1813/14 in the Pyrenees seems 
to have occasioned 3xceptionally heavy losses. "It appears" wrote Dalrymple, 
"that many of the hired mules have died during the winter from excessive 
fatigue, in consequence of the bad state of the roads over which they have 
been required to travel"71. How large the overall casualties were can only 
be guessed but the number was plainly large and the effect of these losses 
upon the'service can be inferred by observing that one third fewer mules 
were attached to certain divisions at the end of 1813 than had been serving 
the same divisions in the middle of 181272. In the winter it became 
necessary for the commissariat to issue corn to the mules (four pounds a day 
was the usual rate) to maintain even such numbers as did service, but this 
supply further reduced the efficiency of the mule brigades as the animals 
on their laden journey had to carry their own fodder as well as supplies 
to their division. The practical difficulties of supporting operations 
in winter were thus great. 
Payment was a further cause of problems in the mule transport, not 
because the remuneration was too low but because it was often long delayed. 
In fact the payments to owners of mules were most generous. They received 
a dollar a day for each mule employed, subject to a reduction of 240 reis 
(800 reis to the dollar) when the animals received fodder from the commissariat, 
and they were required to provide for every three mules one muleteer, for 
70. P. R. O. W. O. 61/108. 
71. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17978 f. 72. Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 23rd January 1814. 
72. Omitting the 7th Division, which for some reason seems to have suffered 
more than the others - "I have brigades now consisting of only 5 or 6 mules each 
of which formerly had 60 & 70" N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17952 f 29, Dobree to Ogilvie 
24th December 1813 - the comparisons read: June 1812 Dec 1813 
See N. A. M. 7512 - 124 3rd Division 553 372 
and Daniel pp 106/7.4th Division 590 372 
6th Division 530 389. 
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whose pay they received an allowance of 80 reis a day, the muleteer also 
obtaining rations on the same basis as the troops73. These rates must 
have made the large mule owners wealthy men. Dionisio Lorenzo, to take 
the case of only a small proprietor though larger than some, received pay 
for 17 mules and an extra dollar as capataz of the brigade of which his 
beasts formed a part74. Net of forage (calculated for the sake of argument 
at the commissariat's own estimate) and payments to his muleteers, he may 
be supposed to have earned over eleven dollars a day, equivalent at the 
rate of exchange of early 1812 to about three pounds sterling and over three 
times as much as was earned by an Assistant Commissary. A few men owning 
tens, or even hundreds, of mules would have earned vastly more than this 
and the many smaller owners rather less, though still a comfortable sum. 
Particularly for the smaller owners however, the financial embarrassment 
of the Military Chest during much of the war posed difficulties as the expenses 
of feeding and attending to the mules could not be delayed until payment for 
their services had been made75. Payment in arrear was a matter of deliberate 
policy and no commissary was permitted to make payments to muleteers without 
a specific authority from the Commissary-General. The shortage of money 
however caused the arrears to mount far quicker than was intended. By the 
middle of 1812 the mule brigades were at least a year in arrear 
(except of 
course those taken on less than a year before), by the start of 1813 Kennedy 
reckoned fifteen months arrears to be normal and although this was reduced 
before the start of the campaign of 1813, December of that year saw him 
reckoning the delay in payment as between twenty and twenty five months76. 
Naturally few owners could afford to wait so long and many were obliged to 
negotiate such vouchers as were occasionally given them at depreciated 
rates77 thus deterring owners who might otherwise have been attracted by the 
good pay offered. By summer 1813, not surprisingly, Ogilvie began to find 
that "the muleteers prefer the service of the merchants to ours"70. 
The large build up of arrears of pay had one advantage, namely to deter 
the desertion of proprietors already long in the service who would lose all 
claim to their money if they left the army. This was particularly relevant 
73. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 16926 f. 33. 
74. P. R. O. W. O. 61/108. 
75. The proprietors also stood to lose when their animals became casualties, 
as the compensation they were entitled to receive would be as tardy as the pay. 
76. P. R. O. W. 0.57/41, Kennedy to Herries 14th February 1813, and 57/43 Kennedy 
to Herries, 22nd December 1813- 
77- Tomkinson, p 139, thought that certain commissaries profited by such 
transactions. His calculations as to the expense of the mule system seem to be 
based on an overestimate of a muleteer's pay though an underestimate of their 
numbers. 
78. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17976. Ogilvie to Kennedy 23rd August 1813. 
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during the winter spent in the Pyrenees when conditions for many mule 
brigades were so bad79. The same- arrears however tended against the good 
of the service by aggravating both the difficulty of maintaining discipline 
and the problem of theft. Some disciplinary troubles might have been 
expected under any circumstances in view of the shortage of commissariat 
officers and the inevitable language problem - "were much delayed in not 
knowing the language as we could not find the muleteers" 
80 
remarked Morris 
on only the second day of his journey to the front - but the dissatisfaction 
produced by the arrears made it harder for the commissaries to restrain 
abuses. A leisurely attitude, noticed with disfavour by several commissaries 
at different times as prevalent among the mule owners, could not be checked 
81 
Though it was normal department policy when dealing with hired transport to 
let it go at its own pace, the practice of the mule service sometimes appears 
to have abused this tolerance. The muleteers "all make for their respective 
homes as soon as they are discharged from the division to which they belong 
and meet at their place of destination on an appointed day" 
ß2, 
explained a 
conductor posted to guide them beyond Alba de Torures in 1812. While this 
abuse was most likely to occur on long journeys, the muleteers could prove 
hard to manage on the shortest trips as well, as Norris found when his charges 
refused to proceed after it began to rain, on the grounds that there would be 
no shelter at their destination that night83. Some instances of alleged 
neglect and indolence were doubtless insignificant, meaning only that 
occasionally the muleteer's pace was too slow to satisfy a particularly 
zealous commissary or meet a particular emergency, and no douot they were 
also sometimes blamed to cover up shortcomings in the department itself. 
However not all of the manifestations of contrariness by the mule owners 
can be explained in this way, and their discontent about arrears coupled 
with the knowledge that the army could not do without all of them, must have 
been responsible for much sluggishness. The discontent indeed displayed 
itself openly on occasions like the mutiny at Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812, when 
79" Head p 322. 
80. N. A. M. Acc 7508 - 24. 
81. For example House at Corticada in 1810 complained that the muleteers could 
not be made to re-assemble for hours after the arrival of a convoy to be forwarded 
and that "the delay is entirely owing to their indolence". N. L. S. Ace 4370 
No 17972 House to Ogilvie, 10th October 1810. See also Ibid No 17955 Carey to 
Ogilvie 23rd December 1813, Carey asserts that neglect had its roots in 
discontent about arrears of pay. 
82. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17899 f 111. Connolly to Ogilvie, 28th September 1812. 
83. N. A. N. Ace 7508 - 24. One of the men apparently drew a knife to emphasise 
his refusal to march. 
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three capatazes deserted and all the remaining owners threatened to march 
their mules on Lisbon unless paid84, or like the grand meeting in 1813 of 
Wellington and the Commissary-General with the proprietors85, and should 
be borne in mind as adding delays and minor inefficiencies to the major 
problem associated with the mule transport system, that of theft. 
Granted the shortage of responsible conductors to oversee supply convoys, 
theft must always have been a temptation, but two particular circumstances 
contributed to raise the problem to a serious level in the Peninsula. In 
the first place, the commissariat evidently trod warily in the matter of 
punishments for fear of losing the services of the essential mule brigades. 
We have just seen some small irregularities which had to be ignored, and 
we now find that demonstrable theft had often similarly to be overlooked. 
Even in 1810, before the demand for mules was as great as it later became 
and before the arrears grew to such a serious extent, the matter was delicate 
and General Hill directed that some muleteers caught stealing should be tried 
by their capatazes and colleagues "having first ascertained that the 
punishment they are disposed to inflict upon them is adequate to the offence 
committed" 
86. 
What punishment was to be deemed adequate is not stated, 
but the effort, at least in a_, pearance, to allow the muleteers to settle 
their own discipline internally suggests that the issue was sensitive. As 
the arrears mounted and the need for mules grew it became even more vital to 
avoid generating resentment. "Mr Fanton informs me that you imprisoned a 
Capataz, and that the Brigade in consequence deserted - we must treat these 
people well, consider the crisis of the moment, their arrears of pay, and 
you must be aware of the importance of using every means in our power to 
keep them in our service"87, wrote Routh to a subordinate. Admittedly 
that was written in the 'crisis of the moment' and when the muleteerd! 
depredations became more serious some days later, he adopted a more vigorous 
policy, but the passage nevertheless demonstrates the need felt to conciliate 
the muleteers. Through the exercise of such sentiments some thefts went 
unpunished, such as the stealing of fifty corn sacks by Morris' muleteers 
88# 
84. P. R. O. W. O. 57/41. Enc. in Dalrymple to Herries, 20th Sept4mber 1812. 
85. Larpent II p 92. Also N. L. S. Ac3 4370 No 17876 f 52. Department Order, 
22nd December 1813- 
86. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17974 f 174. 
87. N. A. M. Ace 7701 - 36 A No 18. - 
88. N. A. M. Ace 7508 - 24. 
Rooke to Ogilvie, 31st August 1810. 
Routh to Marsden, 8th January 1812. 
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and others, like the more serious depredations instanced by Larpent in 
the Pyrenees89, could only be noticed by inscribing the value of the 
deficiency on the brigade's payment certificate, to be deducted from 
their next pay issue. This, the only action required by Departmental 
Orders in cases of theft or suspicious deficiency, was quite devoid of 
deterrent effect because the pay, as we have seen, was normally so much 
in arrears that a threatened deduction from it when it ultimately arrived 
had little impact90. Instead stealing provisions and selling them became 
another way of drawing a little pay in advance, another irregularity 
requiring tacit acceptance on the part of the department. 
To attempt an estimate of the effect on the service of what were 
euphemistically known as 'deficiencies occasioned by mule transport' is 
difficult, as so little generalised information remains. Some consignments 
of barley received at Badajoz in December 1809 are said to have lost 4' 
in transit by mules 
9l. In 1812 Bisset complained of the shortage of 
conductors, stating that rations arrived 20 or 25i% short in weight92. 
This appears to accuse all transport, not just the mule brigades, and may 
appear a large proportion but it is certainly smaller than losses known 
to have occurred on certain specific occasions. Routh, three days after 
the placatory letter already quoted, spoke of "deficiencies amounting to 
almost one half"93 and while this seems to have been an exaggeration, such 
precise figures as remain give deficiencies of between 30 and 40; 11 occurring 
on this campaign94. The best long term figures available are those of 
the deficiencies found in mule transport attached to Mr Marsden between 
the 20th January and 1st June 1812. Upon the presumption that all the 
supplies carried by these mules were for the consumption of Ashworth's 
brigade, to which Marsden was attached, there would be roughly a 10% 
89. Larpent II p 92. 
90. Apart from being a poor restraint at the best of times, even this 
measure of punishment was often omitted, which caused confusion in the accounts 
after the war. See N. A. M. Acc 7701 - 36 D No 77. Extract, hull to Kennedy, 
10th February 1815- 
91. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17877 f 34 seq. 
92. P. R. 0. W-0.57/41, Bisset to Herries, 11th May 1812. 
93" N. A. M. Acc 7701 - 36 A No 23- 
94- The theft mentioned by Larpent (v. s. ) is given in round figures and 
represents 25iý of the cargo. 
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deficiency in the bread supply95. It is likely that 10% or less is a 
more accurate average figure for deficiencies in the period 1812-14 than the 
higher estimates, for two reasons. First it is obvious from the correspondence 
that a deficiency of 20% or more was a matter worthy of remark which it 
would not 'lave been had it happened on every trip. Second, granted 
the 
practice of deducting pay for supplies stolen, any mule owners taking 
regularly more than about 15-20ö of their biscuit cargoes would have 
forfeited all entitlement to any pay whatever 
96 
and this happening on any 
scale would have rendered the system of deductions so obviously pointless 
as not to pass unnoticed in correspondence and memoirs. If about 10% 
(and more likely less than more) is accepted as an approximate average 
deficiency in goods travelling by mule in the second half of the war, then 
the corresponding figure during 1809-11 was very likely rather less, as the 
arrears had not accumulated to such an extent, nor had the need for transport 
grown so pressing as to prevent the imposition of stiffer penalties for 
depredations in that period. 
The various inefficiencies of the mule transport are thus all attributable 
in great part to shortage of money. The ability to pay mule owners regularly 
as well as generously would have improved relations between them and the 
commissaries, enabled penalties to be imposed that would have deterred much 
stealing and permitted the hiring of mules in greater numbers, thus increasing 
the distance from the depots at which the troops could be supplied. The 
system employed from 1810 onwards of attaching more and more mules to individual 
units, their efforts to be directed by the brigade commissary to whom they 
were attached, worked smoothly within the limitations imposed by the number 
of mules available and the distance to the depot, and was given greater 
flexibility by the maintenance at Hegdquarters of a transport reserve which 
was held against various occasional services and was often used to assist 
field commissaries whose own transport resources were for any reason inadequate. 
Employing so many mules was of course expensive and was undertaken for the 
95. N. A. M. Acc 7701-36 H No 104. It is impossible to estimate the deficiencies 
of alcohol and forage as these were lower priority supplies and it cannot be 
assumed that sufficient was sent forward to cover consumption, upon which 
assumption in the case of bread the calculation rests. 
96. Obviously the longer their marches and the cheaper per pound the commodity 
they carried the more they could theoretically 'afford' to steal. Biscuit and 
flour were relatively expensive and most frequently carried. The above 
calculation assumes an average turn around time from troops to depot of about 
7-9 days. 
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reason of greater operating flexibility when the army was moving. To 
some extent the commissariat can be accused of falling between two stools 
in this matter since the great body of hired mules was more than the units 
needed in most stationary gaarters97 yet never enough to maintain very wide 
ranging operations, but this criticism loses much of its force in view of 
the problems we have already noted in finding cart transport and which 
would have rendered it impossible to make the, otherwise economical, 
replacement of mules by carts when the troops were close to the depots. 
The excess of mules, not in any case very great, in view of the use of 
carts being already carried to its reasonable limits, cannot be said to 
have been improvident. The performance of the transport system with all 
its faults was quite adequate as long as the army remained within 
comparatively few marches of the rivers, say within the borders of 
Portugal, but at greater distances it became necessary to rely increasingly 
upon local resources for the sustenance of the troops. The commissariat 
system on eampaign is now to be considered in greater detail. 
97. Bisset's Department Order of April 1812 criticises among other things 
the habit of keeping mule transport idle when in quarters. "The enormous 
expence attendant on Mule transport is such that if kept idle for any length 
of time their pay will nearly cover the value of the Supplies to be removed". 
B. M. Add Mss 57377 and N. A. M. Acc 7701 - 36 A 14o 55" 
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CHAPTER VI : The Logistical Basis of Wellington's Offensive Operations 
1812-14" 
The three previous chapters have presented evidence that although hampered 
by shortages of money and transport the commissariat was generally 
succassful in supplying the Peninsular army. The department adopted an 
eclectic approach to the problem of finding provisioncc, local purchase and 
requisition, small local contracts with merchants or magistrates, larger 
contracts negotiated at command level, large scale purchase in the rear 
markets, purchase abroad by agents or contractors and imports from the 
United Kingdom all having their place in the supply. This plethora of 
methods gave a degree of security and flexibility to the army, freeing it 
from entire dependence either upon its supply line or upon the resources of 
the locality or upon the competence and honesty of its contractors. The 
difficulties confronting the commissariat in Iroviding this supply and its 
exertions to overcome them however have thus far been considered in isolation 
from the other aspects of the war effort. This method. of analysis, evidently 
convenient, is also less unrealistic than might appear because of the long 
periods for which the Anglo-Portuguese army remained in static positions, 
frequently not even in contact with enemy forces1. During such times the 
duties of the commissariat were unhampered either by enemy action or by many 
strategic contingencies, and the insular attention we have paid to their 
activities in the previous part of this work accounts satisfactorily both 
at local and command levels for a good deal of the work done by the 
department in the Peninsula. Nonetheless in a war all days are not of equal 
importance to the outcome and most of the attention of British historians 
has been focused upon the operrtions of the allied army. If these do indeed 
deserve their important status, then a correspondingly greater weight ought 
to be attached to the experiences of the commissariat when cooperating with 
military operations rather than when subsisting garrisons and cantonned 
troops, and the emphasis in cumber of words at least, laid by this study upon 
supply under non-operational conditions appears misplaced. That it is not 
so derives from an inherent difference between the difficulties faced by a 
commander and the commissariat difficulties we are considering. A battle 
1. The most lengthy such periods are from September to December 1809, January 
to September 1810 and December 1812 to May 1813, but a good deal of 1811 and 
the first half of 1812 was spent either stationary in familiar areas or marching 
along previously prepared routes quite free from enemy interference. 
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or a striking manoeuvre may alter the range of strategic possibilities 
without at all changing the nature of the commissary's problems. 
The battle 
of Salamanca for example presented Wellington at a single stroke with an 
embarrassment of quite new and unexpected options as 
to future operations. 
The Commissary-General, the day after the victory as the day before, was 
facing the same difficulties of raising money, finding transport, making 
do 
with insufficient trained personnel, negotiating for an assured meat supply 
from Portugal and supervising the activities in the field of all subordinate 
officers. It is very noticeable that major military events virtually never 
feature in commissariat currespondence, and where they do it is as a postscript, 
rather as interesting facts of importance decidedly subordinate 
to the 
department's business in hand. 
Much therefore of the progress of the department may be charted without 
overt reference to the military operations. Nonetheless since a central 
concern of this thesis is both the effectiveness of the support provided by 
the commissariat for Wellington's plans and in turn the way in which these 
plans were themselves limited by what the commissariat could and could not do, 
it is necessary to consider cases where the troops were marching and in 
contact with the enemy as well as the situation, statistically more common, 
of their being encamped. This chapter intends to examine the commissariat 
on campaign, and in particular on campaigns carried out in advance of 
the 
positions normally occupied by the troops. Thus the transfers of force, 
from north to south in early summer 1809 and again from south to north in 
the early days of 1810, are not considered here, as being only changes of 
front along interior lines prepared before the marches. Nor does the retreat 
to Torres Vedras and the maintenance of the army in the lines appear relevant 
since for most of the divisions this was simply a withdrawal along a pre- 
existent line of supply. Some irregularities took place after Coimbra was 
abandoned, and the Commissary-General admitted to destroying 20,000 rations 
of corn, 35 puncheons of rum and 6 wine pipes to prevent their capture by 
the French2. The newly formed depot at Espinhal had also hurriedly to be 
broken up and distributed among the nearest tr_oopso but since the retreat 
was premeditated and never conducted at a headlong pace it posed few problems 
2. P. R. O. W. O. 57/38, Kennedy to Gordon, 14th 06tober 1810. French sources 
mention the capture of stores at various points on tYhir advance, notably Figueira 
Condeixa and Vila Nova: many of these stores were certainly Portuguese. See 
also Schaumann p 256 for a case, doubtless not isolated, of plundering during 
the retreat. 
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of supply. The frontier operations that occupied mveh of 1811 are also 
not relevant to our present purpose as they rarely took the army far from 
the positions in which troops would normally be cantoned and where the 
arrangements for supply were already made. Instead the attention of this 
chapter will be directed upon the operations of 1812-14, partly since these 
were the largest in scale geographically and numerically as well as the 
most important historically (Massena's invasion of Portugal excepted) that 
were undertaken in the Peninsula but largely because they involved considerable 
marches away from areas in which the troops had previously been supplied 
and thus posed the greatest problems for the commissariat. 
Before 1812 the Anglo-Portuguese army had only been involved in three 
operations of the offensive type we are considering. The capture of Oporto 
and subsequent pursuit of Soult to the north was a short campaign on which 
the pursuing forces outran their supplies because of the speed of the French 
retreat rather than through any defects in the commissariat3. The Talavera 
campaign, notorious for its lamentable lack of commissariat support, is a case 
apart because it is obvious that very few arrangements for the supply of the 
British troops were made by the department, presumably because the Spaniards 
were supposed to be capable of providing the supplies they offered. We 
have already seen how little transport was attached to the units for the 
march into Spain and this was later to make it *possible for the British 
to forage far afield when competition fn August from Spanish forces rendered 
it necessary. As to the support from the rear, top priority seems to have 
been assigned to ammunition and most of the carts found proceeding to join 
the army in July are engaged on this service rather than carrying forward food. 
Mr Downie, at Castello Branco the final link in the chain of supply in Portugal, 
appears to have reasoned that the carts, travelling slowly, would not overtake 
the army until it halted which would not be in his view until it was brought 
to battle and would therefore be in need of ammunition. That so junior an 
officer should exercise any discretion in a case so important is a further 
suggestion that the supply organisation for the advance had been sketchily 
prepared4. Even under better arrangements it would not have been easy to 
force large,. trains of Portuguese transport to cross the Spanish border, 
3. This is not to suggest that there were no defects in the commissariat 
arrangements, only that the circumstances of the pursuit from Oporto are not very 
informative about them. 
4. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 22080 f 120. In fairness to Murray it should be 
remembered that Downie was not a very docile officer and may possibly have been 
following his own opinion contrary to orders. 
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and the co-operation of the Spanish authorities would have been required. 
As is well known this co-operation was not forthcoming and the wonder is 
not that the British were forced to retire but that, poorly supplied with 
transport and in competition with a Spanish army at least equally numerous, 
they were enabled to remain until the middle of August in a country whence, 
only two months before, the French 1st corps had been obliged to depart for 
want of sustenance5. 
The third occasion before 1812 when the army marched forward away from 
its supplies was in spring 1811, when Massen retreated into Spain and was 
followed by allied troops from the Rio Maior. The supply arrangements on 
this march were strained even more than they would have been anyhow by the 
recent order that all Portuguese units forming part of British divisions 
should be supplied by the British commissariat, instantly increasing by about 
a third the number of mouths to be fed by British commissaries6. The pursuit 
commenced on the 5th March and appears to have run out of food by the 15th. 
The ten days provisions thus consumed must have been carried by the mule 
brigades keeping up with the columns, but as the animals had no time to turn 
back for replenishment no food remained at the end of the time. A good supply 
however had been directed to Figueira by sea and this began to arrive up-river 
very soon after the 16th, the day on which the pursuit had been constrained 
to halt7. The following week was a matter of stops and starts with many 
corps missing their rations, and, although the Douro and Mondego depots could 
be restocked comparatively speedily, the dislocation of the land transport 
system brought about by the invasion must have been the principal reason why, 
during 1811, stores accumulated in the rear depots much more quickly than 
they were consumed at the front8. The troops in the south too, intending 
initially the relief and subsequently the recapture of Badajoz, easily supplied 
from Abrantes on the first stage of their journey, also found themselves 
outrunning their supplies, and the support they received from the rear was 
not so efficient as was the case in the north. D. C. G. Thompson was dismissed 
the service for failing to send forward 500 carts with provisions for 
5. Wellington's indignant denials notwithstanding, some appropriation of 
Spanish provisions did take place, which, combined with much scouring of the 
landscape, very little help from Portugal and the mysterious labours of Sr. 
Lozano de Torres, constituted the army's commissariat for most of July and the 
first half of August. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17970 f 51, Findlay to Ogilvie, 6th 
August 1809. Despatches Vp 24, Wellington to Cuesta, 11th August 1809. 
6. Despatches VII p 332, ! enorandum of 5th March 1811. 
7. Daniel p 37. 
8. See chapter III, 'Bread'. 
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Beresford's troops and in consequence of this lapse, wrote Ogilvie, "I was 
obliged to break up my office to send all my clerks and to cause the 
magistrates to bake bread and furnish transport - ... I was obliged to 
entrust country people also and send them into Spain with stuns of money to 
pay for supplies and the means of transport with passports of Gen'l 
Caste. nos"9. The contrast between the provenance of supplies on the Tagus 
with that near Badajoz is obvious from a comparison of the sums disbursed 
by Ogilvie for provisions in different months. In January and February, 
near Almeirim and Chamusca, his average daily supply expenditure was 965 
milreis; in April and May, near Badajoz, the equivalent figure was 4,15010. 
The prices Ogilvie paid are unknown but at reasonable commodity prices this 
larger daily disbursement, less that part of it expended on forage, would 
have fed at least 10,000 men. In the second half of the year depots were 
once more established forward in this sectbr. and transport arrangements 
were instituted to enable troops on the frontier to draw many of their 
rations from the rear. 
All the three cases briefly considered above thus demonstrate Wellington's 
operations hampered by shortages of supply, although paradoxically the only 
proven instance of major culpability on the part of the commissariat took 
place in a branch of the service not seriously affected: neither the battle 
of "Albuera, nor the sieges of Badajoz were prevented by supplies failing. 
Viewed in this light the prognostications for the campaign of 1812 were not 
good. On the other hand all these three operations were special cases. 
The attack on Oporto was carried out before the army's transport had been 
regularised upon the pattern followed from 1810 onwards, the Talavera campaign 
had been undertaken without many supply arrangements on the understanding 
that the Spanish authorities would provide supplies and the pursuit of 
Massera led the army through a region designedly stripped of provisions six 
months before and then passed and re-passed by the hungry invasion forces. 
Even the army admitted that the commissariat had done well on this occasion 
to make the march possible at all. Thus on each of these campaigns the 
11 
9. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17877, Ogilvie to Sargent, 26th November 1827, 
10. Ibid No 17895" The months are commissariat months which run from the 25th 
to the 24th. The point is not as straightforward as it is here presented since 
in May the additional strength of the 4th division had joined Beresfords force, 
but it remains a striking comparison. 
11. For example Tomkinson, pp 98 and 140. 
;  
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commissariat had been restricted in its possible modes of supply. 
On the 
first two occasions the supply from the rear had been deficient and on the 
third, no supplies could be procured. locally12. Before examining 
the main 
campaign of 1812, it '. s intended to look more closely at 
the extent to which 
different means of supply were employed to sustain operations and this will 
be done by considering one short campaign for which 
(comparatively) good 
statistical information is available. 
The campaign with which we are concerned is Lieutenant-General Hill's 
advance from the neighbourhood of Albuquerque upon Merida and Almendralejo, 
for the purpose of distracting the Army of the South from two of its current 
projects, the hunting of General Ballasteros' army ana the at acx on rarila. 
Wellin ton feared the march might prove impossible for the commissariat to 
support. "The Principal difficulty, however, which occurs to me in making 
a movement upon Merida, conEists in the want of supplies... it is impossible 
to procure money to pay on delivery the enormous sums required for every 
article which the troops want. The mArch to Merida will increase your 
distance from your magazines to such a degree, as to render the supply of 
the troops from them very difficult and precarious"13. Hill replied that 
"having spoken to Mr Routh on the subject of supplies.. he does not seem 
to 
apprehend any great difficulty"14, and set out across the Guadiana on 
the 
27th December 1811 with about 15,000 men and over 2,500 horses15. For 
the 
purposes of calculation it is necessary to estimate the nuu'bers of men supplied 
by the British commissariat, since the force included Campbell's Portuguese 
cavalry brigade who "are only to be occasionally supplied when their own 
means fail" 
16 
and Hamilton's Portuguese division and its attache. artillery 
of which the same was true. Ashworth's brigade however, being part of the 
2nd division, was supplied by the British. Deducting the independent 
Portuguese units left some 9,500 mouths and perhaps 1,500 to 2,000 horses 
12. "Nothing could be purchased on the road but fruit". Daniel p 45. The 
advanced troops benefited from animals left behind by the French, whose rear 
guard was the comparatively well-fed 6th corps. Schaumann p 291. 
130 Despatches VIII p 449, Wellington to Rill, 19th December 1811. 
14, B. K. Add Mss 35062 f 110, Hill to Wellington, 21st December 1811. 
15. Oman V pp 130-3 deals with the campaign. Oman seems to be wrong in putting 
Hill's force at 12,000 men. His text and appendices on the point however present 
anomalies which it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate further than 
noticing that the 12,000 figure is much too low and that the cause of the error 
is probably his opinion that Ashworth's brigade did not march, which from the 
Marsden papers it appears to have done. 
16. N. A. M. Acc 7701-36 A No 17. Routh to Marsden, 8th January 1812. 
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to be supplied by A. C. G. Routh and his subordinates. In fact this is to 
understate his responsibility since the Portuguese commissariat proved 
incapable of supplying its charges and received occasional assistance from 
British stores17. Regularly to have supplied. the Portuguese would have 
been beyond Routh's power and our further calculations will be upon the 
basis of supply being provided only to 9,500 men. 
Prior to the advance the force had been supplied mainly from the depot 
at Portalegre. Routh decided to support the operation by collecting a 
major depot at Albuquerque. "I am very anxious to hear you have a large depot 
under your charge, I wish it to be to a great extent"18, he wrote on the 
29th December to Mr Marsden, the officer he had selected to take charge of 
the stores at Albuquerque19. Marsden's instructions make it plain that 
the new depot was intended to be sufficient for the supply of the little army. 
He was to maintain four couriers at Albuquerque and send daily returns of 
provisions to Mr Fanton at Portalegre who would thus be enabled to send 
forward whatever was necessary to keep up stocks. "In the event of supplies 
at Albuquerque falling short, he (Marsden) will forward the mules of brigade 
commissaries to Portalegre; but he is expected always to retain in store 
a supply of forage corn, Flour and some biscuit for the mules which will be 
despatched to him by my orders from Mr Kirton"20. Besides what could be 
sent forward from Portalegre, Marsden was to be supplied with all articles 
by a gentleman called Don Guillermo, who as also employed to build up a cattle 
depot at Albuquerque consisting of 300 head, while a further 200 followed 
the army down the road to Merida. 
It is apparent that a considerable extension of the means of transport 
with the force was necessary to meet the needs of the campaign. Twenty mule 
cars belonging to Jorge Fernandez were hired at the beginning of 1812 to ply 
the road from Albuquerque to Merida and Barry loads in barrels which could 
not so easily be transported by a single mule. Further efforts to expand 
the transport capacity were directed at increasing the number of mules directly 
serving the troops. On 15th December Routh hired two new brigades and on 
170 "Our wants are much increased by the whole of the Portuguese Troops having 
come entirely dependent upon the British Commissariat". B. M. Add Mss 35059 
f 496, Hill to Wellington, 2nd January 1812. 
18o N. A. M. Ace 7701-36 A No 5. Routh to Marsden 29th December 1811. 
19. Maisden had only arrived at the front a few days before. His active 
service hitherto had been confined to several months in charge of receipts and 
issues in the depot at Belem. 
20. N. A. M. Ace 7701-36 A No 3, Routh to rlarsden 26th December 1811. Preciseý 
what duty Hr Kirton was executing to be thus preferentially treated. is uncertain. It seems most likely that his consignments were intended to form a general 
reserve, though that they were intended for Hill's headquarters is also Possible- 
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the 20th a third, all totalling 98 asses and 45 mules, while A. C. G. 
Wilkinson took on a further 26 animals for use between Portalegre and 
Abrantes. Necessary though they must have been, these transport increases 
had a major drawback. "I have found" wrote Wilkinson on the 11th January, 
"that the muleteers employed from these neighbourhoods are greatly inclined 
to rob the Cargoes they brL. ng, part of a brigade went off last night who 
were suspected of stealing the shoes brought by them"21. The following 
day Routh sent a firm order that any capataz delivering short weight was 
to be jailed immediately. The losses in convoy had become serious at 
this time, in part by the fault of Marsden who despatched. convoys from 
Albuquerque with the goods unweighed so that the muleteers "were not bound 
to deliver by weight when they did not receive it by the same rule , 
22 
, as 
Routh explained, and so could steal as much as they liked without its being 
chargeable to them at the end of the journey. In defence of the muleteers 
it seems clear that they were not to blame for all the deficiencies. By 
the 6th January, Hill was writing about the unfed Portuguese troops plundering 
the mule trains23. Had this been the sole reason for the losses however 
and was known at Headquarters on the 6th, the muleteers would hardly have 
remained the only villains in the commissariat correspondence as late as 
the 12th. The shoes mentioned above were hardly likely to have been 
plundered by starving soldiers, and there seems no reason to doubt the 
commissaries' opinion that much of the loss was occasioned by dishonesty 
among the muleteers. 
It seems that the most serious losses occurred from the mules arriving 
at the army between the 7th and 12th of January inclusive. From such 
figures as survive it appears that the convoys of unweighed goods often arrived 
between thirty and forty per cent short. The effect of these losses was 
probably not to deprive the troops but to reduce the reserve in hand, thus 
effectively cancelling the possibility of offensive operations had Hill 
wished to undertake any. On the 11th Routh admitted "we have in consequence 
(of the losses in mule convoy) only one day's bread now with the troops"24. 
On the 13th Hill retired, in accordance with Wellington's orders, to take up 
a new station further to the north astride the Tagus. The Albuquerque depot 
21. N. A. M. Acc 7701-36 A No 25. Wilkinson to Fanton, 11th January 1812. 
22. Ibid No 23. Routh to Marsden, 11th January 1812. 
23. B. M. Add Mss 35059 f 503. Rill to Wellington, 6th January 1812. 
24. N. A. M. Acc 7701-36 A No 23. Routh to Marsden, 11th January 1812, footnote. 
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was broken up on the 16th and 17th as the army was moving towards the depots 
of Portalegre and Niza and the campaign, although a winter operation, 
straightforward from the military and com. iissariat points of view along a 
single line of advance against an outnumbered enemy, ended with the return 
of the army to Portugal. 
The available statistics enable us to investigate more closely the means 
adopted for the supply of the troops. From the figures for the receipts 
and issues of Ni Marsden during the month following the 25th December 1811, 
there may be calculated an approximation to the quantity of stores that 
passed through Albuquerque up to the 16th January when the troops returned 
to the Guadiana. On the basis that the British supplied portion of Hill's 
force comprised 9,500 men with 2,000 horses, it appears that the bread 
supply was satisfactory, the meat supply was very insufficient and the 
alcohol and forage corn quantities were inadequate for the number of mouths 
to be fed. The bread supply was aided by captures about the extent of which 
there is some confusion. It is most likely that they amounted altogether 
to some 30/409000 rations and not the 160,000 lbs of wheat besides an 
unspecified amount of biscuit mentioned by Oman25. Between the 25th 
December 1811 and 16th January 1812 approximately 9,000 bread rations per 
day were provided. through Albuquerque, excluding the captured stores. 
Taking these into account there was clearly enough to feed all the British 
supplied portion of Hill's force and leave a small surplas for the 
independent Portuguese. The same calculation regarding alcohol reveals 
a supply of only 7,000 rations daily, while the figure for forage corn is 
either 1,500 or 1,200 rations according to whether the allowance on this 
canpaign was ten or twelve pounds per horse per day. The greatest deficiency 
is found in the meat supply, where only 4,000 rations per day were provided 
through Albuquerque, but since some cattle are known to have come directly 
25. The principal source for the 160,000 lbs of wheat seems to be Despatches 
VIII p 520, Wellington to Liverpool, 9th January 1812, which doubtless inspired 
Oman and Sidney, Life of Lord Hill 1845 p 180. Wellington's assertion has no 
basis which can be discovered whereas all the other statements about the capture, 
though showing internal discrepancies, unite in presenting it as vastly smaller. 
Thus Despatches VIII p 511 Wellington to Graham; 6th January 1812 speaks of 600 
fanegas (perhaps 40,000 lbs) captured at Merida and Almendralejo and N. A. M. 
Acc 7701-36 A Nb 13 Wilkinson to Marsden 4th January 1812 talks of 30,000 rations 
of wheat captured, which, at 12lbs the unbaked ration, agree together quite 
well. Hill himself acknowledged the capture of 180 fanegas of wheat "besides 
a quantity of bread" at Merida alone, later reporting "a few stores" found at 
Almendralejo. His return of these latter is not among his papers, but nothing 
in his letters or subsequent memorandum suggests that the finds at Almend_ralejo 
were any bigger than those at Merida. B. M. Add Mss 35059 ff 489,496 and 505. 
Hill to Wellington 30th December 1811,2nd January 1812 and memorandum. 
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from Estremoz to the army this figure does not represent the whole supply, 
which was probably considerably more extensive. 
This result accords with the policy we have already noticed (in chapter III) 
of giving preference to bread above the other articles of supply. The 
deficiencies of alcohol and meat should be regarded as being supplied by 
purchases in the locality either from inhabitants or small dealers. This 
is implied by Routh's anxiety on the 5th January over g delay in the forwarding 
of 20,000 dollars in specie26, since supplies are the only expense which 
could not have waited ten days until the army's retirement, and it is confirmed 
by Hill on the 7th. "I have found the Spanish People well inclined & by no 
means unwilling to let us have what the enemy have left"27. The shortfall 
of forage corn may have been similarly supplied but probably represented 
underfeeding of the horses. It may seem from these figures that the supply 
from the rear formed so considerable a part of the commissariat arrangements 
for this campaign that local supplies, while useful in a small way, could 
virtually have been, except by the independent Portuguese, dispensed with. 
The supply we have examined so far however has been the supply from Albuquerque, 
a depot especially instituted out of the usual depot pattern for the purpose 
of sustaining the advance of the troops. By no means all of the supplies 
forwarded from Albuquerque arrived thither from further in rear. Don 
Guillermo28, already mentioned, appears from the extant receipts to have 
been the only local supplier to Albuquerque during this campaign but he supplied 
about a third of all provisions received there, 25iý of the bread (as flour), 
65% of the meat, 20% of the alcohol (all rum) and 45% of the forage corn. 
Thus without the assistance of the general locality the supply would have 
been quite inadequate, in spite of the increases in transport, which probably 
amounted to about 10"of in animals29 together with a number of carts unspecified 
but in excess of 20. The mixed nature of the supply provided by Routh appears 
to have caused neither surprise nor strategical inconvenience to Hill's 
Headquarters. Although worried at first lest he could not maintain his 
position at Almendralejo30, Hill was able to do precisely what his orders 
26. N. A. M. Acc 7701-36 A No 15, Routh to Marsden 5th January 1811(recte 1812). 
27, B. M. Add Mss 35059 f 509. Hill to Wellington 7th January 1812. 
28. Don Guillermo's full name was Guillermo Antonio Alexis. 
29. It is not recorded how many mules the 2nd division and five British cavalry 
regiments employed prior to the campaign but by analogy with the practice in the 
northern army, about 1,500 would be a likely guess. 
30. B. M. Add Mss 35059 f 496. Hill to Wellington 2nd January 1812. Shortage 
of forage corn was the problem Hill feared. 
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enjoined him to with the assistance of his commissariat. On the 3rd January 
we learn that "the general is as yet highly pleased"31, and though on the 6th 
Hill wrote that "the dreadful state of the weather the condition of the roads 
(which are daily becoming worse), and the consequent difficulty of getting 
up my supplies, render any further operations on my part impossible for the 
present... "32, he was able to maintain his position at Merida until ordered, 
for reasons unconnected with commissariat considerations, to retire, and no 
"further operations" were required of him. Additional evidence of the 
generally satisfactory conduct of commissariat business in this campaign 
is provided b- the fact that Hill shortly afterwards recommended Routh for 
promotion, which was awarded on the 9th March. Thus it cannot be said that 
the, admittedly limited, ambitions of the operation were thwarted by 
difficulties of supply. 
When thinking ahead to the major operation of 1812 neither Wellington nor 
Bisset doubted that it would involve a partial dependence upon local supplies. 
Wellin,?, tonl worry was less that these might exist in insufficient quantities 
than that shortage of money might prevent the army receiv=i. n the benefit of 
them. "My friends in Castille... " wrote Wellington, "assure me that we shall 
not want provisions even before the harvest will be reaped... and that if we 
can pay for a part credit will be given us for the remainder. They have 
lon, given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castille upon 
British securities... 
In case we should be able to maintain ourselves i Castille .. I have in 
contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I 
shall at all events have our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. 
But with all these prospects I cannot reflect without sh&.:? ering upon the 
probability that we shall be distressed, nor upon the consequence which may 
result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain33. Not very long 
before Bisset had asserted the impossibility of an advance in the army's 
present financial state "Because, like (sic) Moses, we cannot with a wand 
31. N. A. M. Acc 7701-36 A No 12. Routh to Marsden 3rd January 1811 (recte 1812) 
32. Despatches VIII p 522. Hill to Wellington, 6th January 1812. 
33. Despatches IX p 177, Wellington to Liverpool 26th May 1812. 
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strike what we want from the rocks"34, and he seems also to have been 
worried about how much food was to be found in Spain where "In many places 
were you to give the Bank of England you could not get as much bread and 
meat as would supply 100 men without considerable previous arrangements, 
35. 
The decision to undertake the campaign, naturally, was Wellington's, but 
on this occasion he was probably acting against the advice of his Commissary- 
General, or at least he would have been had Bisset been asked for his 
advice which may not have been the case36. On the 18th May Bisset denied 
the advance to be possible: on the 10th June (three days before the army 
set out) he wrote of the move as a settled thing but repeated his previous 
apprehensions as the finances had not improved in the interim. 
The events of the early part of the campaign, in the country that lay 
between Salamanca and the Douro, justified neither of these fears. The 
Salamanca region was not one of those places dreaded by Bisset where the 
Bank of England would have gone hungry. "The country through which we have 
marched from Salamanca", wrote William Warre, ADC to Marshal Beresford, "is 
extremely fertile and well-cultivated, producing abundance of corn of all 
descriptions, sometimes in one year for the consumption of three and this 
year the crops are remarkably fine... 37 This observation is supported 
by many passing references in contemporary memoirs. Since the campaign 
opened in summer and the area of operations was so fertile, the cavalry 
were enabled to obtain barley from the fields and their supply mules were 
re-allocated among the infantry divisions. Bisset observed that 'commissariat 
Bills' (being the securities described in chapter IV as drafts) were used in 
payment for the barley taken from the fields, so evidently it proved possible 
to obtain supplies locally without the payment of ready money as we1138. 
The situation of the infantry regarding supplies may be observed through 
the surviving figures respecting the 6th division in this period, which 
figures are here presented graphically. The picture is complicated by two 
circumstances, first the very heavy losses suffered by this corps at 
Salamanca (which I have for convenience presented gradually, spread out 
between two points arbitrarily chosen shortly before and shortly after the 
22nd July) and second the large reinforcement which enewed its strength at 
34. B. M. Add Mss 57377, Bisset to Herries, 18th May 1812. 
35" Ibid. 
36. After all, six months before it had been Wellin ton giving Bisset advice. 
See the transport memorandum of 20th November 1811. Despatches VIII p 626. 
37. W. Warre, Letters from the Peninsula ed. E. Warre, 1909, letter of 7th 
July 1812. See also Daniel pp 114 and 121. 
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the beginsling of August and i$ represented by the vertical tixrn of the 
graph. It should be emphasised that no intermediate point on the lines 
is necessarily significant as these are only filled in for ease of 
comprehension. From the graph it apä, ears that while the troops were 
between Salamanca and the Douro their supply (line AA) was adequately 
provided, the turn around time to the depots varying from ten to twelve 
days (hence the upward slope of the line) for an average of 6,000 men39. 
The upturn subsequent to the sharp dip in the graph caused by the loss of 
over 1,500 men at Salamanca represents the increasing distance from the 
frontier depots as the division marched in late July to Cuellar whence the 
round trip to the Portuguese border took from twenty to twenty five days. 
After the reinforcement to about 7,000 men the line slopes upwards to the 
end of August, but should probably be considered as subject to fluctuations 
between the low point indicated on August 1st and the high point at the end 
of the month as the mules' journey times at such a great distance appear 
to have varied. Since in August the number of mules available (line BB) 
was plainly below the requirement (line AA), I have added a lower line 
(line CC) representing the mule requirement if the alcohol supply were to 
be dispensed with, normally the case as we have seen when transport shortage 
dictated a reduction in the supply from the rear. 
On the basis of these figures it appears that while it remained or, the 
Douro and before reinforcement the 6th division was adequately supplied from 
Ciudad Rodrigo and liarca D'Alva by its own mules. After reinforcement 
however, at Cuellar, the mules could no longer have kept pace with the 
biscuit supply, let alone any other40. From the returns of provisions in 
hand and the statements of transport activity it is ay, parent that the 6th 
division during August was not surviving solely on what the mules could 
bring forward since accessions of bread are recorded without any transport 
that might have brought them having returned from the rear. Its wine was 
mostly bought in the country from day to day. If the mule convoys were 
not adequate to the supply of the division at Cuellar during August, they 
could certainly not have been adequate at Burgos in September and October, 
and nor, unless the 6th division was unusually deficient in mule transport, 
39" This figure is a compromise between the ration strength of the division at the end of June and the fighting strength at Salamanca according to Oman (actually 
from the morning state Of 15th July 1812). The large discrepancy between these 
figures is largely explained by casualties at the taking of the Salamanca forts 
in late June. 
40. The 6th was the only division of the army which fought at Salamanca not 
to proceed to Madrid in August. 
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were the other troops at Madrid andBurgos from August to October likely 
to have been able to subsist on biscuit from the frontier of Portugal. 
This argument would be undermined were it true that depots *ere drawn 
forward into Spain behind the troops and the distances between the army 
and its magazines was maintained in this way. While supplies were advanced 
into Spain and depots were established along the communications of the army 
both on the Burgos and Madrid roads, all these depots were for the convenience 
of detachments, convoys, hospitals or messengers and were not intended for 
the supply of the field army. Arevalo for example was issuing only 1,500 
rations daily in mid-September "in consequence of all detachments halting 
at this place for orders41. Among the intermediate depots only Salamanca 
was maintained to a degree at all sufficient to be a source of supply to the 
army's mules but it was only ever a partial resource. The instructions 
given D. C. G. Anderson stated that he was to be in a position to issue 8,000 
rations daily besides maintaining a reserve magazine, "any excess of which 
(quantity) may be sent forward from Ciudad Rodrigo or that you may procure 
through the medium of the Intendente by purchase, or by contracts in existence 
to be afforded to the first divisional Transport of the day requiring loading"42. 
Salamanca was used intermittently by the divisions at Burgos and probably very 
rarely by those at Madrid, and must have helped lessen the great deficiency 
of supply which would otherwise have fallen upon the advanced troops. It 
is noticeable however that mules proceeding from the 6th division at Cuellar 
seem to have been no quicker returning from Salamanca than was normal for 
Ciudad Rodrigo. Altogether the amelioration produced in the position of 
the forward troops by the Salamanca depot cannot have been very great, since 
even under the demand only of the Burgos troops, it became drained far quicker 
than replenishment could arrive from Ciudad Rodrigo and probably under half 
of the supply to Burgos can have been made from it. 
It seems reasonable to infer from the facts presented that the army at 
Madrid and Burgos faced a shortfall of bread arriving from the rear, and 
equally reasonable, in spite of bissetls worries in May, to suppose this 
shortfall supplied by local purchase. This appears to have been the usual 
way of providing the bulk of the supply while the forces were on the move. 
D. C. G. Routh made a practice of compiling intelligence in advance about the 
41. N. L. S. Ace 4370 1o 17877 f 32 Price to Ogilvie, 14th September 1812. 
42. Ibid No 17954 f 87. Instructions of 23rd August 1812. 
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resources and modes of production of areas in which 
it was possible he 
might be called upon to act. "This plan was acted upon 
in the Peninsular 
(sic), in the advance of Lord Hill's corps from Almendralejo to Aranjuez, 
by the route of Truxillo and Talavera, by the Tagus, where there was no 
depot, and the country itself much exhausted. By the information 
thus 
obtained every supply was procured on requisition in abundance"43. 
D. A. C. G. Dallas, senior commissary with Skerrett's force marching from 
Cadiz to Toledo in August and September 1812, spoke fluent Spanish and used 
this ability to enter into conversation with inhabitants and 
discover where 
they had hidden their provisions during the French occupation. Then 
he 
would reveal himself as a British commissary and appropriate what 
he wanted. 
He also pressed 100 carts and 300 mules to carry the food he extracted and 
was able by these means to ensure that, at least as far as Seville, 
his 
charges "were never without food during the whole march except the deficiency 
of one half day's ration"44. Requisitions like these although easiest with 
r 
only a small force to provide for45 were also feasible for larger numbers. 
Regarding the march from Madrid to Burgos in September, Dalrymple wrote that 
much barley was procured from the country and also bread from right and left 
of the line of march equal to the consumption of the force. At the end of 
the letter he added that the biscuit mules "ultimately came up"46. While 
under more normal circumstances the regular march of the mule brigades would 
have ensured at least the greater part of the bread supply from the rear, 
it 
is evident that the localities were able and willing to part with enough to 
remedy the deficiency. 
It was seen in the case of the advance to Almendralejo that a fair proportion 
of the supplies collected by mules from the forward depots had not arrived 
there from the rear at all, but had been obtained on the spot from a contractor. 
This was also the case at Salamanca in 181247 where the various sources of 
supply are discussed in chapter III. Unfortunately good figures are lacking 
regarding the volume of supply from the rear to Salamanca. Biscuit and forage 
corn were the articles provided both from Almeida and Ciudad. Rodrigo leaving 
the alcohol supply to be obtained locally, as was the fresh bread iasued, tö 
430 Routh p 190 
440 A. B. Dallas, Incidents in the Life and Ministry of the Revd R. C. Dalsai 
1871 p 131- 
45- Routh was feeding roughly 15,000 men and Dallas about 5,000. 
46. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17960 f 99 Dalrymple to Ogilvie, 13th September 1812. 
47. Though there is no evidence that any part of Ciudad Rodrigo's stores were 
similarly provided it would be surprising in view of 
the number of contractors and 
would-be contractors in Castille if none of them had 
been. 
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the hospital and passing detachments. It appears that the greater part of 
the bread supply, in excess of what was required for the depot, did come 
from the rear and may have amounted to about 6,000 rations a day on average 
during September and October. Besides these supplies Sr Pessoa's contradt 
(see chapter III) was intended to provide 5,000 rations daily for issue to 
the divisional mules and appears in fact to have amounted to about 4,000 
biscuit rations a day. Altogether therefore Salamanca provisioned the main 
army to the extent of 10,000 rations a day. The remainder of its supplies 
had to be fetched in the autumn from Ciudad Rodrigo or made up on the spot, 
although a large convoy of supply carts did set out in September from the 
Portuguese border towards the Escorial46. There is no evidence that this 
was a regular route for carts and this journey appears to have been an 
isolated occasion, probably undertaken for the purpose of stocking the 
depot near the Escorial from which the forces at Madrid drew three days 
provisions before their retreat. 
49 The 454 carts which set out could have 
carried enough provisions for this purpose. No other evidence has emerged 
of carts carrying provisions other than those required for the daily issues 
at intermediate commissariat stations, being sent forward in the wake of 
the army, which was thus rendered dependent on its own means of transport. 
These, as we have seen, were inadequate to its maintenance either at Madrid 
or at Burgos, and the deficiency was made good by local purchase at the 
divisions with some contracts or larger scale purchase agreements concluded 
at Headquarters. 
50 
From the picture so far presented it will seem that the British army in 
the summer and autumn of 1812 was enjoying the best of both worlds. It was 
secured in case of retreat and partly supplied by large magazines in rear 
and yet it was enabled to make grand movements by its ability to draw on local 
resources, for short periods at least exclu3ively of any supply from its 
depots. In fact its power to continue in this happy situation was limited 
in two respects, regarding both of which time was beginning to run short 
by September 1812. First, such an expensive system both of purchase and 
transport could not function indefinitely upon credit. "If our credit. 
48. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17954 f 70. 
49" Dallas p 135 and Routh p 19. 
50. Supplementary Despatches VII p 430 Sydenham to Wellesley 28th September 
1812, includes a passage which reveals the importance of local resources at 
Burgos. 
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were not better we should certainly starve"51, Wellington had i, rritten in 
July, and later in the year the accumulation of debts was beginning to damage 
this credit. Early signs of diminishing confidence may be seen in the 
mutiny of some muleteers in August (see chapter V) and in the (denied) 
request of the Salamanca contractor Pessoa to be paid in Bills on Londor 
rather than Headquarters or Lisbon52. Later the same supplier threatened to 
end his contract unless he was paid and the best Kennedy could do was to 
offer 10,000 dollars if that should be sufficient to induce him to continue53. 
Another supplier, Don 1'ra-icisco Lopez, owned a stock of shoes of which the 
department was at this time in want but refused to part with them except for 
ready money54. The overall reduction in the army's creditworthiness by the 
end of the campaign, evident in any case from the depreciation of commissariat 
drafts and the adoption of the 'half and half' system discussed in chapter IV, 
may be seen from a later letter referring to conditions imposed and obviously 
not met) by the meat dealers: "There are demands on the Com"t for meat 
supplies, under particular & stipulated engagements of prompt payment... ""55 
The modest resurgence taking place in the last foiir months of the year in 
the sums of money arriving from England must have helped to delay this process 
but was not large enough to halt it and by early November the need for cash 
was so desperate as to induce Kennedy to introduce his controversial new 
money raising scheme. How long operations might have been sustained against 
the background of worsening public confidence cannot be said. Evidently 
Kennedy's opinion was that the army was close to bankruptcy by the close 
of the campaign and, even granting his new measure, the saving in expenditure 
brought about by the dispersal of the troops into winter quarters must have 
been most timely. 
The second factor limiting the commissariat's power to continue the supply 
to the troops as before, even more inevitable than the accumulation of debt, 
was the approach of winter. Winter brought bad weather which affected the 
roads and slowed transport besides damaging supplies in transit. More 
important still, winter brought to an end the local supply of forage corn 
upon which the horses and mules had depended in the autumn. This meant 
51. Despatches IX p 289. Wellington to Stuart 15th July 1812. 
52. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 22080 f 135. Dalrymple to Ogilvie 7th September 1812. 
53. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17879 f 40, Kennedy to Ogilvie 2ejd November 1812. 
54. Ibid No 17891 f 67 Cairns to Ogilvie 16th October 1812. 
55" B. M. Add Mss 57393 f 77. Extract from an anonymous letter to Messrs Lyne 
Hathom & Roberts dated Lisbon 19th June 1813. 
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that more supplies from the rear were called for to accommodate the cavalry 
and artillery at the same time as the mule brigades could carry less since 
they were having also to carry their own corn. The enormous difference 
this made to the mule system is illustrated by the line DD on the graph 
presented earlier, showing the increased number of mules required for the 
same service if they had to feed themselves as well as their unit. Naturally 
the effect of this was most felt at the greatest distance from the depot56. 
By the beginning of October the department was already taking steps to guard 
against shortage of corn, and Wellington ordered the depot for the cavalry 
to be moved forward from Salamanca to Arevalo and stocked immediately with 
ten to fifteen thousand fanegas (55 80,000 rations) of corn. Dalrymple, 
communicating this order to Ogilvie, added that he should buy as much forage 
corn as possible since with the onset of winter there would certainly be a 
-Ihortage57. Thomas Price, in charge of the Arevalo depot, found, despite 
the help of an officer loaned him by the Intendente to enforce his regdsition, 
that "this province is much exhausted, nothing can be procured without 
money"58. He hoped for better results from his efforts round Rueda and 
Avila whither he had sent agents to collect corn, but he had not been able 
to hire any mules for its transport. Inih'e, event Price cannot have had 
enough time to assemble much since the retreat of the army made it necessary, 
little more than a week after he had begun to look forward to the arrival 
of some corn, to carry back to Salamanca what had been gathered already at 
Arevalo and Puente Dano. 
Although so soon after the harvest it must have been possible to collect 
stores of forage corn the combination of the short time the department was 
given for its preparations, the lack of ready money, the credit decline and 
the difficulty of finding transport, makes it unlikely that what was provided 
came anywhere near the 20,000 forage rations a day stated by Kennedy to be 
necessary. Indeed the provisioning of the men on the retreat must have been 
similar to the manner we have already seen employed to sustain movements in 
56. This is a hypothetical line in its context since in July and August it 
would not have been necessary for the mules to have carried corn for themselves. 
It illustrates the impossibility of the same operation being undertaken in 
January. See again Despatches VIII p 626. Memorandum of 20th November 1811. 
57. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17960 Dalrymple to Ogilvie 3rd October 1812. 
58. Ibid No 17927 ? rice to Ogilvie 11th November 1812. 
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the earlier part of the year. Although on the 31st October Kennedy sent 
to Salamanca the news that he could buy nothing as the Spaniards were eating 
everything that could be found and that he needed 70,000 rations per day59, 
it seems most unlikely that they were forthcoming. His previous attempt 
to have biscuit sent forward to the army had been spoilt by the weather 
which had soaked and virtually ruined four convoys of biscuit between Ciudad 
Rodrigo and Salamanca, and the depot at the latter place had run so low that 
no divisional mules could be supplied there on October 25th. The 70,000 
rations must have been intended to supply Hill's force coming from Madrid 
as well as Wellington's retiring from Burgos, but Hill plainly did not receive 
the benefit of them as his senior commissary, D. C. G. Aylmer, wrote in November 
that "we have not had the advantages of drawing upon depots for some time 
past" 
60, 
and asked for a depot supply of biscuit.. Even the San Christobal 
position, where with the combination of the supplies accumulated at Salamanca 
and the much shorter trip to Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida for the divisional 
mules it should have been possible for at least the most important supplies 
to be fetched from the rear, would have proved too far advanced for the 
department to have supported because the border depots by November were 
themselves being denuded as the enthusiasm of the carters within Portugal 
and the speed at which they travelled diminished with the approach of winter6l. 
Shortly after the final retreat of the irmy hurried measures were being 
introduced to re-stock the depot at Almeida, and there was the suggestion 
that the divisional mules might themselves make the journey to San Sebrao 
or Quinta dos Fulhos, easing the pressure on the cart convoys62. 
The retreat and conclusion of the campaign of 1812 was thus attended with 
at least as much commissariat ae military necessity. New measures were at 
once resorted to with regard to the supplies of money and meat and the 
divisions were distributed into quarters close to the Douro or Mondego in 
order to rest and preserve all forms of transport. Yet despite these urgent 
steps it cannot be suggested that Wellington's retreat was caused by a shortage 
of supply since excellent military reasons existed for it and indeed no 
59" N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17879 f 46, Kennedy to Ogilvie 31st October 1812. 
60. Ibid No 17909 f 55, Aylmer to Ogilvie 17th November 1812. 
61. Almeida's disposable supplies excluded a permanent stock of at least 150,000 
lbs of flour, which in the event was not touched, so by drawing upon these supplies 
its role as a forward depot could have been maintained a while lon pr if necessary. 
62. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17936, St Remy to Ogilvie 22nd November 1812. 
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shortage appears to have existed before the date when the retreat was made. 
Concern for commissariat matters can be detected in some of the larger 
decisions of the campaign. Wellington was for a while undecided whether, 
after his capture of the frontier fortresses, he should undertake the 
re-conquest of Andalucia or an advance into Castille, and it cannot be 
entirely coincidental that his ultimate choice was for the operation on the 
Douro, far closer to his nearest river depots than an attack upon Seville 
would have been. Similarly after the fall of Madrid, the choice between 
opening further operations against the main French armies to the south or 
marching on Burgos must have been heavily weighted in favour of the latter, 
since Burgos was not much further from his border depots than Madrid, while 
any advance beyond the Tagus would both have extended the army's supply line 
and carried it into thinly populated territory. It is possible too that the 
difficulty already noticed in getting supplies forward from Salamanca at the 
end of October was a factor in Wellington's decision to unite his forces 
behind the Tormes rather than further forward near Arevalo as he had initially 
preferred. On the other hand it should be remembered that the advance 
initially was undertaken in defiance of calculation, with optimistic trust 
in the power of the locality to provide and credit to procure, so that any 
attempt to explain the course of events either as being dictated by 
considerations of supply or as a triumph of prior organisation would be 
unsuccessful. Equally nothing can be stated with certainty about the 
speculative possibility that supposes Wellington, either from the capture of 
Burgos or from a successful battle in Castille late in the year, to have been 
under no necessity to abandon the country between Portugal and the Douro or 
even Madrid itself. Could the army have been sustained during the winter 
in Spain? Impossible to tell, but it is not pushing speculation too far to 
say that, if so, the continued expense and wear and tear on transport in so 
doing would surely have precluded any great effort in the following year. 
It is to that effort that we now turn. 
In contrast to the attitude in 1812, the campaign of 1813 was carefully 
prepared on the commissariat side, and this is discernible from the 
arrangements even before the army came into range of supplies from the north 
Spanish coastline. The initial march of the main army was prepared by the 
establishment at Miranda and Mirandela of depots from which the troops drew 
three days rations as they passed through towards Spain. The advance to 
Vitoria, like the marches of summer 1812, was chiefly supplied from the 
country. "During our movements, " wrote Graham, "our troops depended on 
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the country for provisions. The villages procured us bread in plenty and 
we had brought live bullocks on with us from Portugal; many hundreds 
however died on the way. Rum was brought by mules along with us, but of this 
we required little, as the country produced excellent wine... Our horses fared 
the worst, as we could not bring hay and corn with us. These were obliged 
to live upon the barley oats & wheat, all green in the ear, which we found 
in the fields" 
63. 
Head at the 3rd division relates a similar experience 
64 
and the perusal of A. C. G. Strachan's cash book for the period of the advance 
shows, from the volume of payments for supplies, that the cavalry lived in 
the same style 
65. 
Nonetheless there were important differences between this 
march and the movements of 1812. For one thing, the reserve supply was no 
longer provided by the coming and going of mules between the divisions and 
the frontier depots, but provided on mules and carts which followed the army 
like a moving depot. On this occasion too; it not being intended that the 
army should retire again after moving forward, depots once passed were drawn 
forward as best could be managed. Thus the stores at Miranda and Braganza 
after the divisions had left were carted on during June to Alcanizes and thence 
to Palercia where a major bakery for biscuit was established66. These 
provisions, many of which were obtained ©riginally in the locality of the 
depot which despatched them forward, were of course well in rear of the army. 
The main bulk of the supplies from Portugal were arriving at Toro and Paleihcia 
at the end of June and for most of July, at which time the main army was 
already settling into positions in the Pyrenees, and the Braganza and Alcanizes 
depots were not finally broken up until the last days of July. The convoys 
following the army were however only intended as an eventual reserve and not 
to provide daily consumption, so the pace of the advance did not need to be 
accommodated to them. 
The other important difference between the method of supply used in 1813 
and that of 1812 was in respect of payments. The army's financial state was 
more healthy in 1813, and not only had a good many of the old debts of 1812 
- been paid off before the new campaign began but it also provbd possible 
to maintain credit better by paying at an earlier date for supplies received 
63. Graham p 53- 
64. Head pp 283-7. 
65. P. R. O. W. O. 62/18. Cash book of Assistant Commissary-General Strachan. 
66. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 16930 ff 122 & 126. Kennedy to Ogilvie, 11th and 3rd 
June respectively, 1813. 
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from the country. It seems likely, though it cannot be demonstrated for 
certain, that the field commissaries had more money in June and July 1813 
and so had to issue fewer drafts than in 1812. Both Graham and Larpent 
mention the fact that gold was paid for supplies bought along the line of 
march 
67, 
and a commissary accompanying the 16th Light Dragoons paid ready 
money for some barley at Tavara already collected in response to a 
requuition, which suggests that cash was not in such short supply as usua168. 
It was not only the greater availability of cash however which helped in 
prolonging the British army's credit. Strachan's cash book shows that he 
received 891 dollars in cash during July, but this represented a mere 6jß 
of his total exnenditure in the month. More significant than any increased 
volume of cash payments was Ogilvie's mission of August to pay the army's 
debts in the neighbourhood of Villa Caya and Medina de Pomar. The drafts 
he honoured dated from June and appear from the quantities stated to 
represent a great part of what the army must have purchased in the region69. 
T%eir payment close to the army and at such an early date after their issue 
wap obviously intended to increase confidence in the department's ability 
to pay, thereby both : 'educing the discount obtained by speculators in the 
army's debts and encouraging contractors and inhabitants to provide their 
supplies to the commissariat at reasonable prices. To what extent this 
measure achieved these results it is impossible to tell. Such prompt 
settlement could not subsequently be kept up, and by early 1814 the army 
was experiencing another liquidity crisis though of shorter duration than 
that of 1812. The attempt nonetheless demonstrates the intention to 
improve upon the methods of the previous year and the priority given to 
payments for supplies bought locally over those for transport, since the 
mule owners arpear to have benefited not at all after the start of operations, 
from the easing of the financial situation. 
The next important novelty among the commissariat arrangements for 1813 
was of course the directing of sea-borne supplies to the north Spanish coast. 
The earliest such shipments arrived at Santander in the first week of July, 
67. Graham p 53 and Larpent I, Castrogoes 12th June 1813- 
68. N. L. S. Acc 4370 Ido 17907 f 180, Johnstone to Ogilvie 27th May 1813. 
69. Ibid Io 17915 f 54. The amounts of meat and alcohol paid for are trivial 
but the quantities of bread (mostly as wheat) and green forage amount to about 
35,000 and 5,000 rations per day respectively. 
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though mules from the army had been despatched to that place and loaded 
there with flour locally acquired as early as June 25th70. Thereafter the 
supplies arrived. very rapidly and by the 17th July, Ogilvie reported that 
over three weeks' bread rations for 60,000 men had been accumulated at 
Santander at Passages or at sea between the two71o Most of the sea-borne 
supplies arriving at Santander were directed on by sea to Passages or Bilbao, 
but there also existed a land route through Villa Caya to Vitoria and Tolosa, 
used by about one ration in every ten. At Villa Caya this route coincided 
with that followed by the supplies carted forward from Portugal. These, 
whether from the old depots of Portugal north of the Douro or from the direction 
of Salamanca, generally passed through Palencia, thence north to Reinosa and 
then across the mountains to Villa Caya. Both Reinosa and Villa Caya were 
substantial depots, each of which was intended to hold a reserve of a quarter 
of a million biscuit rations72. This route is curious in that it avoids the 
main road through Burgos to the Pyrenees, selecting instead a longer way round 
over more mountainous country in the region of Reinosa. The intention cannot 
have been to by-pass Burgos, since the French destruction @, nd evacuation of 
the place was known eight days before Kennedy issued the order establishing 
the Reinosa depot. The most likely conclusion its that Wellington proposed, 
if driven away from San Sebastian and Pamplona, to retreat into the mountains 
near Santander rather than back into Portugal which would have meant abandoning 
his new sea communication. The land route from Portugal was only important 
during the transitional period of July and August73 when the depots formed to 
assist the early advance were being broken up and sent forward, and even 
during this period it was much less important than the routes by sea where 
ships from Lisbon, Oporto, Cork, Liverpool and London all converged upon 
Santander and Passages. About one sixth of the bread supply reaching the 
army in these months came overland, although more served to establish the 
reserve quantities already mentioned. Provisions were collected by the 
divisional mules directly from Passages and Tolosa, or from Villa Caya and 
Bilbao in the case of the cavalry quartered in the Ebro valley for greater 
70. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 16930 f 86, Ogilvie to Kennedy 25th June 18130 A small 
vessel carrying 200 barrels of floor had arrived. from Cadiz before tais date. 
71. Ibid No 17936 f 104, Ogilvie to Herries 17th July 1013- 
72. Ibid No 17955 f 56. The Commissariat Car Train under Mr Laidley operated 
on the road between Palencia and Reinosa. 
73. It was used by cattle throughot't the war, but not much by other supplies 
after August. 
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ease of foraging, and in this new depot system the army was well established 
by the middle of July, after barely seven weeks of more improvised methods 
since leaving Portugal. 
From autumn 1813 until the end of the war, the army depended upon the 
coast for the bulk of its supplies of bread and corn. These were provided 
by the mule brigades proceeding on their round trips to the coastal depots, 
Shortfalls in the supply, even of bread, nonetheless occurred, partly from 
delays in sending forward provisions from Passages and Santatider to the new 
port depots of St. Jean de Luz, Socoa and Renteria, and partly because it was 
still difficult to provide the divisions with enough mules to keep up the 
supply. In December a shortage of corn at the depots caused difficulty 
keeping the mules fed and led to delays in their journeying. Cuming at the 
7th division complained that one of his mule brigades waited twenty two days 
for corn at Passages and had in the end to be content with biscuit after 
wasting so much time better spent on the march74. Even when such delays were 
not occasioned many divisions could not keep up their own supply, as Head 
pointed out on December 20th saying that he had enough mules to carry five 
days provisions but that they had a six day round trip to their depots, with 
the result that either the mules' forage or the bread supply to the 3rd division 
When the division moved from Itza, tzu to Ha. sparren, it had to fall short75. 
acquired a few more animals but the round trip now lasted eight days and the 
mule brigades were even less able to keep up the full supply. The 4th 
division near Ustaritz and the 6th and 7th divisions were both also short of 
the requisite number of mules in January and February76. One recourse of 
the field commissary with insufficient transport (apart from the temporary 
expedient of borrowing from his colleagues) was to a reserve at Headquarters 
which appears to have held limited quantities of bread and meat in this period, 
but this could only occasionally be drawn upon. Despite help from Head- 
quarters, which might arrive directly or via the coordinating commissary for 
the centre divisions, the 3rd division was reduced to half rations of biscuit 
in late December and early January and this must have been the case with 
other units also, whose transport resources were no better, particularly those 
troops on the right of the line, furthest from the sea. 
74. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17955, Cuming to Ogilvie 21st December 18130 
75. Ibid No 17875 f 110, Head to Ogilvie 20th December 1813- 
76. Statements of mule strengths can be found in N. A. I. Ace 7512-124, N. L. S. 
Acc 4370 No 17879 f 25 seq. and No 17915 f7 seq. 
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The activities of contractors, both local like the N. aire of Hasparren 
and more frequently Spanish or Portuguese employing their own means of 
transport to bring supplies forward to the army, covered the bulk of the 
deficiencies in the supply provided from the coast. Although some of the 
hitches in the coastal supply were inevitable being caused by bad weather, 
most of the problems arose from shortage of transport and this in turn 
resulted from shortage of money. In the agreement of 22nd January 1814 
with the mule owners the best that could be promised. was that occasional 
part payments in Treasury Bills would be made in the new year and drafts 
regularly provided at the end of every month77. Although many suppliers 
were also kept waiting for their money78, it appears that priority was given 
to payments for supplies over payments for transport. When cash was short, 
as it was at the turn of the year, deficiencies produced by transport shortage 
had to be made up by purchases from contractors since less would be provided 
directly from the locality on credit. When cash became slightly more 
plentiful, as in February and March of 1814, every effort was made to break 
away from middlemen and buy the resources of the neighbourhood. The active 
operations of the last two months of the war were supported in the same way 
as those of the previous two years had been, partly from the locality direct 
(with the aid of captured magazi, aes which provided large quantities of forage) 
and partly by the attenuated mule brigades, which drew upon St. Jean de Luz 
but also upon an especially assembled depot at Ustari_tz79 and a captured 
magazine a. t Mont de Marsan. The lull in Wellington's operations until mid- 
February of 1814 may no doubt be partly explained by the poor winter weather, 
but must also have owed something to the shortage of ready money so important 
initially in obtaining the confidence of the locals. Certainly the renewal 
of the offensive coincided with a slight easing of the financial situation, 
noticed by Larpent, and signalled by an order from Wellington fixing the rate 
77. The capatazes ]However were to be paid regularly in coin. There was little 
market for Treasury Bills in the Pyrenees. See Larpent II p 137 and N. L. S. 
Acc 4370 No 178.76 f 52. 
78. When Ogilvie wrote to Dalrymple about a man who was, in desperation, 
demanding payment in bullock hides, the Commissary-General replied "I have a 
number of applicants of this description, whom I cannot satisfy... " N. L. S. 
Ace 4370 No 16930 Ogilvie to Dalrymple, 19th January 1814- 
79- A measure of the difficulty of supplying the troops on the Nive is that 
the Ustaritz depot, intended to be a reserve against the army's advance, had to 
be used to augment the day to day consumption of the centre divisions in 
January and February. 
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at which currency should pass in transactions80. The fact that the war 
ended in April 1814 conceals the dangerous cross-roads whither two years 
of regular field operations had brought the army. The dwindling mule 
brigades needed the expense of large sums to restore them to the size and 
efficiency of 1812, and yet the appropriation of money to this service would 
have hampered the local collection of supplies and tied the army down to its 
depots on the coast. On the other hand to allow the mule transport to run 
down was to place an entire dependence upon the country and court the 
unpopularity that extensive requisitions were bound to produce. Wellington's 
operations after the battle of Vitoria have always been regarded as cautious 
on the level of strategy, yet from the commissariat viewpoint they appear 
boldly calculated upon the assumption that the war would end before the 
winter of 1814 by which time a fresh accumulation of debt81, even greater 
than that of winter 1812 must again have threatened the collapse of credit 
and the bankruptcy of the army, this time upon hostile soil. 
80. Larpent II pp 193/4 and N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17928 f 40, James Laidley to 
Ogilvie, 2nd February 1814. 
81. As from the 22nd January 1814, the army's overall debt was no longer 
diminishing as a result of operations at Lisbon. See P. R. O. W. 0.57/44, Kennedy 
to Herries 5th May 1814. 
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CHAPTER VII : The Limitations of Wellington's System of Commissariat and 
its Effect Upon Strategy. 
It is intended in this chapter to trace further the relationship between 
commissariat affairs and strategy along the lines stated in chapter I and 
also to draw conclusions about the relative merits of the British and 
French systems. rirst it may be as well to dispose of one final. question 
disputed in the Peninsular literature, that of the com)etence or otherwise 
of the commissariat officers in the exercise of their duties. 
1 
While 
examples of dishonesty, negligence and stupidity have been cited in previous 
pages it should be apparent that in general the commissaries did a difficult 
and tiring duty with great success. The ammunition most often used against 
the department in this regard is the alleged dissatisfaction of General 
officers, and Wellington in particular, with the way the commissaries 
discharged their duties, but it must be pointed out that relations between 
the commissariat and the Generals were not so had as is sometimes implied. 
Generals, particularly those commanding cavalry, were of course critical on 
occasion and Wellington's grumbles are common knowledge (though his complaints 
about the commi: sariaat seem to me no worse than his similar generalised 
animadversions upon other categories of person: the regimental officers 
for example as far as administration and 'interior economy' were concerned, 
or the moral qualities of the rank and file) but not only do almost all 
criticisms date from 1809/10 when most commissaries must still. have been 
learning their jobs but some of the complaints reflect more the soldier 
being hard to please than the commissary being culpable. Colonel Le Nesurier 
for example complained when a flock of ewes was issued to his regiment and 
returned half of them to the commissariat as inferior rations to be shared 
equally among the brigade. "I must add, " he explained, "that the flesh of 
Weathers (sic) is not open to the objection urged against ewes but doubtless 
beef is preferable to either as being more nutritious"2. There exists 
besides the complaints a considerable body of complimentary literature. 
Both Dalhousie and Picton took the trouble to write to the Commissary in 
Chief in favour of their divisional commissariesp while Craufurd, after some 
1. See Oman, Wellirgton's Army pp 318/9, for a guarded compliment to the 
commissaries. Ward, op. cit. pp 71/2 is disparaging about the quality of many 
of the department's recruits but does not make this a charge against the 
Peninsular staff. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army 1972 p 110, conclude that "verdicts differ on their zeal and competence". 
2. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17908 f 57, Le Mesurier to Ogilvie, 13th August 1810. 
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irascible moments in 1810, was pronounced to be "much more temperate than 
formerly and very well satisfied with Mr Purcell's exercions(sic)"3. Ogilvie 
was complimented by several generals, notably Stewart, Dalhousie and 
Wellington himself, and O'Meara was praised by General Cooke at Cadiz. 
These examples could be multiplied4, indeed other compliments to commissaries 
have already appeared in the text, and there seems to be little justification 
for the view that the generals habitually regarded their commissaries either 
as inept or as civilian inferiors in a soldier's world. 
It has appeared from the contents of the three chapters preceding number 
VI and dealing successively with the basic elements of the commissariat system 
that little of a rigid law of commissariat practice existed once questions of 
internal organisation and accounting are left behind. All the food supply, 
although the different rations display different degrees of dependence upon 
the various methods, was provided by such a mixture of large scale rear 
purchases, smaller local contracts and local purchases that there may seem 
little regular about it beyond the desire to hold plentiful food in reserve 
and enough food at the front to keep the men supplied for the next few days. 
Some generalisations can however be made regarding the system of supplying 
food. In the first place permanent depots or areas having a regular need to 
supply a limited number of rations very often took advantage of contracts to 
cover this element in the supply. Thus troops in or around Lisbon were supplied 
through a contract with Sampaio made in 1808 by D. C. G. Rawlings and still in 
force in 1813 5. The existence of such a contract to meet the regular needs 
of supply has also been seen at Salamanca during 1812. A further regular 
feature of the supply system was the intake of local provisions at the forward 
depots which were more than a few days' march from the river unloading points. 
Apart from Salamanca in 1812, and Albuquerque during its',, brief existence as a 
depot early in that year, this element in the supply at Portalegre and Almeida 
in 1810 has already been demonstrated and the depots at Mirandela and Alcanizes, 
established to support the advance of spring 1813, also drew in supplies from 
their localities. The relative importance of these sources of supply depended 
upon the whereabouts of the troops. When the divisions were close to the 
3. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17908 f 22. Letter to Ogilvie, 27th May 1810. 
4. Le Marchant's good opinion of Tupper Carey may be of interest as coming 
from a cavalry commarider, and one not inclined to suffer fools gladly. 
H. H. Thoumine, Scientific Soldier, 1968, pp 155/6. 
5- P. R. O. W. 00 57/43, Kennedy to Herries, 13th January 1813. 
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rivers the need for purchases at the forward depots was reduced, and local 
provisions would be obtained by the brigade commissaries without passing 
through the depots at all. Meat, long forage and alcohol were the supplies 
most often _nrocured in this way though, particularly when the unit expected 
to remain stationary for some time, small lo, --al contracts 
for soft bread to 
vary the regular biscuit allowance were not uncommon. The cantonments in the 
Pyrenees in the autumn and winter of 1813/14 present comprehensive examples 
of the units themselves taking over the collecting role of forward depots, 
though since the immediate locality in the mountains was sparsely provided 
with supplies, this business was normally done through contractors or 
middlemen. When the troops were advanced beyond their forward depots these 
became again important buyers of local produce, while if the army was moving 
for several days it would need to find a good many of its provisions along 
its line of march. 
Thus either the forward depots or the units themselves, or both, provided 
a part of the supply, though often only a small part when the troops were 
close to (say within fifty miles of) the up-river depots. This proportion may 
be called'the local supply. The meat ration is exceptional here since it 
did not depend on the transport system for its supply from the rear and since 
a change in its mode of provision took place during the war, with the result 
that between spring 1812 and autumn 1813, campaigning or not, the army received 
its meat mainly from the rear, while at other times the local supply probably 
accounted for over a half of the meat issued. Except under rare circumstances, 
as in the lines of Torres Vedras, when the army was very far withdrawn, part 
of the alcohol supply was locally provided. The local proportion probably 
varied between about a third (Ashworth's brigade's experience in early 1812, 
at a normal distance from the depots and after the arrival of the first large 
rum shipments) and the whole, as in central Spain in 1812, and was doubtless 
on average higher in 1809/11 than afterwards when a more regular spirit supply 
was being imported. Bread and forage were the supplies most extensively 
provided from the rear, with the proviso that green or long forage was almost 
entirely provided locally and bearing in mi. nd that cavalry cantonments had 
always to be withdrawn behind the infantry ones to keep up the forage corn 
supply fron the rear. When , caritonnedý the horses drew their corn mainly from 
the supply line from 1810 onwards, but when in advance (which they were less 
often than the infantry) they could eat locally during summer and autumn or 
go hungry in the other seasons to the extent of three quarters or more of 
their rations. Bread was obtained locally, perhaps to the extent of a third 
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of the supply, or a half decreasing to a third between 1809 and autumn 1811, 
except during exceptional movements 
(like the attempted relief of Badajoz in 
spring 1811) when the proportion must have been greater. Prom late 1811 
onwards the troops, unless far beyond the forward depots, could draw nearly 
all of their bread from the rear supply line6. The limits of this bread. 
supply under active conditions were shown jr chapter VI. The troops at 
Burgos must have had about half of their supply provided from local sources, 
and the army on its advance in 1813 rather more than that. 
Like the food supply, the provision of money also has the appearance of a 
succession of expedients. That cash should be provided either from home or 
by the efforts of British agents overseas was early found to be impossible and 
the Commissary-General instead needed to rely on methods of converting the 
credit of the British Treasury into cash in Portugal. The failure of this 
resource, added to the sums sent from England, to provide enough cash to meet 
the expenditure became evident during 1811, and the growth of commissariat 
indebtedness, assigned upon drafts, was a perpetual embarrassment thereafter, 
since the negotiation of drafts both adversely affected normal money raising 
operations at Lisbon and tended further to depress the department's credit 
in the Peninsula. The credit crisis looming in late 1812 was averted by the 
expedient of the 'half and half' scheme but this change of system was only a 
short term measure since its long term effect was to aggravate the depreciation 
of the drafts. Despite the increase in cash supplies from home in the period 
after autumn 1812 a further crisis must have followed the campaign of 1814 haI 
it rot been for the early conclusion of the war. As it was, the transport 
service was seriously affected by the need to use as much money as was available 
to pay French suppliers and conciliate local opinion, without the favour of 
which the invasion of France would have been impossible. It is therefore 
against the background of worsening credit that the operations of winter and 
spring 1813/14 as well as those of 1812 should be viewed. It will thus be 
seen that Wellington's refusal to provide more than partial supplies to his 
auxiliary Spanish forces was from economic necessity rather than calculation 
or principle and that his decision to let the transport system deteriorate 
rather than accumulate debts for supplies renders more intelligible the wide 
distribution of the army between Bordeaux, Bayonne and Toulouse when military 
arguments might have preferred the concentration of greater force against Soult's 
field army. 
6. The contracts for soft bread already mentioned were more for variety than 
necessity in 1812/13. See N. A. M. 7701-36 A No 55 Department Order of 16th April 
1812. 
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An evolving system is more evident in the area of transport than elsewhere. 
In the course of 1810 there was the institution of the mule transport attached 
to each individual unit, and in 1809 legislative measures which governed the 
requisitioning and hire of carts. Both of these features of the system were 
subject to modification as circumstances changed. We have seen already that 
the cavalry mules were taken in the summer of 1812 for the benefit of the 
infantry divisions and it may be noticed also that while in the lines of 
Torres Vedras all the units appear to have been much reduced in transport 
capacity7, the mules being taken to carry provisions from Lisbon and the 
country south of the Tagus to reserve magazines in rear of the army. In 
general however the trend was to increase the mule transport with the divisions 
between 1810 and 181213, though by late 1813 the number of mules serving the 
troops was diminishing without being made up. The period of increase in the 
mule capacity saw a relative decline in the capacity of the cart transport. 
Before undertaking the operations of 1812 Wellington took steps to arrest this 
decrease, by improving the navigation of the Douro, by ordering the construction 
of new carts and by persuading the Portuguese Regency to issue the Transport 
Regulation of December 1811 which would, he hoped, make it easier to obtain 
carts from the country. The Commissariat Car Train proved useful during 1812, 
but the Regulation was not successful in preventing the diminishing of the 
cart transport in numbers and efficiency alike towards the autumn of the year. 
The effect of this may be seen in the campaign of 1812, when two thirds or more 
of the distance between the army and the river depots had to be traversed by 
the divisional mules and only one third by the country carts. The shifting 
of operations to the Pyrenees introduced an altered arrangement of transport, 
inasmuch as the forward units now sent their mules directly to the coastal depots 
and the cart stage in the journey was entirely omitted. 
8 
Thus not only were 
the mule brigades with which Wellington entered France less efficient than 
those with which he had campaigned in Spain, but what had been a stage in his 
old transport system, albeit a slow and troublesome one, was missing, this 
preventing any movement of depots inland after the army. The only inland depots 
established behind the advance of 1814, excluding captures and those stocked 
entirely with local produce, were at St. Pee and Ustaritz, neither very far 
7. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17886 f 3. 
8. In spite of Frazer's reference to "small four-wheeled carriages drawn by 
little horses yoked like bullocks", (Frazer p 441) it does not appear that much 
cart transport was levied in France, either because little was available or 
because it could not be afforded. 
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from the coast nor very well positioned to support operations beyond Toulouse 
had they proved necessary. The movements of spring 1814 were thus very 
much dependent upon local purchases and on a continuing supply of money to 
9 
enable them to be made. 
The import-: nce to the commissariat of purely local resources has been 
clearly demonstrated. It has been seen successively that local manpower, 
provisions, commercial facilities and means of transnort were all called into 
the service of the British army and that the commissaries, far from being 
merely administrators of a transporting and issuing system, were all required 
to be men of business as well, taking on staff, negotiating transactions 
and dealing with other business concerns. This is an aspect of commissariat 
duty which tends to be concealed behind the phrase 'depot system' so often 
applied to the activity of the Peninsular department. The British did 
indeed use a system of depots, but these were more complicated institutions 
than at first appears. Their obvious role, as intermediate stages where 
such supplies as made that journey halted between the coast and the army, 
was only one of their functions. Besides this they were repositories where 
the army's reserve supplies were held10, they were rationing points for 
detachments and they were centres of the cart transport system, responsible 
for requisitioning, working, supervising and paying vehicles required for 
army service. They were also commercial centres where supplies were bought 
and contracts entered into. This is plain to see at Lisbon and Oporto where 
cash was raised and supplies bought as well9 but is also true of the inland 
depots whose contracting and purchasing activities have already been described. 
This commercial aspect of the commissariat duty is also clear in the activities 
of the field commissaries, all expected to buy and contract locally, while 
the same side of the work performed by the Commissary-General an(l his senior 
co-ordinating subordinates needs no illustration. Viewed in the light of 
this important commercial element in all commissariat duties the speculations 
of Wellington and Stuart in corn to be sold at Lisbon appear less extraordinary. 
D. C. G. O'Meara undertook a very similar venture when he sold flour from Cadiz 
9. Captured magazines, though numerous in March and April 1814, were mostly 
of hay, straw or oats. 
10. Comparatively small provision reserves were held in Portuga_j before 1811. 
From then onwards it was Wellington's policy to maintain three months' consurriptio: 
of bread and forage corn, and this was increased for 1812 to six months in 
consequence of the British Government's decision to prohibit grain exports from 
the United Kingdom. Despatches VIII p 446, Wellington to Bioset, 17th December 
1811. 
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in the needy parts of Murcia during 1812, applying the profit to the support 
of the commissariat at Cartagena11. Here too is the justification for 
another fact which has struck many subsequent observers as bizarre, namely 
that the commissariat was subordinated to no military authority, being a 
Treasury sub-department. For a large scale business and commercial venture 
such an orga. niiation seems not unnatural. Indeed had any effective method 
of training its employees been devised and acted upon, the Treasury might 
have well acquitted itself of its charge, despite the difficulties of dual 
responsibility it inevitably threw up, since it is hard to imagine a commissariat 
controlled by the Horse Guards receiving any useful instruction in finance 
and commercial techniques. 
The other question arising out of what has been said about the commissariat's 
local dependence is regarding the supposed superiority of the British supply 
system over that of the French. If the British themselves 'lived off the 
country' to such an extent, it may be -elt that their commissariat give them 
no advantage over their opponents, who were adept at doing likewise, and 
therefore that the strategical implications of commissariat problems were 
similar for both armies. The difference between the British and French 
methods of supply however did not depend on the proportion of local resources 
each army employed but on the different ways they set'about employing them. 
The British method did not go uncriticised in its own day. Vansitta. rt, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, submitted to the attention of Stuart and 
Wellington a reasoned memorandum which inquired if "it may be worth considering 
whether any useful hint can be derived from the system by which the French 
armies are subsisted, modifying it so as to strip it, as far as possible, of 
its injustice and oppression"12. His idea was to pay magistrates in Bills 
on England for block requisitions which would, he felt, not only lessen the 
demand for cash on the spot but also reduce -prices, since the magistrate 
"would always be able to obtain value (for the Bill) while an Individual 
of the lower class who may take a Bill to a small amount under the present 
system, is often unable to dispose of it at all, or at best at great loss, 
against which he will guard himself by an exorbitant price"130 A suggestion 
of similar practical tendency by Major-General 
. 
Jhittingham, though more 
concerned with military convenience than reducing cost, appears also to have 
11. P. R. O. W. O. 57/41 Ross to Wellesley, 23rd March 1812, and O'Meara to 
Herries, 19th April 1812. 
12. B. M. Add Mss 31236 Memorandum of 2nd September 1812. 
13. Ibid. 
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been brought to Wellinfton's attention, shortly after Vansittart's 
idea. 
Wellington's replies to both these memoranda show his appreciation that 
the true distinction between French and British methods lay deeper than 
the mere administration of requisitions. The French system depended upon 
the direct exercise of military force - "Let any person attend to the detail 
of a French operation of this description he will see the use of the bayonet 
in every part of it"14, as Wellington expressed it in his answer to 
Whittingham - while the British army was denied this sanction, partly 
because its state of discipline was not such as to enable it to behave so 
and remain under control and partly because the French as the 'de facto' 
government in the provinces they occupied could take as a kind of taxation 
while the British army "could not have this resource without depriving its 
Ally of it15. For these practical reasons, quite apart from any consideration 
of whether it were the more effective policy, the British commissariat had 
to rely on transactions for the realisation of local resources. This method 
was more expensive than the French one and was flexibly utilised, as much 
force being diluted among the money as it was felt would not provoke hostility. 
The illustration of this is to be found in the different treatment accorded 
to the inhabitants of the three countries in which the British commissariat 
dealt. As is well known, every effort was made to conciliate the civilians 
of France. "I am always very willing to dispatch people the moment they 
bring their vales - knowing the benefit we reap from it - and am at the same 
time circumspect in the payment and often have paid them rather more than 
their certificates stated to prevent the smallest grumbling Qn their part"16, 
wrote the commissary at Villefranche in February 1814. The policy of 
generosity towards the demands of French inhabitants had earlier led Boyes 
to complain that "the whole of the wood which was out down by the French army 
for Fascines etc appears to have become payeable (sic) upon this division"17. 
In the attempt to conciliate, the British of course benefited from the obvious 
contrast between their behaviour and that of the French, and also from the 
14. Despatches Xp 366, Answer to Whittingham. 
15. B. M. Add Mss 31236 Memorandum of 2nd September 1812, Wellington's marginal 
note. 
16. N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17928 f 40 James Laidley to Ogilvie, 2nd February 1814- 
17- Ibid No 17934 f 73, Boyes to Ogilvie 19th December 1813. Boyes wrote from 
Vieux Mouguerre. Presumably the fascines he mentions were employed opposite 
Hill's troops on the right bank of the hive a week or so before the date of the 
letter. See also Daniel p 344 for generous treatment of the locals in France. 
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pre-existence of regular channels of requisition18. The policy was 
calculated to impress and was evidently successful in this regard during 
the few closing months of the war. 
In both Spain and Portugal less meticulous attention was paid to local 
feeling although the Spaniards were more warily treated than their neighbours. 
"I cannot over the heads of the Spanish authorities knock loudly at the doors 
of the several magistrates, as we do in Portugal"19, explained Ogilvie at 
Salamanca. Comparatively little coercion appears to have been exercised 
in Spain, though two examples of the forcible requisition and retention of 
carts cited in chapter V are in respect of Spaniards. Portugal however was 
another case. The political and economic power exercised by the British 
over the Portuguese government reflected itself not only in enactments, like 
the Transport Regulations mentioned earlier, designed to help the commissariat 
call out local resources but also in the attitude of the commissaries to the 
authorities with whom they had to deal20. Ogilvie's remark already quoted 
is as much a statement of disrespect for the Portuguese authorities as of 
regard for the Spanish. Dalrymple referred to the Governor of Almeida as 
"a willing slave to our service"21. Junior members of the department 
naturally shared the attitude of their superiors. "The violence of the 
Commissariat towards the magistrates", wrote Charles Stuart answering the 
Conde de Funchal, "I am afraid is a true accusation"22. The worst specimen 
of it I have discovered was, curiously, the behaviour of the Portuguese junior 
clerk called Araujo, briefly stationed at Aviz in December 1810. The day 
after his arrival, his demand upon the Juiz de Fora for sacks not being met, 
he assembled all his muleteers and proceeded from house to house appropriating 
sacks, for which, and for taking a store of barley ordered by a Portuguese 
commissary, he was put under arrest by the Juiz and wrote indignantly to 
his superior, "I hope you send up here a guard of 20 men to examine the case 
18. See for example the courteous reply of the juge de paix of Tartas to a 
requition by Marshal Beresford, promising the required supply and politely 
pointing out the regular form of such a requisition for future reference. 
N. L. S. Ace 4370 No 17919 f 104- 
19. Ibid No 17879 f 77, Ogilvie to Kennedy, 1st November 1812. 
20. Feeling in the army too was often to despise the Portuguese for their 
compliance and to admire the Spaniards, while criticising them over numerous 
particularities, for their dignity. 
21. Ibid No 17977, f 74,1)9. lry ple to Ogilvie, 24th September 1812. 
22. B. M. Add Mss 31236 Stuart to Castlereagh, 17th October 1812. 
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and give a good lesson to the Juiz de Fora" 
23. He was particularly 
irritated at having his pistol taken away, since "my pistol is a thing that 
I always use generally when I am in a town like this"24, and continued to 
attend to the duties of his station from his house arrest, succeeding in 
further annoying the Juiz and even falling out with the muleteers over his 
practice of sending a soldier to take a mule whenever he wanted a letter 
delivered. If the complaints from magistrates are to be trusted, behaviour 
of equal violence, though perhaps less flamboyantly executed, was to be 
encountered in many parts of south Portugal in the same period. 
The element of force, implicit in any case in the diplomatic relations 
between Britain and Portugal and sometimes explicit in the behaviour of 
British soldiers and officials25, should not be regarded as an expression 
of irrational feeling. It was, in its general incidence, a rational 
phenomenon born of the experience that force was often effective where 
negotiation failed and that a certain degree of violence could be indulged 
in Portugal without provöking the adverse reaction that might be anticipated 
in Spain. The Araujo incident and the other complaints of December 1810 
already referred to should not be considered without taking into account 
the alarmingly denuded state of the stores at Lisbon, which made it a matter 
of great urgency that large quantities of all kinds of grain be sent in 
from those portions of the country not occupied by the French. On the 
30th November Kennedy had written home expressing the grave need for more 
supplies and it is reasonable to assume that an extra effort to obtain 
provisions was being made inland at the same time. 
26 Similarly the forceful 
measures, discussed in chapter V, taken to produce transport at the end of 
1812 were in response to urgent need. It is also surely significant that 
the greatest volume of complaints and reports of violence shown to the locals 
are in respect of forage, the only major item of supply generally inadequately 
provided by the department's best efforts. Altogether, the numerous 
exceptions especially in dealing with the Portuguese notwithstanding, it may 
be said that the policy of the British commissariat was to depend on 
23. N. L. S. Acc 4370 No 17884, Araujo to Ogilvie, 27th December 1810. 
24. Ibid. Araujo's attitude to his requisitioning duties may be seen in his 
own words. "Tho Juizes do not mind much the letters without some soldiers to 
deliver it as some have told rae that have been (frited? ) great many times and 
thea do not mind much now; in short I can do more for getting transports in 
one day with a cople (sic) of men that (sic) writing a week to the Juiz". 
Ibid f 42: 
25. Violence was of course often used upon the locals by Portuguese commissarief 
as well. 
26. P. R. O. W. O. 57/38, Kennedy to Gordon, 30th November 1810. 
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transactions, force only being resorted to 'xnder the pressure of necessity 
when the attempt to transact had broken down. The French system on the 
other hand relied considerably on contributions in kind, both regulated and 
unregulated, and where they used cash to obtain the goods and services they 
required, the money itself was the product of an enforced contribution rather 
than of a commercial operation. 
The word transaction has been used advisedly thus far to avoid giving 
the impression that all these dealings involved the use of money. A few, 
probably a very few, of them were settled with cash payments on the spot. 
A larger number were settled in cash upon the presentation of the receipt 
or other necessary voucher at Lisbon or Headquarters within the specified 
period of one month. A great many were assigned upon the drafts discussed 
in chapter IV and paid ultimately but only rarely to the original owner of 
the claim, these securities being commonly negotiated at an appropriate 
discount. The transactions involving the largest sumsof money were those 
paid in Treasury Bills where the cash was paid over in London if at all, 
but the merchants holding bills on London might simply draw upon them in 
payment of other dealings and never see the money value of their holding 
at all. The basis of the British transactions system was thus not cash but 
credit. This fact accounts for the inability of the department to dispense 
with the services of middlemen, either in the shape of contractors or of 
speculators in commissariat drafts, since the local owners of supplies and 
transport were not able or prepared to deal on the basis of the extended 
credit that the British had to offer. It was accordingly necessary that 
there should be both a market in which small creditors could discount their 
claims upon the department, and an alternative means whereby their produce 
could reach the commissariat depots. The credit of the department in 
dealing with middlemen was ultimately as good as that of the British Treasury, 
because it was based largely upon its power to issue and sell Treasury Bills 
in unlimited quantities, and little upon the relatively small amounts of 
specie received from England. Chapter IV described the various efforts of 
the commissariat to convert this credit into cash and their partial success, 
sufficient to enable the department to keep an element of competition in their 
dealings with suppliers and on selected occasions to undertake considerable 
local purchases, but never enough to deny the contractors or speculators 
their place in the system. 
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The rival commissariat systems were to a great extent imposed upon the 
armies by wider circumstances. The French could not depend upon credit 
since Napoleonic France was not capable of sustaining by its own wealth the 
Emperor's military commitment of which the Peninsular 'War was only a part. 
The British could not resort to much use of military force for reasons 
already explained. Once adopted, the systems governed the general pattern 
of the war. The French were obliged to deploy their forces over wide areas 
since the armed force upon which they depended for their subsistence needed, 
as the Spaniards did not submit passively to their demands, to be exercised 
in person upon each locality. Force, while often effective in place of 
money to obtain supplies, was of more limited service in the acquiring of 
a transport system. That the British were able to maintain a fairly 
efficient system of transport, at least until the winter of 1813, while 
their opponents were not, is not however wholly a corollary of the transactions 
versus force distinction here being offered. After all, while the mule 
brigades served voluntarily for pay, the bulk of the British cart transport, 
although also paid, served because it was obliged by civil legislation and 
military threats to do so. The French were equally capable of exerting 
such pressure and did press carts and beasts into their service to carry 
ammunition and provisions along with the troops, but they were quite unable 
to convoy supplies from one area into another in the British manner since 
they would, apart from the difficulty of keeping the carters or muleteers at 
their work, have had no means of protecting from the guerrillas so many 
convoys on the march. Perhaps the most important contribution of the Guerra 
de la Independencia to the defeat of the French was by preventing them 
transporting the provisions they could not be prevented from garnering. 
For this reason the French armies, whexarer they had exhausted the provisions 
they carried with them and eaten what they could find on the ground they 
occupied, were always liable to be embarrassed if halted or if the seascn 
were unfavourable. The French commissariat system therefore appears not 
only to have imposed a strategy of dispersal upon their armies but done so 
under circumstances which limited their power to make even temporary strategic 
concentrations of large forces. 
The British, depending on credit, needed only to disperse their agents and 
not their armies in order to obtain local provisions. The credit system 
obliged them to maintain bases upon the coast where, at the major ports, 
trade produced both specie balances that credit could tap and markets where a 
credit on London (such being ultimately the source of all commissariat credit) 
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had commercial value27. Thus the importance to Wellington of his Lisbon 
base was less that it allowed him physical access to imports for supplying 
his army than that it provided him with the means of paying for the goods 
and services, imported or indigenous, that he employed. Transport, in the 
British case like the French, proved the greatest limitation upon the system. 
Operating however on friendly territory Wellington was able to employ 
convoys virtually unprotected to move provisions gathered in one area into 
another, and he was thus enabled, within the practical limitations made clear 
in chapters V and VI, to concentrate or disperse his army at will. The 
advantages of sea and river transport over carriage by land tended to 
reinforce the constraint already imposed by the credit system that a 
communication with the coast be kept up, since the navigeable rivers 
provided transport routes inland from coastal points to which it was often 
worth shipping even supplies not imported originally28. The system by 
which the operations of 1813/14 were supported is a large scale example of 
this practice. The coast therefore, while of importance in the economy 
of the whole Peninsula which imported so much of its food, was of particular 
importance to the British army as a source of monej-, and an area of rapid 
transport, whereas the French could no more have protected regular sea 
communications than they could overland ones, and their methods of raising 
money were as effective inland as on the coast. 
Since chapter VI has demonstrated the paucity of careful advance planning 
for the campaign of 1812 on the commissariat side, a fact somewhat at odds 
with Wellington's familiar reputation for prudence and forethought, it remains 
to be considered what effect commissariat concerns did have on the army's 
operations, beyond the occasional instances discovered in earlier chapters 
and the grand strategy considered above. It is true that the British system 
was always flexible, allowing some kind of an operation to be mounted, 
provided the precautions had been taken of filling the forward depots and 
bringing the mule brigades up to strength, and the gaps in the supply to be 
filled from local sources. It is not true however that it could meet all 
demands or that it remained unaffected by changing strategical conditions. 
27. The. sums of money realised by the sale of Treasury Bills were greatest at 
large ports like Lisbon or Cadiz. Smaller sums were raised at Corunna, Oporto, 
Gibraltar and many South Spanish ports. The only inland centre where their sale 
was attempted was Madrid, with disappointing results. P. R. O. W. U. 57/59 
Harrison to Herries, 29th September 1812. 
28. The shipping of supplies from Lisbon to the Mondego in March 1811 for 
example. 
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In fact between 1809 and 1814 there arose two British commissariat systems, 
each adapted to different strategic necessities. The first prevailed from 
late 1809 until 1812. It was born of the lessons of Oporto and Talavera, 
that casual supply arrangements could not be relied upon under campaigning 
conditions and in particular that transport was the key to keeping a 
concentrated army provisioned, and it was characterised by the transport 
organisation that attached mules in increasing numbers to individual units 
and employed carts behind the army to ferry provisions from all sides to the 
few points to which the army's mule brigades were sent to make the collection. 
The combination of this transport network and the various methods of supply 
outlined in chapter III proved capable of supporting the army inland in 
Portugal during 1810, a strategic juncture which in any case demanded a 
defensive posture on the part of the allies, and capable also of restoring 
the army to the borders of the country during 1811. When the strategic 
situation turned in the allies' favour, the system broke down. Despite 
the presence of large supply stocks in Portugal, the transport network proved 
incapable of moving them forward into Spain fast enough for the consumption 
of the army, itself much enlarged since 1810, and the resulting purchases 
of local supplies, besides the extra cost of attempts to extend the transport 
system, proved too expensive for the commissariat credit apparatus. If 
Wellin`ton was to take the offensive, a system was required which would 
support his troops in Spain not simply as raiders, or even for the duration 
of another summer campaign, but as permanent occupiers of the country. 
The experience of 1812 demonstrated that to extend into Spain the system 
hitherto found adequate for the defence of Portugal and the maintenance of 
a concentrated army near the Spanish border, involved prohibitive expense for 
such large numbers as were necessary to defeat the French. While an advance 
to Vitoria in spring and summer presented few difficulties, the maintenance 
of the army later in the year on the ground won could only have been achieved 
by depending further on purchases and the activities of contractors, less the 
one sixth of the bread supply noted in chapter VI to have, in fact, arrived 
overland at the army in July and August 1813, and this would have cost at 
least as much as the previous campaign from which large debts were still 
outstanding. The best way to avoid this expense was to use some of the 
large reserve stocks held in Portugal, principally at Lisbon, augmented by 
any supplies which could be purchased with Treasury Bills, a mode of payment 
costing nothing in the Peninsula but rarely possible outside a trading port. 
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If however the provisions were advanced overland into Spain, even supposing 
it physically possible, which from the performance of the transport system 
in 1812 appeared unlikely, the transport expenditure would cancel the saving 
on supplies and the pace would be so slow that two campaigns or mo: ^e would 
be needed to reach the Pyrenees. The solution of shipping the supplies to 
Santander and beyond was both. quick and cheap since the transport cost could 
be met in England. In the event unexpected delays in the shipping, brought 
about mainly by the danger from American privateers and the shortage of 
British naval units along the north Spanish coast, retarded the arrival of 
the reserve stocks and might have proved serious had. it been necessary to 
send round to Santander further supplies bought in Lisbon with Treasury Bills 
29 
In Jane however the opening of the Baltic made it possible once more to supply 
grain from the United Kingdom, and from July onwards the flow of supplies from 
Britain both removed the army's dependence (for provisions) on the sea route 
to Lisbon and contributed towards reducing expenditure in the Peninsula, a 
"considerable public economy"30, as Herries gravely remarked. Thus did a 
disaster for Napoleon at one end of Europe contribute to his defeat at the 
other, and thus was Wellington's attempt to economise favoured by external 
events. 
The new commissariat system of supplying by sea the forward bases31 and 
having the mule brigades fetch provisions thence to the divisions was 
successful in maintaining the army in the Pyrenees at less expense than the 
supply had demanded in 1812. The combined effects of winter and mountainous 
roads prevented the mules providing a complete supply from the rear and 
contractors were needed to supplement their efforts, but at least what was 
supplied from the rear had usually cost the Peninsular department nothing, 
and the absence of the river and cart transport stages also served to save 
money. The same supply apparatus however, although extended along the coast 
to St. Jean de Luz and ultimately to Bordeaux, proved less well adapted to 
the invasion of France undertaken in the closing months of the war. Moving 
away from the coastal depots threw upon the commissariat the expense of 
29. It did prove possible to buy some supplies with Bills at Santander. 
Ogil-vie spent £2,543 in , his way between the 7th July and the 18th August 1813. 
N, L. S. Ace 4370 No 17877 f 134- 
30- P. R. O. W. O. 58/134, Herries to Kennedy, 18th June 1813- 
31- Some of the supply to these forward bases was still obtained by trans- 
actions on the spot. See Supplementary Despatches VIII p 531 Bathurst to 
Wellington, 21st April 1814, for trade on private account at St. Jean de Luz. 
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increased local purchases which it was felt particularly desirable to settle 
promptly thereby conciliating the local population. It is hard to see how 
any extended operations in France could have been carried on without the 
re-establishment of a transport system capable of providing at least the 
basic supplies of bread and corn at a distance i'eater than three or four 
days' march from the coast and without an increased supply of money to pay 
both for the extra transport and for some of the arrears of that currently 
employed. Both a money supply and a transport organisation had had to be 
provided when Wellington first arrived in Portugal and had been arranged 
with reasonable success between 1809 and 1811. The army in 1814 was 
however larger than previously, it was setting out from a position of 
indebtedness immense in comparison with the few liabilities left behind 
by Moore's campaign and the events of 1808 and the operations were this time 
on potentially hostile soil where no common enemy or government at least in 
principle compliant would help the army to obtain co-operation from the 
people if by its actions they were estranged. The same arrangement that 
had permitted the defence of Portugal would not have proved feasible on 
this new occasion. To render inland marches by the allies possible the 
French inhabitants and authorities must have been prepared to extend to the 
British commissariat the credit and compliance they had enjoyed in the other 
areas of the war and without which they could never have advanced from the 
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